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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
“Strange, isn’t it? Each man’s life touches so many other lives. And when he isn’t 
around, he leaves an awful hole, doesn’t he?” 
      —It’s a Wonderful Life 
      
 
So says a knowing Clarence to a bewildered George Bailey in Frank Capra’s It’s a 
Wonderful Life (1946). The familiar spin on Dickens’ A Christmas Carol follows the story of 
George (Jimmy Stewart), a husband and father who begins to question the choices he’s made 
throughout his adulthood. Frustrated with his current financial, professional, and personal 
predicament—and feeling awfully sorry for himself—a shot-reserve-shot sequence juxtaposes 
shots of a distraught, inebriated George contemplating jumping off of a bridge and committing 
suicide with shots of the icy river below. Before George jumps—or doesn’t—we are confronted 
by the snowy, bleeding visage of George: the selfless, well-meaning friend and family man who 
has done immeasurable good for those in his community of Bedford Falls. After having 
witnessed George’s transformation from an ambitious young man to an embittered and frustrated 
middle-aged one, the film frames George in the bridge scene both narratively and cinematically 
almost as a martyr—but just almost. It’s a Wonderful Life takes a hard line against suicide; 
George can only be a living martyr, not one who died by his own hand. George is saved, 
however, by a jump not to end his own life, but one to save that of another: the angel-in-training 
Clarence. Clarence, who has been sent from on high to help George realize the value of his life, 
does exactly that by indulging George in a type of abortion fantasy: what would the world be like 
had George Bailey never been born?  
 The answer, in short, is this: much, much worse. “You’ve been given a great gift, George: 
a chance to see what the world would be like without you,” explains the patient Clarence as we 
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cut to a medium shot of George alone, shaking his head in disbelief—one of many such shots 
during the abortion fantasy portion of the film that underscore the isolation and remorse George 
feels as he is emotionally (and sometimes physically) pummeled by the ill effects of his 
imaginative self-abortion. George learns that had he never been born, his brother drowned as a 
child; old Mr. Gower, the druggist, spent 20 years in prison for poisoning a child; his Uncle Billy 
lost the family business and went mad; and—perhaps worst of all!—Mary, his wife, became a 
stereotypical spinster librarian. This is all simply too much for George, who desperately prays for 
an end to his abortion fantasy-turned-nightmare: in a revision of the earlier attempted suicide 
scene, George returns to the bridge, this time in a tearful pose of prayer and supplication, 
begging, “Please, God, let me live again!” 
Capra’s holiday classic may seem the least likely of places to look for reproductive rights 
politics, but as I argue, this film serves as a keen example of the kind of conservative pro-life 
rhetoric and ideology found in Hollywood’s golden era. Although abortion is never mentioned, 
of course, the moralizing message of George’s story comes through loud and clear—all life is 
precious, and it would do the world great harm to prevent a potential boon to society like George 
Bailey from being a part of it.   
 Just two years later, an imitation of It’s a Wonderful Life treats the pro-life message much 
less artistically and much more obviously. What was suggested only metaphorically in It’s a 
Wonderful Life is unmistakably implied—although, under the Production Code, not explicitly 
stated—in Good Sam. Leo McCarey’s Good Sam (1948) stars Gary Cooper as Sam Clayton, the 
George Bailey-esque patriarch whose generosity lands his family in financial trouble at 
Christmastime. Sam just can’t resist helping when he learns that a young couple he knows, the 
Adamses, are considering abortion because they cannot afford the cost of raising a child. 
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Appalled at the thought of abortion, Sam loans the Adamses money that was meant for the 
Clayton family’s very necessary mortgage payment. This gesture outrages his wife, Lu (Ann 
Sheridan), who chides Sam for prioritizing the Adamses’ situation over potential foreclosure 
upon the Clayton home: “Don’t throw their baby in my face! What’s the baby going to do? Sell 
papers and pay us back?” Lu is the sensible one here—or so she thinks—with her opinion that 
providing for her own family takes precedence over providing for another’s. Lu does not seem to 
have a problem with Mrs. Adams having an abortion for financial reasons.  
 Interestingly—although perhaps expectedly—Sam, like George Bailey, is the pro-life 
voice in this film. Later on, Sam again attempts to explain his loan decision to Lu: “It seemed so 
right to tell them they must have the baby. And they’d regret it the rest of their lives if the didn’t. 
Years later, they’d find themselves saying, ‘he’d be sixteen now…’. Well, that’s about it. The 
house seemed awfully unimportant at that moment.” Like George, the misunderstood and 
underappreciated Sam decides to cope by getting drunk at a local bar; unlike George, it’s not 
Sam who has the suicidal abortion fantasy—at least, not for himself. Sam, by contrast, is more 
concerned with saving, so to speak, the Adamses’ fetus. Through imagining the Adamses’ bleak 
and guilt-ridden post-abortion future, Sam emphasizes not only the importance of the as-yet-
unborn Adams baby itself, but he also emphasizes what he sees as the permanent and inevitable 
void left by said as-yet-unborn baby should the Adamses choose abortion. By some kind of 
generic gendered logic, one might anticipate that Lu would be the one to object to Mrs. Adams’ 
consideration of abortion because she herself is a woman and a mother. Instead—as we will see 
throughout this project—women like Lu are the ones who understand a woman’s need for 
reproductive agency, while men like Sam attempt to curtail, if not squash, said agency under the 
rationale of morality. The film obviously sides with Sam: in the end, he gets a loan for the house, 
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a promotion at work, and a namesake in the Adamses’ newborn baby boy. While never explicitly 
using the word “abortion,” Good Sam heavily implies through its innuendo-laden dialogue that 
abortion is exactly what it is dealing with—and it does not support abortion as an option, even 
for a couple who cannot financially support a child. 
  
*** 
 
In this project, I trace the larger trajectory of how reproductive rights are treated, 
addressed, and represented in the visual and verbal rhetorics of Hollywood film from the 
Progressive era to the mid-century. Over the course of this 37-year span, I observe a distinct shift 
in the visual and verbal rhetorics of choice in film. In the 1910s, there is a premium placed upon 
education, both scientific and moral, as a component of narrative film after the Mutual v. Ohio 
decision in 1915. These films present ambiguous messages about birth control and abortion; I 
argue that this ambiguity ultimately emphasizes a woman’s right to choose as a result of a 
woman’s right to proper and legitimate contraceptive education. The science films of the 1920s, 
while not Hollywood narrative films, nonetheless demonstrate the burgeoning influence of the 
classical Hollywood narrative form even upon media as remote as science films. The abortion 
exploitation films of the 1930s illustrate a move away from choice while ostensibly not 
abandoning it completely. These films bear the trappings of the educational, but the hyperbolic 
and exploitative content that defines their contradictory narratives far eclipses any semblance of 
the educational. By the 1940s, the last vestiges of the scientifically educational—the last vestiges 
of reproductive choice—have been replaced completely by the prescribed moral master narrative 
of the dutiful, unquestioning, and normative wife and mother, as found in the abortion 
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melodrama. Anything and anyone that so much as suggests contraception or abortion is vilified 
and dismissed.   
 There are three key approaches that inform my study; the first two are historical while the 
last is theoretical. Historically, I draw heavily upon Leslie Reagan’s notion of prescribed versus 
popular morality as a crucial means of understanding a.) the discrepancies and ambiguities 
inherent to the contraception/abortion film, and b.) the shift over the course of the thirty-seven-
year span of my project that I observe from narrative films with morally and scientifically 
didactic purposes to films that completely disavow even the semblance of a educational purpose. 
From the historical perspective of censorship, Annette Kuhn privileges the concept of regulation 
over censorship as a more accurate description of the back-and-forth act of interpreting and 
passing films, as it allows for greater input and agency on the part of the filmmaker within the 
process of censorship. Lastly, my project also has a theoretical basis in the work of Laura 
Mulvey and Mary Ann Doane from which I am able to reclaim a place for female reproductive 
agency within film.  
 
Popular and Prescribed Morality in Reproductive Rights History 
 With this section, I aim to look at and establish a background for one historical context 
that I feel centrally informs the films I examine throughout this study: abortion practice in the 
interwar United States. I will begin with abortion history in order to show how its attendant 
ambiguities (moral and legal) could easily seep into and overlap with those ambiguities found, to 
various degrees, in the films analyzed in my project. Furthermore, understanding the ambiguous 
nature of abortion in early twentieth century America—the discrepancy between law, popular 
representations (such as those in the films I discuss) of abortion, prescribed morality, and popular 
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morality—is critical to an understanding of how the Production Code may be applied to the 
abortion crime films, as well as to how the films function within the context of crime films. 
 Leslie J. Reagan, historian of women and public health, emphasizes several key points 
regarding the history of abortion in the twentieth century United States that I find particularly 
salient for my discussion here. In her study, When Abortion Was a Crime, which examines the 
history of illegal abortions in the U.S. leading up to the Supreme Court’s 1973 Roe v. Wade 
decision, she begins by asserting that her study “challenges the dichotomy between public and 
private” in a way that moves beyond turn-of-the-century notions that the public sphere was the 
domain of men and the domestic sphere the domain of women: “[My book] looks more toward 
the private sphere and finds interaction between what have been assumed to be two distinct 
spheres. The relationship between public and private is dynamic; it is not just that the public has 
invaded private life or that excluded, politically unrecognized groups, including women, have 
found ways to move into public life. Rather…the private invaded the public” (Reagan 2). Reagan 
proceeds, through using Chicago as a localized case study as well as analyzing national policy 
and trends, to demonstrate the many ways in which, in practical terms, abortion was neither as 
taboo nor as indicative of moral degeneracy as we would typically historically think based upon 
stories and representations of it in popular media, and this is all in spite of its illegal status.    
 Reagan breaks the recent history of abortion into 4 periods, running from 1880 to the late 
1990s, when her study was published. The first period, 1880-1930, is one where “abortion was 
widely accepted and was practiced in women’s homes and in the offices of physicians and 
midwives…A crackdown on abortion occurred between 1890 and 1920 as specialists in 
obstetrics renewed the earlier campaign against abortion, and the medical profession was drawn 
into the state’s enforcement system” (Reagan 14-15). We will see some evidence in 
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representations of abortion from the films in Chapter 2, such as Where Are My Children?, that  
illustrates this point; Mrs. Walton, her friends, and eventually her maid’s daughter, Lillian (with 
fatal results), visit Dr. Malfit in his office, which appears to be in a house. Additionally, 
reformers’ calls for better regulation and health standards beginning in the mid-1800s all but 
necessitated some manner of state intervention in the medical practice, and those anti-abortion 
groups and protesters, notably Dr. Horatio R. Storer, used these moves for reform to outlaw—
and ideally do away with—abortion.1 Between 1860 and 1880, America saw innovations in 
changing laws that importantly “eliminated the common-law idea of quickening2 and prohibited 
abortion at any point in pregnancy” (Reagan 13). These moves not only legally took away a 
woman’s right to choose whether or not to have an abortion, as indicated by the latter stipulation, 
but they also devalued a pregnant woman’s personal experience with her pregnancy, as indicated 
by the first stipulation. Additionally, this is the time period during which the Comstock Laws—
the laws that would later precipitate reproductive rights pioneer Margaret Sanger’s and Lois 
Weber’s fictional Dr. Homer’s stints in jail—came in into effect, for “[t]he ‘Comstock Law’ 
passed in 1873 included abortion and birth control in federal antiobscenity legislation; states and 
municipalities passed similar ordinances” (Reagan 13).3  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 As Reagan notes, the ideology behind Storer’s campaign was based upon a racist brand of 
eugenics not completely different from that espoused and promoted by Lothrop Stoddard in 
1920; however, Storer’s publication, Why Not? A Book For Every Woman, appeared decades 
earlier in 1868. Basically, Storer feared, as Stoddard phrased it in his own book, “The Rising 
Tide of Color”; he wondered whether the then-sparsely-populated areas of the United States 
would “‘be filled by our own [white] children or by those of aliens?”’ (Qtd. in Reagan 11).  
 
2 Quickening is a concept that has been understood for centuries as the point at which a pregnant 
woman can feel her fetus move within her womb. This definition of understanding a pregnancy 
as such is, it is worth noting, “grounded in the female experience of their own bodies” (Reagan 
8).  	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 Given that a woman could be punished in some manner (fined, jailed) for disseminating 
information related to birth control or abortion—let alone actually going through with an 
abortion—it comes as no shock that, as Reagan aptly puts it, “[t]he antiabortion campaign was 
antifeminist at its core” (Reagan 11). As a movement, it aimed—and aims—to undermine and 
outlaw a woman’s right to make personal choices about her own body that would have 
significant bearing upon her own life, and this sense of a right to choice is not just a construction 
of the post-WWII protest era:  
In their conversations and behavior women expressed their sense that abortion 
was morally acceptable, and through their actions, they asserted a ‘right’ to make 
moral decisions about reproduction and to use abortion. They did not use the 
language of civil rights to express their views, but simply assumed that the 
decision to avoid childbearing, through the use of contraceptives and abortion, 
was theirs to make. (Reagan 44) 
Thus, given this pervasive and enduring feeling of human entitlement to a right to choice, we can 
see how abortion would persist despite its illegality, despite the legal consequences, and despite 
the fact that anti-abortion crusaders like Storer called upon the cult of true womanhood to guilt 
and vilify women who chose to have abortions for any reason they deemed suitable. “Women 
were condemned for following ‘fashion’ and for avoiding the self-sacrifice expected of 
mothers,” Reagan writes, and she goes on to quote Storer once more: ‘‘The true wife’…did not 
seek ‘undue power in public life,…undue control in domestic affairs,…[or] privileges not her 
own’” (Reagan 11). Anti-abortionists lacked the fundamental understanding of the right to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 The 1873 Comstock Law regarding the dissemination of contraceptive materials or information 
would later be reversed in 1936 decision United States v. One Package of Japanese Pessaries in 
which Margaret Sanger played a significant role.  	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choice, as is echoed in Storer’s citation of “privileges” that do not extend to abortion. In this 
sense, we can see, for example, how Where Are My Children?’s EdithWalton and her cohort 
were vilified and used as anti-examples of proper womanly conduct (in a very classed and 
racialized way, no less) because of their decisions to have abortions, discuss these decisions 
amongst themselves, and keep these decisions from their husbands.   
The second period in recent abortion history, the 1930s, is critical because “abortion 
became more available and changed location. As the practice moved from private offices and 
homes to hospitals and clinics, abortion was consolidated in medical hands and became more 
visible. The changes wrought by the Depression accelerated the pace of change in the coming 
decades, particularly in the methods of enforcing the criminal abortion laws.” (Reagan 15).4 This 
comes into play heavily for films like Guilty Parents and Gambling With Souls, which I examine 
in my third chapter. While we do not see any of the female characters actively seeking out or 
undergoing an abortion, we do see hospitals begin to appear in the mise-en-scene: Helen in 
Guilty Parents is shown leaving baby clothes behind after a stay in what appears to be a hospital; 
Helen’s friend, Betty, is given some kind of anesthesia prior to her abortion, suggesting a clinical 
setting; Carolyn, Mae’s younger sister in Gambling With Souls, is brought to a hospital for care 
after a botched abortion.5 The enforcement of abortion as a criminal law is a central issue of 
Race Suicide and Unborn Souls. And yet, despite containing some elements that reflect the real 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Period 3 extends from 1940-1973 when, respectively, “the new methods of controlling abortion 
were first instituted” and then later undone by Roe v. Wade (Reagan 15). The fourth period 
examines 1973 to the present.  
 
5 Although not dealing specifically with abortion, much of the action in the latter half of 
Tomorrow’s Children (1934) takes place in a hospital, and the film was censored originally for 
its graphic surgical scenes. A film that I will look at in Chapter 4, Men in White (1934), takes 
place almost exclusively in a hospital, and Barbara, a nurse there, undergoes an unsuccessful 
operation after her botched abortion.  
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climate of abortion in America during the 1930s, the films in my third chapter are far from 
scientifically educational. With the exception of the opening intertitles of a few of the films, 
these films are more sensational than awareness-raising; on occasion, the intertitles do more to 
fuel this sensationalism than to make a morally educational point.  
Allow me to clarify that Reagan’s study is, methodologically, an investigation into the 
legal and health histories of abortion in America. Any references that she makes to popular 
culture or media are, generally, general, and she does not specifically address film or filmic 
representations of abortion in any way. What I want to do, then, is overlay the history of abortion 
that she has traced upon representations of abortion in contemporaneous film so as to observe the 
extent to which this history is accurately—or, more to the point, inaccurately—reflected in film. 
It is the inaccuracy of representation that moves these abortion films firmly in the direction of 
entertainment; heavily emphasizes the sense of moral ambiguity and conflict inherent in these 
films; and, over time, illustrates the shift from choice to non-choice with respect to reproductive 
agency. The conflict I speak of is not internal character conflict, but rather the conflict between 
prescribed and popular morals.  
That being said, the first of Reagan’s points that I wish to expand upon with regard to 
filmic representation has to do with clarifying some facts about who was having abortions, how, 
and under what circumstances; the second has to do the ambiguity of moral conflict. Although, 
in the interest of space, I will refrain from citing Reagan’s specific examples that illustrate these 
various facts, I would like to highlight a few of the most salient facts about abortion in the early 
decades of the twentieth century in America, particularly as they relate to filmic representations. 
The first has to do simply with availability: “Abortion was widely available throughout much of 
the era when abortion was a crime” (Reagan 14, emphasis mine). This is not to suggest that 
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abortion was widely advertised or impossibly easy to come by, but as an 1888 exposé in the 
Chicago Times demonstrated, even if a woman’s regular physician did not practice abortion, the 
chances were good that he knew someone who did and would recommend the woman in need to 
a practicing abortionist.6 From doctors to midwives, abortion care could be found7 if one did 
some investigating. Talking with friends, family members, and even lovers or husbands was one 
way to find the proper channels: “Although women could have abortions without anyone 
knowing about it at the turn of the century, many…talked about their abortions and relied upon 
friends, relatives, or partners to help them carry out their abortion plans,” which demonstrates the 
network of non-judgmental support that many women had available to them (Reagan 21). The 
fact that boyfriends and lovers, and to a lesser extent husbands, were involved in helping a 
woman procure an abortion (often paying for it, accompanying her to the doctor, and seeing that 
she had proper care afterwards) contradicts the prevalent stereotypes that all women who became 
pregnant out of wedlock were used and abandoned by the men in their lives. Not every woman 
had a male companion to aid her with her predicament, of course, and Reagan is sure to note that 
“[s]ome women were seduced and abandoned [and] some were raped”; however, not only is it 
true that “[m]ost of the women who had abortions in the early twentieth century were married 
and already mothers,” but furthermore, “[m]ost women survived their abortions and never had to 
tell anyone unless they chose to” (Reagan 33, 37, 22).8  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 See the opening of Chapter 2 in Reagan’s When Abortion Was a Crime.   
 
7 Abortions were, although available, costly, and they were most readily available in 
metropolitan centers. Thus, women who could not afford abortions and/or women isolated in 
rural areas did not have the same kind of access to abortion care and may instead have resorted to 
medications or other material means (hangers, knitting needs) in order to induce an abortion.  
 
8 Judith Walzer Leavitt suggests, according to Reagan, that “nineteenth- and early-twentieth-
century middle-class women approached childbearing with foreboding,” and that it was this fear 
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Despite the facts that proper medically-assisted abortions were not as taboo or as fatal as 
is commonly thought, were spoken about amongst a woman’s trusted circle, were generally 
supported by those who knew about it, and were considered a woman’s choice despite their 
illegality, representations of abortion in the media—newspaper articles, stories, films—portrayed 
anything but. “The publicly articulated and published discussion of abortion rarely included the 
voices or perspectives of women who had abortions, except to provide shocking examples of 
depraved womanhood,” and “…the image of the seduced and abandoned unmarried woman 
dominated turn-of-the-century newspapers and popular thinking” (Reagan 7-8, 23). One version 
of a contemporaneous feminist response assumed that if the telos of premarital sex is marriage, 
abortions therefore occurred because the men involved would not propose marriage to their 
pregnant lovers. Even a late-nineteenth/early-twentieth-century “[f]eminist interpretation of 
abortion did not admit the possibility of female sexual independence, only female victimization” 
(Reagan 32). And on the other end of the spectrum, these very women were vilified for carrying 
through with their abortions; Storer went so far as to compare abortion to prostitution.9 With this 
comparison, we can see how crucial the vilification of women who chose abortion was even 
from the beginnings of the anti-abortion movement. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
of childbirth and its potentially fatal outcome that “drove married women to use contraceptives 
and abortion” (Reagan 38).  
 
9 Late-nineteenth and early twentieth-century women’s rights advocates argued for husbands to 
stop sexually forcing themselves upon their wives and to give their wives ultimate say over their 
own bodies and childbearing in the spirit of voluntary motherhood; they also emphasized the 
moral superiority of chaste wives over their promiscuous husbands. In response, “[t]he campaign 
against abortion challenged this feminist analysis of men by condemning women for having 
abortions. Indeed, Storer compared abortion to prostitution and, in doing so, called into question 
all claims made by middle-class nineteenth century women on the basis of moral superiority. 
‘There is little difference,’ he proclaimed, ‘between the immorality’ of the man who visited the 
prostitute and the woman who aborted” (Qtd. in Reagan 12).  
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Looking at the abortion films from the 1910s to the 1940s, then, we observe that they 
bear increasingly less of a resemblance to what the reality of abortion was at the time. As I 
mentioned earlier, there are occasional elements that fit with the historical reality: the presence 
of hospitals, the legal pressure to seek out and expose abortion practitioners, as well as the 
occasional married couple seeking abortion care or unmarried couple discussing their options. 
The majority of the details in these films, however, are not in keeping with any type of 
realistically historic version of contemporaneous abortion practice. We primarily encounter 
young, unmarried women seeking abortions, which we are led to believe are self-induced or 
performed by unsafe quack doctors interested in a quick profit and unconcerned with the well-
being of their patients. Once pregnant, these women’s lovers are neither helpful nor concerned. 
We do not see women discussing abortion options or care (as we did with Mrs. Walton and her 
friends). All of these women are victims in one or more ways. Those women who live through 
their abortions end up depraved to some extent and on trial for abortion-related murders that they 
indeed committed. Seemingly “good” doctors spend more time trying to save women from 
botched abortions than performing safe ones. In short, these films are hyperbolic and 
sensationalized. They take a shred of truth—the fact that abortions occurred despite their 
illegality—and present over-exaggerated worst-case scenarios. In the case of Guilty Parents, 
Unborn Souls, and Race Suicide, they ostensibly have some sort of educational purpose in 
addition to being entertainment, such as emphasizing the importance of sex education or serving 
the function of an exposé of the “bad” abortion racket. These purposes, although perhaps 
seemingly noble, are undermined, I would argue, by the fact that since very little about these 
films reflects realistic situations in which a young woman might find herself, there cannot be 
much educational worth in them. Their scientifically educational potential is negated by their 
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overblown salaciousness and sensationalism. Their morally education potential, however, is a 
different but related matter. The classical abortion melodramas, such as Christopher Strong and 
Leave Her to Heaven, transfer sensational storylines into sensational and violent spectacles 
without even the faintest glimmer of the educational about them.  
The morally educational potential of these films is directly related to their moral 
ambiguity and the ambiguous nature of opinions regarding abortion; I will demonstrate how this 
ambiguity decreases from the 1910s to the 1940s. In order to consider this trajectory, Reagan’s 
concept of popular v. prescribed morality—the second key point that I wish to highlight from her 
study—is foundational. I. As she writes, “[p]rescribed morality and popular morality may not be 
identical,” and according to her research into early twentieth century abortion practices, they 
were often not identical when it came to abortion (Reagan 6). In Reagan’s terms, popular 
morality would be the moral beliefs on a given topic or subject—such as abortion—of people in 
reality. It reflects the views actually held by those affected by this topic, whether directly or 
indirectly. In this sense, popular morality might also be called practical morality, since it stands 
as evidence of the way people actually think. Prescribed morality, but contrast, is the way that 
some group of persons want people to think or want to make others believe is actually a 
popularly moral view. Another way to think of this is as a theoretical morality—the ideal view 
that, according to a specified group and for a specified purpose, people would and/or should 
have, although it is not the view that they necessarily do have. This is particularly important 
when considering the subject of abortion, for “[t]he evidence of people’s behavior—the 
persistent use of abortion by women of all social groups, and the sympathy of many men and 
women for their doing so—suggests the existence of an alternative popular morality in conflict 
with the law” (Reagan 45). 
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Despite their dialectical relationship, this is not to say that popular and prescribed 
moralities cannot or do not coincide, but rather that they do not always already coincide, as is 
particularly the case with pre-Roe views regarding abortion in the United States. As Reagan 
points out, problems occur when the prescribed morality regarding an issue is not questioned but 
is instead blindly accepted in popular discourse as one in the same with the popular morality, as 
this could result in an erroneous understanding of the history of a topic, and this is precisely the 
argument she makes about abortion. “Analysis of women’s practices and ideas—popular 
behavior and belief—rather than exclusive focus on the statements of male theologians and 
philosophers,” she writes, “suggests that it is incorrect to conclude that hostility to abortion is 
‘almost an absolute value in history.’ The reverse may be more accurate” (Reagan 6). I really 
like the distinction that she makes, as it clears room for considering other possible receptions of a 
topic such as abortion in conjunction with its representations. I also appreciate the questioning of 
the authorities who decide upon a prescribed morality and their motives for doing so: “Instead of 
assuming universal agreement on the immorality of abortion as expressed in the law and insisted 
upon by regular medical leaders, we might think of gradations in moral thinking or the existence 
of multiple moralities,” especially considering that “[a]bortion was part of life” and that “[t]he 
widespread acceptance of abortion, expressed in word and deed during the era of its illegality, 
suggests the persistence of a popular ethic that differed from that of the law and the official 
views of medicine and religion” (Reagan 22, 21). Furthermore, the argument that popular and 
prescribed moralities regarding abortion differed creates an interesting discrepancy. Why do 
these two moralities differ? What is at stake in this difference for filmic representations of 
abortion? What is at stake in considering “[t]he behavior and beliefs of ordinary people in daily 
life,” especially when the ideas being presented in the popular medium of film—a medium that is 
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a part of people’s daily lives—run counter to what those “ordinary people” believe to be true 
(Reagan 22)? 
 
Regulation and Interpretation 
While Reagan provides an historical and conceptual framework for this project in terms 
of reproductive rights history and discrepancies between popular v. prescribed morality, Annette 
Kuhn and Janet Staiger offer another salient historical framework as they address different types 
of approaches to film censorship. This frame can help us to parse out how images of 
contraception, abortion, and the reproductive female body come to signify negatively. The first 
approach to censorship, which Staiger refers to as “censorship as fetishistic or sadistic behavior,” 
is destructive censorship: either offending content is prohibited and removed, or it is left in but 
punished (Staiger13). The second type of censorship is Staiger’s “eventualization/diagnosis” 
model, which she draws from the work of Annette Kuhn (Staiger 13).10 Kuhn develops this 
approach from her understanding of the Foucauldian apparatus. As she observes, “[a]n apparatus, 
according to Foucault, is more than merely the sum total of a series of variegated components. Its 
most important characteristic is its activity, the interaction between its parts – its practices and 
processes. These interrelations are always fluid, always in a state of becoming, always ‘inscribed 
in a play of power’” (Kuhn 6). The dynamic nature of power that Foucault describes is crucial 
for Kuhn, who utilizes this construction to strip censorship of its seemingly unassailable position 
of power and place it on the same level as the film being censored.11 Indeed, Francis Couvares’ 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Specifically, Staiger is working from Kuhn’s Cinema, Censorship and Sexuality, 1909-1925.  
 
11 Kuhn identifies four main developments that issue from the apparatus model of censorship. 
The first is that censorship now addresses “the conditions of operation and effectivity of film 
censorship,” meaning that the conditions that produce a given final film text are now part of that 
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historical inquiries into pre-code censorship support Kuhn’s understanding of regulation. He 
argues that “the history of efforts to censor and regulate the movies is best read not as a simple 
tale of artistic freedom struggling against repressive moralism;” rather, censorship negotiations 
represent a “cultural struggle” on a number of different levels and fronts between groups, namely 
the Protestant and Catholic churches, who would continually strive to represent as homogeneous 
a non-homogeneous viewpoint and whose opinions about censorship and its role would change 
over time (Couvares 152, 131).  
Within this model, the distinction between the text and context of a given film is elided; 
instead of censorship as an institution (context) dictating a film’s content (text), the text and 
context share a dynamic relationship in which they inform one another. In this way, Kuhn refers 
to the former act as censorship, but to the latter as regulation; I find this to be a worthwhile 
distinction for this study in so far as it allows for a way of methodologically considering the 
text/context relationship not only between institution and film, but also within the films 
themselves. For example, under the rubric of regulation, we would consider not only the scene 
itself in the film, but also the censorship documents about that scene in the film. Additionally, we 
could work backwards from the film to the censor’s reports in order to see the finished filmic 
product with relation to the reports and, thusly, how this interplay affects the way the Production 
Code is interpreted. This reveals a two-way street: while initial interpretations of the code affect 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
text (6). Secondly, “the productive capacity of film censorship …would require 
acknowledgment” (6). This indicates that censorship would have to be reconsidered as an 
element of film production with positive connotations. Thirdly, “the nature of the powers 
involved in film censorship would be reexamined,” which opens a space for questioning and 
potentially reconfiguring the heretofore hegemonic (and patriarchal) nature of the censorship 
body (6). Lastly, “film texts would be rescued from their subordination and accorded a 
place…among the various practices that constitute film censorship” (6). With this, Kuhn posits 
that the text itself becomes equal to censorship institutions in terms of textual production.	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what censors deem presentable or unpresentable in a given film, the final version of the film 
itself affects future interpretations of the Code.  
However, Staiger and Kuhn, like Tom Gunning, also point to the potential of narrative to 
mitigate offending images or content (Staiger 14);12 this practice is of particular interest with 
relation to contraception films.  When a narrative film is censored, the offending material is not 
completely absent, as those doing the censoring might have us believe. Rather, the absence of 
that material becomes present in so far as it causes the viewers to imagine what they know to be 
missing. While the censored material is materially absent, it is not imaginatively absent. With 
this, we see a version of David Bordwell’s theory of viewers forming and testing expectations as 
they view a film as a way of involving themselves in the viewing process. In Narration in the 
Fiction Film, Bordwell devotes a chapter to the discussion of the ways in which the viewer 
cognitively engages with and brings her prior experiences and knowledge to bear upon a given 
film in order to follow the story and understand the plot. He states that “[t]he viewer must take as 
a central cognitive goal the construction of a more or less intelligible story” (Bordwell, 
Narration 33). Here, the viewer is characterized as being cognitively engaged on at least two 
levels in so far as she must choose to want to construct the story, and then she must actually do 
so.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 In his discussion of the narrator system in particular relation to the early films of D. W. 
Griffith, Tom Gunning describes these systems as able to allow, amongst other possibilities, the 
expression of “a range of moral judgments” (Griffith 27). A main impetus behind the shift to 
narrative integration and narrator systems is the desire to make cinematic images less potentially 
offensive by tempering them with a narrative frame. With an integrated narrative in place, the 
imagined viewer runs less of a risk of drawing the wrong ideas from a film—ideas that involve 
the emulation of crime, vice, or other wrongdoings. Since these actions or ideas are depicted 
within a narrative for the purpose of acting as a cautionary tale, and not as attractions, the viewer 
witnesses—the viewer must witness—the negative consequences of said act, and not only the 
“immoral” act itself.  	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When a viewer actively forms expectations for a film’s causal development as the film 
unfolds, she is more likely to have a stake in the elision of key causal moments and become 
engaged in the process of imaginatively filling any causal gaps in order to continue following the 
narrative. However, in this scenario, any given viewer could now be following a somewhat 
different version of the same narrative, depending upon how the causal gaps were bridged. What 
are the stakes involved in removing portions of factual information from didactic social issue 
films? How does this affect the relationship between the didactic and the narrative? How does 
this complicate the earlier belief of censorship institutions that a narrative frame helps control 
audience reception? 
As a means of beginning to address the aforementioned questions, which I will explore in 
various generic types of contraception films in greater depth, I find it helpful to think of Kuhn’s 
separate characterizations of censorship and regulation as being capable of functioning 
simultaneously. I do not believe censorship and regulation to be mutually exclusive, but instead 
understand these seemingly antagonistic models as operative within a dialectical relationship not 
altogether different from, and in many ways analogous to, the relationship between narrative and 
sub-narrative, between entertainment and didacticism. Just as a new productive space for filmic 
representations of women’s agency opens up when we consider the particular sub-category of 
Mary Ann Doane’s woman’s film that I identify as the contraception and/or abortion film, I also 
believe a productive space for exploring the possibilities of reproductive agency in narrative film 
opens up when censorship is considered as a negotiation and not as a mandate.  
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The Reproductive Woman’s Film as Liberating Filmic Space 
The third methodological approach that undergirds my project is Laura Mulvey’s and 
Mary Ann Doane’s theoretical inquiries into the relationship between female erotic and 
reproductive agency.  To call this relationship problematic would be a gross understatement, for 
negotiations between the two strike to the heart of discourses of censorship, reproductive rights, 
and representations of women in film. When I refer to women with erotic agency, I mean women 
who demonstrate control over their sex lives outside of the strictures of social mores: they decide 
whether to engage in sexual activity as well as the extent of their sexual activity based upon their 
personal needs and desires. By women with reproductive agency, I mean women who 
demonstrate control over their sex lives with specific regard to their reproductive options: they 
decide whether or not they desire children, and based upon that decision in a given context, they 
choose whether to remain abstinent, whether to employ a form of birth control, and, if pregnant, 
whether to terminate or continue with their pregnancies. These two types of agency may seem 
intimately related, and they are: if a woman is biologically mature, she has the capability for 
erotic agency; if she has erotic agency, then it follows that she must also have opinions about her 
reproductive life and thereby also has the capability for reproductive agency. I differentiate 
between these two categories, however, because such a differentiation is necessary to 
understanding the way that these two categories are artificially split within cinematic 
representations. Along this false dichotomy, films that exclude the topic of reproduction address 
a woman’s erotic agency, whereas those that do include this topic address a woman’s 
reproductive agency.   
In order complicate and better understand female agency, as well as how different types 
of female sexual agency might be constructed for and by women on and off of the screen (as 
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subjects, objects, those who are viewers, and those who are viewed), I wish to begin by 
addressing female spectatorship. While the focus of my project is not solely female film 
spectatorship, censors’ perceived audience reaction to films is one of this project’s concerns. 
Given that the films I address are women’s films, the imagined audience with which censors are 
largely concerned is women.13 Furthermore, at least a preliminary consideration of female 
audience is necessary for establishing a female gaze with relation to representations of 
reproductive women—especially considering the fraught beginning of female spectatorship and 
the cinema.14  
Concern with spectatorship and spectacle—with those being looked at and those doing 
the looking—and their relationship to the sexual politics of representation has been a hallmark of 
feminist film criticism since its beginnings in the 1970s. Laura Mulvey famously identifies 
(although does not agree with) a strict masculinization of the gaze.15 Through working from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 This is not to suggest that there exists only one type of imagined audience for any given type 
of film; in fact, there are often several, and they might be audiences of interest for different 
reasons. For example, in the case of the woman’s film, censors may be concerned with how a 
film might affect women (which is itself a broad category and necessarily contains many 
possible sub-categories), but they may also be concerned with how a film might be received by a 
religious or special interest group like the Catholic Church or the Women’s Christian 
Temperance Union.   
 
14 Shelley Stamp notes in Chapter 1 of Movie-Struck Girls that, in effort to attract a more 
sophisticated, middle-class clientele, many movie houses began marketing to women. While 
largely successful, this ploy brought with it some unexpected problems by inadvertently creating 
a type of movie-going attitude amongst female viewers that “complicated exhibition space and 
accepted viewing practice just at the moment when cinemagoing began to receive broad-based 
appeal” (Girls 39).   	  
15 In “Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema,” Mulvey explains, “In a world ordered by sexual 
imbalance, sexual pleasure in looking has been split between the active/male and passive/female. 
The determining male gaze projects its phantasy [sic] on to the female figure which is styled 
accordingly. In their traditional exhibitionist role women are simultaneously looked at and 
displayed, with their appearance coded for strong visual and erotic impact so that they can be 
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psychoanalytic theory as a “political weapon,” Mulvey connects woman-as-desired-object and 
woman-as-threat, arguing that whether through voyeurism or narcissism, the female is eroticized 
and used to fuel male sexual desire and/or the male ego both within the storyworld of the film 
and from the point of view of the spectator (Mulvey 6). In Mulvey’s theoretical model, there is 
little to nothing that the female spectator can do to gain any sense of agency, and in fact, there 
seems to be no room for the female or feminine spectator at all. Rather, the woman is inherently 
the sexualized object of the male gaze, and her sexuality is her spectacle—or rather, her sexuality 
is spectacle for others within the system of Hollywood signification and desire.16 
I agree with Mulvey in terms of the destructive power of masculinist viewing practices 
and the Hollywood narrative system’s perpetuation thereof; nevertheless, I do, however, believe 
there to be another way of approaching the issue of female agency on- and off-screen that is, 
frankly, less bleak than Mulvey’s diagnosis of women’s roles in and engagement with 
Hollywood cinema. One possible alternative is—without denying, of course, the validity of 
Mulvey’s concerns—to shift the emphasis from the debilitating male gaze to the film’s 
apparent/assumed audience as well as its content and form. The woman’s film provides a prime 
example of how there is indeed a space for women to demonstrate agency within the structure of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
said to connote to-be-looked-at-ness. Woman displayed as sexual object is the leit-motif of erotic 
spectacle…she holds the look, plays to and signifies male desire” (Mulvey 11). 	  
16 Mulvey’s indictment pertains specifically to the classical Hollywood narrative film form, to 
“illusionistic narrative film” (17). Mulvey claims that this system is sustained and defined by 
privileging the film as a freestanding and contained entity, rendering the creation of the film 
invisible, and downplaying the role of the audience in the viewing of the film; this, in turn, 
perpetuates the objectification of women. In order to move beyond this system of female 
objectification—a move that she acknowledges is happening in radical film—one must “free the 
look of the camera into its materiality in time and space and the look of the audience into 
dialectics, passionate detachment” (18).   
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the classical Hollywood narrative, and it is thusly the type of film that lends a productive frame 
to the examination of contraception and abortion films. 
In The Desire to Desire, Mary Ann Doane takes up the question of women’s agency with 
relation to woman as both spectator (although more so in the psychical sense, as she calls it, than 
in the sense of being a living, breathing member of an actual audience who is watching a film, 
although she does address the latter) and spectacle, and she does so in the particular context of 
what she terms the “woman’s film.” For Doane, there is agency to be had for the female viewer, 
at least theoretically, through the genre of the woman’s film, which, “quite simply, attempts to 
engage female subjectivity” (Desire 34). More specifically, Doane defines this genre as 
consistent of “films [that] deal with a female protagonist and often appear to allow her 
significant access to point of view structures and the enunciative level of the filmic discourse” 
(Desire 3). She adds that these films “treat problems defined as ‘female’ (problems revolving 
around domestic life, the family, children, self-sacrifice, and the relationship between women 
and production v. that between women and reproduction), and, most crucially, are directed 
toward a female audience” (Doane, Desire 3). 
Although these content-related characteristics set the woman’s film apart in theme and 
subject, Doane acknowledges that in many formal ways, the Hollywood woman’s film is no 
different from any other standard Hollywood film. However, although she clearly states that 
female gendered seeing need not always be the case with regards to the woman’s film, it remains 
that female gendered seeing is problematic within her subject-object dialectic,17 and “the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 In The Desire to Desire, Doane posits simultaneously that “[t]he cinema in general, outside the 
genre of the woman’s picture, constructs its spectator as the generic ‘he’ of language. The 
masculine norm is purportedly asexual while sexually defined seeing is relegated to the woman. 
Access to the gaze is thus very carefully regulated through the specification of generic 
boundaries,” and yet “[t]he female spectator (the spectator singled out and defined entirely by 
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sustained attempt to incorporate female subjectivity for a female subject-spectator introduces 
perturbations and discrepancies which are frequently not quite successfully contained by the 
narrative process” (34). In this way, Doane’s and Mulvey’s opinions align in so far that the 
classical narrative form is not suitable for a fair, non-objectified representation of women (and 
their agency and desire). Yet, instead of suggesting, as does Mulvey, that we completely abandon 
that form for a space beyond the scope of the masculine gaze in order to theorize productively 
about female spectatorship, Doane works within the classical structure. In so doing, she 
demonstrates how the very structure that arguably disallows female agency and desire can also 
be a problematically productive form for exploring how and where these types of agency and 
desire attempts to eke out an existence: “…because the woman’s film insistently and sometimes 
obsessively attempts to trace the contours of female subjectivity and desire within the traditional 
forms and conventions of Hollywood narrative—forms which cannot sustain such an 
exploration—certain contradictions within patriarchal ideology become more apparent. This 
makes the films particularly valuable for a feminist analysis of the way in which the ‘woman’s 
story’ is told” (Doane, Desire 13). And this is precisely the kind of work that I believe has 
cleared a theoretical space for analyzing the early twentieth century contraception and abortion 
films that I take up. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
her sex) exists nowhere but as an effect of discourse, the focal point of an address” (Doane, 
Desire 3, 9). These ideas may seem contradictory at first: how is it possible for a woman to at 
once be sexually defined as female in terms of her spectatorship—as one who possesses a 
(gendered) gaze and who, one might argue, also has an interiority and a physicality connected to 
that gaze—but to also exist as an image, to exist only as a constructed entity or idea, to exist as 
the sexual Other who would or could not exist without the masculine (and/or without whom the 
masculine would or could not exist)? Doane suggests here that the female spectator exists in a 
type of dialectic: she is at once subject and object, viewer and viewed, inherently sexually 
marked yet also sexually constructed through difference. 	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Although psychoanalysis primarily informs feminist film scholarship from the 1970s to 
the 1990s, there has been a turn in recent feminist film scholarship toward approaching films 
through their material histories and contexts. This is not to suggest that the theoretical baby has 
been thrown out with the bathwater, but rather that psychoanalytic readings of films by feminist 
scholars are frequently accompanied by attention to production files, censorship 
correspondences, pressbooks, and trade reviews, as well as other related sources that help to 
contextualize a given film, its reception, and its import within the field. Miriam Hansen’s study 
of spectatorship and the public sphere stands as an example of this. Hansen describes how 
women came to be in the public sphere through spectating various forms of entertainment and 
how commodity culture further altered their public lives. Specifically, she contends that “[t]he 
cinema’s role in changing the boundaries and possibilities of public life was perhaps most pivotal 
for women, across—though related to—distinctions of class, racial and ethnic background, 
marital status, and generation…More than any other entertainment form, the cinema opened up a 
space—a social space as well as a perceptual, experiential horizon—in women’s lives” (Hansen 
114, 117). Hansen’s identification of the social and perceptual here is important, as it 
acknowledges firstly that access (to cinema) is fundamental for reclaiming the gaze and, thereby, 
agency; secondly, it opens up the possibility of a type of desire and subjectivity through cinema 
that is uniquely female (despite the fact that this desire and subjectivity becomes the target of 
consumerism).  
Lea Jacobs’ treatment of the fallen woman film in The Wages of Sin also exemplifies the 
turn away from psychoanalytic theory. She argues that “[t]he fallen woman film permits us to 
examine not only the operations of censorship under the studio system, but more specifically, the 
representation of sexual difference within this context” (xi). In this way, the fallen woman film 
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functions as a type of mirror for Hollywood itself, allowing the viewer to see the constructedness 
of misogynist, classist, and/or racist attitudes within films of this type.  Jacobs contends that 
“[…] ‘failures’ on the part of industry censors provide interesting cases for feminist criticism, in 
that they indicate how films which seemingly observed the status quo could simultaneously call 
it into question” (xi). This will be an important concept to bear in mind, for as I will demonstrate 
in Chapter 1 through case studies of female character types, it takes on a whole new valence 
when considered in the context of implied reproductive capacity and threat, let alone in the 
context of an overt reproductive woman’s film. We can see here that Jacobs does not completely 
diverge from considering issues of spectatorship, but these issues become more grounded in the 
histories of specific films.  
Given feminist film criticism’s roots in psychoanalysis, it perhaps does not come as much 
of a surprise that studies of the mother-figure in woman’s films extend therefrom and allow an 
inroad into scholarship treating the reproductive woman. Much attention has been paid (and still 
is paid) to the presence of female erotic sexuality and agency within interwar film, but the focus 
on the mother as a subject worthy of inquiry for its own sake can help us to better assemble a 
fuller picture of cinema’s version of female erotic and reproductive agency. E. Ann Kaplan 
attempts to restore the place of the mother as subject within the genre of melodrama for, as she 
explains, “[f]ew scholars had been interested in understanding her positioning or her social role 
from inside the mother’s discourse, in whatever context, of whatever type” (Kaplan, Motherhood 
3)18; Lucy Fischer identifies a certain kind of “‘amnesia’ about the mother” in film, and “only 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Kaplan clarifies that “[i]t was not then so much that the mother had not received attention as 
that she had mainly been studied from an Other’s point of view; or represented as an 
(unquestioned) patriarchally constructed social function” (Kaplan, Qtd. in Motherhood 3).  
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recently has serious attention been paid to motherhood” (Fischer 10).19 Both Doane (in the 
context of the woman’s film) and Jacobs (in the context of the fallen woman film) identify a 
space for the maternal as well, but even identifying the maternal as such presupposes that, even 
if the pregnancy was unintended, the pregnant woman in question carried through with her 
pregnancy and gave birth to her child, which typically becomes the point at which the film’s 
conflict begins. As these scholars demonstrate, the reproductive woman absolutely has a place in 
interwar film, and these thought-provoking and necessary studies have done the critical work of 
granting an aspect of the reproductive—the maternal—the weight and importance that it deserves 
within American film history.   
And yet, within these maternal narratives, I find vexing the amount of emphasis placed 
upon the traditional master narrative of pregnancy—something desired by a woman and man 
within the safe confines of marriage that typically results in a healthy, normative child—for there 
is still another version of the woman’s reproduction story that has yet to be heard much more 
fully. In addition to groundbreaking work on the maternal by Doane, Fischer, and Kaplan, 
scholars such as Martin Norden, Martin Pernick, and Shelley Stamp have contributed 
significantly to studies of early contraception and abortion films from a rich array of 
sociohistorical viewpoints.20  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Fischer goes on to cite Maureen Turim’s observation that “early scholarship often ‘implicitly 
or explicitly attacked motherhood…as a by-product of the attack on marriage as an institution’” 
(Qtd. in Fischer10). Her study of the maternal as represented in genres not typically associated 
with a feminine viewership aims “to ‘recall’ the importance of the maternal register within 
cinematic discourse” (31).  
 	  
20 See Martin Norden, Cinema of Isolation; Martin Pernick, The Black Stork; and Shelley Stamp, 
“Moral Coercion, or The National Board of Censorship Ponders the Vice Films.”
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Somewhere between the erotic and the traditionally reproductive woman lies the focus of 
my inquiry: the non-traditional reproductive woman. As I have mentioned and will explore 
further, the representation of the pregnant body on screen entails its own problems with regard to 
visibility under the Production Code, but another perhaps larger (or at least more insidious) 
problem of visibility is that of women who choose contraception or abortion over pregnancy and 
motherhood. The lack of attention to nontraditional reproductive women has been detrimental, 
for ignoring those who do not desire or choose pregnancy and motherhood is tantamount to 
omitting a woman’s right to reproductive choice and family planning. This oversight exacerbates 
the cultural divide between sex and reproduction and thus perpetuates the socially constructed 
taboos surrounding contraception and abortion.  
And yet in spite of this oversight, the nontraditionally reproductive woman is still present 
in film. So, then, what exactly does Hollywood find so threatening about women who wish to 
engage sexually and avoid pregnancy? How does cinema deal with narratives of unwanted 
pregnancies, terminated fetuses, and the preventative measures undertaken by women in order to 
avoid pregnancy? What do we make of the influence and implications of representations that 
diverge from the traditional pregnancy narrative?  
Working from Doane’s definition of the woman’s film and her understanding of how it 
participates in an economy of female desire, the films that I analyze in this project certainly fall 
under the classification of the woman’s film, as they are intimately concerned with reproductive 
choices and those choices’ relationships to the family and domestic life, or to the woman’s lack 
thereof. What Doane’s category of reproduction focuses on, however, is motherhood, and this 
category fails to account for reproductive choices that mean to avoid or circumvent motherhood, 
such as contraception and abortion. Through my treatment of Hollywood films dealing with 
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contraception and abortion, I aim to expand Doane’s take on what the woman’s film is, what 
problems it encounters, and what it is capable of accomplishing.  
On the positive side, the woman’s film, by treating issues pertaining to women such as 
reproductive agency, creates a space for the female spectator to be just that: a female spectator, 
and not an asexual or masculinized spectator. This is a crucial development. Firstly, it revises 
Mulvey’s assertion that the only possible gaze within cinema is the masculine one. Secondly, it 
allows us to really consider women as an audience—both real and assumed—and to investigate 
what it means for a film to be marketed toward women and to examine women’s issues; 
additionally, this will cause us to think more critically about the cinematic portrayal of those 
issues in relation to their historical realities. 
Furthermore, the reproductive woman’s film, through its engagement with reproductive 
agency, mainstreams subjects that are, frankly, still taboo in certain conservative social, political, 
and religious contexts for many women, as can be seen in contemporary Hollywood cinema, 
amongst other contexts.21 As Doane and Mulvey aptly point out, however, the Hollywood 
narrative form and, I would add, the industry surrounding it can also obscure and obstruct 
reproductive woman’s films that possess the potential to educate, to incite action, and/or to 
present a narrative of women’s reproductive agency that opposes, or at least revises, traditional 
narratives about maternity and motherhood. This tension between Hollywood’s proliferation of 
dominant cultural narratives and the realities of women’s reproductive rights is of critical 
importance. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 For a study of contemporary representations of pregnancy in the media, see Kelly Oliver’s 
Knock Me Up, Knock Me Down: Images of Pregnancy in Hollywood Films. I will address 
Oliver’s work further in my Coda.  
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Chapter Descriptions 
 Chapter 1 
My first chapter addresses the following question: What do we need to know about filmic 
treatment of the erotic female body and its attendant problems in order to understand how and to 
what extent similar problems become mapped onto the reproductive female body? Using 
feminist psychoanalytic theories of film and philosophy, I establish a basis for the objectification 
of the eroticized woman that I use to discuss four female character types with erotic agency in 
representative films: the white slave in Traffic in Souls (1913), the vamp in A Fool There Was 
(1915), the flapper in It (1927), and the femme fatale in The Maltese Falcon (1941). 
Additionally, I consider the impact of significant developments in censorship history, 
particularly the Sims Act and the Mutual v. Ohio Supreme Court decision, upon these films and 
their female leads. I argue that the problems that arise from these types center around a fear of 
erotic female agency that reproductive agency only exacerbates.   
 
 Chapter 2 
 Chapter two addresses the social problem contraception/abortion films of the late teens22 
with specific relation to contemporaneous eugenics discourse and the early birth control 
movement. These films clearly attempt to be objectively didactic in nature to a certain extent, 
and yet also contain causally driven eugenics-based narratives that render their messages more 
ambiguous. In terms of didacticism, I look at the complicated relationship between these films’ 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Chapter 2 narrative films include Where Are My Children? (Lois Weber, 1916), Birth Control 
(Margaret Sanger and Hannah M. Stone, 1917), Birth Control, or the Law of Population (1917), 
The Black Stork (Leopold and Theodore Wharton, 1917), and The Hand That Rocks the Cradle 
(Lois Weber, 1917). Science films include Biology of Conception and Mechanism of 
Contraception (Margaret Sanger, 1922), Personal Hygiene for Boys (1922) and Personal 
Hygiene for Girls (1922).  
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scientifically educational components and their eugenically-driven morally educational 
components; my analyses are based upon the films’ structure, visual rhetoric, and engagement 
with eugenic theories. While the films in this chapter, particularly Lois Weber’s Where Are My 
Children? (1916), contribute to the vilification of women who use their reproductive agency to 
choose contraception or abortion, they also push for reproductive rights, and their ambiguities 
foreground the importance of choice and the uniqueness of a given woman’s situation.   
  
 Chapter 3 
Chapter three treats appropriations of the contraception/abortion film by the exploitation 
film.23 Through the use of contradictory narratives, these films simultaneously claim to offer 
objectively educational information about sex education, pregnancy, and abortion while giving 
no such actual information and presenting salacious, hyperbolic narratives of illicit sex, gambling 
and prostitution rings, abortion, murder, and ruined lives. There are two types of these films: 
those that vilify the woman who has the abortion, and those that vilify the doctor who performs 
it. Abortion, while legitimately a crime in the 1930s, still cannot be explicitly dealt with in film, 
and so protagonists who choose abortion are criminalized and tried in other ways. However, as I 
argue, the implicit crime of which these women are guilty and for which they are punished—
whether by prison or by death—is reproductive agency.  
 
  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Chapter 3 films include Guilty Parents (Jack Townley, 1934), Gambling With Souls (Elmer 
Clifton, 1936), Race Suicide (S. Roy Luby, 1937), and Unborn Souls (Del Frazier, 1939). I will 
consider these as responses to Weber’s Where Are My Children?. 
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 Chapter 4 
The films in my fourth chapter leave the pretense of the objectively didactic behind 
altogether and engage the dialectical relationship that emerges from the apparent struggle 
between foregrounding subjective character psychology and foregrounding social issues.24  This 
is done within the generic constraint of the melodrama, which targets a female film viewership. 
These films take the trappings of the reproduction film and repackage them in ways that mark a 
decided shift away from any message of reproductive empowerment seen in the 1910s. They also 
dial up the sensationalism of the exploitation films; yet, doing so within the confines of the Hays 
Code ends up producing moments of violent abortion spectacle that at once allow for 
protagonists with reproductive agency and discourage female viewers from exercising this kind 
of agency. These films variously demonstrate the phenomenon of the “invisible” pregnancy as 
well as a particularly visually violent approach to the depiction of abortion. 
 
 Coda 
 The Coda that follows will discuss the 1952 Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson Supreme 
Court decision that marked the decline of American film censorship by effectively reinstating 
cinema’s protection under the First Amendment. The case revolves around an outcry lead by the 
Catholic Church for censorship of the Italian short film, Il Miracolo, directed by Roberto 
Rossellini, from 1948. The film treats the story of an Italian peasant woman who is ostracized 
after claiming that the man responsible for her pregnancy is St. Joseph himself; the Church 
considered this idea blasphemous. In my Coda, I will consider not only the importance of this 
legal case for censorship, but I will also address a.) the significance of the centrality of female 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Chapter 4 films include Christopher Strong (Dorothy Arzner, 1933), Men in White (Richard 
Boleslawski, 1934), and Leave Her to Heaven (John M. Stahl, 1945). 
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reproduction to the film that precipitated this case, b.) the eventual dissolution of the Code in 
favor of the MPAA ratings system in 1968, and c.) the shifts in filmic representation of the 
reproductive that follow in the wake of Burstyn v. Wilson.
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CHAPTER 1 
 
From Sexy to Pregnant: The Problem with Women’s Erotic and Reproductive            
Agency 
 
Hollywood’s treatment of reproductive female sexuality has much to do with 
representations of and strictures placed upon erotic female sexuality. Many of the problems, 
concerns, and negotiations that surround erotic filmic representations become mapped onto 
reproductive representations, such that any type of female sexual agency creates cause for 
concern amongst directors, producers, and censors, especially when filtered through concern 
over audience reception and imitation.   
The aim of this chapter is to examine how Hollywood and its censorship bodies 
negotiated this paradox in terms of erotic sexual agency; such an examination provides a basis 
for understanding how this paradox functions in different types of films dealing with 
reproductive sexual agency. Some questions that I consider in this chapter include the following: 
Why do erotic female agency and reproductive female agency become so problematic in 
American film from the first half of the twentieth century? What are some of the ways in which 
these “problems” were negotiated in Hollywood, and to what ends? Given the stark causal and 
representational separation between sex and pregnancy, how is it that fears and anxieties on the 
parts of various social and religious groups—and therefore on the part of the Hays Office, 
Hollywood’s censorship office as of 1930 and arbiter of the Productions (or Hays) Code—
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pertaining to erotic female agency become mapped onto the reproductively sexual female body? 
What is at stake in this elision?  
In order to begin addressing these questions, I turn first to theoretical discussions of the 
arbitrary separation of female erotic and reproductive agency in order to see how Hollywood 
takes hold of and perpetuates this false dichotomy. I then turn to a few classic desiring female 
types in early twentieth century film—the white slave, the vamp, the flapper, and the femme 
fatale—and the issues of representation, censorship, and potential reproductive agency that they 
raise. I read an exemplary film from category—Traffic in Souls (1913), A Fool There Was 
(1915), It (1927), and The Maltese Falcon (1941)—first in terms of their female leads’ erotic 
agency, and next in terms of what that agency might mean if it were reproductive.  
Using feminist psychoanalysis as a starting point, I will show how the erotic and desiring 
women in these films stand as threats to masculinity and patriarchal control. This angle may 
perhaps seems fairly standard or uncontroversial, but it becomes both amplified and complicated 
by the sense of cultural (masculine) fear attendant to and exacerbated by even the thought of 
these female characters as reproductive—especially when/because the reproductive is never 
really divorced from the erotic, despite Hollywood’s attempts to effect such a blatant separation. 
By framing my discussion of key films with the idea of the woman’s film and expanding upon 
Mary Ann Doane’s definition thereof, I argue that the inclusion of greater reproductive options 
allows the woman’s film to take on a significant political valence: it highlights the inclusion of 
reproductive choice in our understandings of erotic and reproductive female agency.  
I begin by discussing filmic representations of erotic agency in order to demonstrate that 
the contraception and abortion films around which my succeeding chapters are organized 
function like films featuring erotically active women. Women in transitional and classical film 
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with erotic agency are represented in such a way that this agency becomes problematic and is 
often met with punishment of some kind; the same goes for women with reproductive agency. 
Historically, abortion and contraception films appear in the late teens, drop off in the 1920s, and 
reappear in the 1930s. While contraception and abortion, even at the beginning of their filmic 
representations, are certainly controversial topics, they are not too controversial for film—a fact 
to which those films specifically treating them attest. It’s not that films featuring erotic women 
can’t be about abortion or the reproductive because the subject is completely taboo;25 rather, 
linking erotic agency with the reproductive agency is something that is just not done because, as 
I argue, it gives the female character an increased level of agency. Thus, the two are kept 
separate. In this way, I mean to trace in this chapter how female agency is undercut and 
diminished through its severance of sexuality from reproduction. 
We typically find the erotic without the reproductive, as with the female types 
highlighted in this chapter; this, at least, is logically possible (although not without 
contraceptives, which the films in this chapter do not acknowledge). We cannot, however, 
logically have the reproductive without the erotic, although this connection is rarely shown or 
acknowledged in the film examined in this study. The fact that contraception and abortion films 
either try to erase the erotic from the reproductive equation (i.e. Leave Her to Heaven) or skip 
many steps between the erotic and the reproductive so that the two seem either unrelated or 
related in a uselessly oversimplified way (i.e. Guilty Parents, Men in White) is something that I 
want to establish here as issuing from these erotic female types’ representations. Whether or not 
the characters I discuss here are using a form of contraception (such as a diaphragm) or are just 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 As I explore in Chapters 3 and 4, while abortion and contraception maintain a fraught 
relationship with the Production Code and censorship, they are not even completely taboo or 
unrepresentable even under the Code’s strictures. Instead, they are representable, but in a highly 
nuanced and coded manner.  
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“lucky” to avoid pregnancy, my point is not that these films are really about reproduction, but 
rather that they easily could be but deliberately are not. This trend returns us to the false 
separation between the erotic and the reproductive that I wish to analyze, for Hollywood utilizes 
and perpetuates this separation in order to allow for the objectification and vilification of the 
woman’s erotic agency. This type of objectification and vilification lays the groundwork for 
having similar negative effects upon affect woman’s reproductive agency—effects that 
eventually make their way into codified form through censorship codes and stipulations. 
 
The Sex/Pregnancy Divide 
At the heart of this tension is Hollywood’s impulse to separate female desire from sex 
from pregnancy. This split is not, however, something unique to Hollywood, but is also a topic of 
philosophical inquiry. Iris Marion Young addresses the relationship between sex and pregnancy 
(or, to employ my vocabulary, between the erotic and the reproductive) in her essay “Pregnant 
Embodiment: Subjectivity and Alienation,” wherein she argues that pregnancy is both inherently 
eroticized and culturally de-eroticized depending upon subject position. The subject position that 
Young privileges is that of the pregnant woman, which she describes as “decentered, split, or 
doubled in several ways. She experiences her body as herself and not herself. Its inner 
movements belong to another being, yet they are not other, because her body boundaries shift 
and because her bodily self-location is focused on her trunk in addition to her head,” and this 
split pregnant subject can be found “in the eroticism of pregnancy” (46, 47). In this way, Young 
identifies the coexistence of the erotic and the reproductive as a hallmark of pregnant subjectivity 
and the pregnant bodily experience. The erotic, as she explains, is an essential part of the 
reproductive: “The pregnant woman is often not looked upon as sexually active or desirable, 
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even though her own desires and sensitivity have increased […] Though the pregnant woman 
may find herself desexualized by others, at the same time she may find herself with a heightened 
sense of her own sexuality” (Young 53). Through her choice to temper these statements with 
counter-claims, Young suggests although the pregnant or reproductive woman may (and often 
does) understand herself as also possessing an erotic sexuality, she typically is not seen this way 
by others. Thus, the split between sex and pregnancy, though a false dichotomy, is nonetheless a 
very real one to Young. She criticizes the tendency of modern Western culture to denigrate 
pregnancy based upon normative ideas of acceptable body image: “There was a time when the 
pregnant woman stood as a symbol of stately and sexual beauty. While pregnancy remains an 
object of fascination, our own culture harshly separates pregnancy from sexuality. The dominant 
culture defines feminine beauty as slim and shapely” (Young 53). She suggests here that within 
the dominant cultural paradigm, the pregnant body does not qualify as that which is either 
aesthetically pleasing nor, surprisingly, feminine; the pregnant woman occupies a type of no-
man’s-land where she is considered more curiosity than woman, let alone woman with any kind 
of agency.   
Yet in a recuperative move, Young also claims that there is perhaps something positive to 
be gained from the separation between the erotic and the reproductive.  in so far that this 
separation allows the pregnant woman the opportunity to appreciate her own body (and 
subjectivity) and, ultimately, to gain social approval apart from cultural standards of beauty:   
Perhaps the dominant culture’s desexualization of the pregnant body helps make 
possible such self-love when it happens. The culture’s separation of pregnancy 
and sexuality can liberate her from the sexually objectifying gaze that alienates 
and instrumentalizes her when in her nonpregnant state. The leer of sexual 
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objectification regards the woman in pieces, as the possible object of a man’s 
desire and touch. In pregnancy the woman may experience some release from this 
alienating gaze. The look focusing on her belly is one not of desire, but of 
recognition. Some may be repelled by her…but the look that follows her in 
pregnancy…does not instrumentalize her with respect to another’s desire. Indeed, 
in this society, which still often narrows women’s possibilities to motherhood, the 
pregnant woman often finds herself looked at with approval. (Young 54, emphasis 
mine)  
With phrases like “sexually objectifying gaze,” “alienating gaze,” “instumentalize,” and 
“another’s desire,” Young’s description of female subjectivity within the sex/pregnancy divide 
takes on a distinctly cinematic tone reminiscent of Laura Mulvey’s famous essay, “Visual 
Pleasure and Narrative Cinema.” While I do not mean to suggest that Young deliberately draws 
upon feminist film criticism, it is worth pointing out a level of concurrence between their 
concerns suggestive of the reciprocal relationship between the objectified experience of women 
in both lived and culturally mediated contexts.  
Despite Young’s efforts to identify a non-judgmental (or at least less judgmental) space 
for women and recover the dignity of the pregnant subject through her identification of harmful 
social mores, I find it somewhat disturbing that she ultimately suggests that a woman can only 
find social and personal acceptance through pregnancy—and even then, acceptance is not 
universally guaranteed. This kind of acceptance barely seems even a consolation prize for the 
cultural split between the erotic and the reproductive. Furthermore, to me, the key idea here is 
that the social dismissal of a woman’s eroticism through pregnancy allows her to avoid the 
sexual objectification that occurs implicitly, though not exclusively, because of and through men 
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(or at least a masculine gaze). This idea allows dominant masculine understandings of female 
sexuality to potentially govern how a woman experiences her own sexuality whether pregnant or 
not; additionally, it severely limits the possibilities of what that sexuality could mean in a given 
circumstance. If you’re pregnant, you cannot be sexy, and if you’re not pregnant, you must be 
sexy; there is no room for any alternative, especially if a non-pregnant woman wishes to avoid 
objectification. But to play devil’s advocate for a moment, why are pregnant women excluded 
from the gaze—from sexuality, from erotic sexual agency—when, as Young mentioned earlier in 
her essay, the pregnant woman “may find herself with a heightened sense of her own sexuality”? 
(53). I suggest that this exclusion results from a perceived cultural need to separate sex from 
reproduction; once these entities are separated, they can be monitored, understood, and 
controlled more easily.  
In this way, we can begin to see how the sex/pregnancy divide can play a crucially 
helpful role in Hollywood’s need to maintain control over how women are represented on the big 
screen and how they intend these representations be interpreted by the audience. The arbitrary 
sex/pregnancy divide is especially crucial for Hollywood, since the male gaze makes any both 
erotically changed. Let us first examine how the gaze conflates the erotic and the reproductive. 
For example, if an image of pregnancy is on screen, then it is in a position to be looked at. In 
other words, because the reproductive is present, it must somehow be dealt with. Since that 
which can be viewed must still mediated through the gaze, it follows that images of the 
reproductive female body are therefore mediated through the gaze. However, mediation only 
occurs through the gaze because the pregnant body is present in the first place and must be 
somehow acknowledged: the pregnant female body that is present on screen cannot escape the 
gaze. And as argue, acknowledging the inability of both reproductive bodies and erotic bodies to 
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escape the gaze leads to viewing the reproductive body as erotic—and this is a serious problem. 
Thus, so long as Hollywood can keep the erotic and the reproductive visually separated, then the 
two remain imaginatively separated as well.  
Additionally, we observe that a version of Mary Ann Doane’s subject-object dialectic 
issues from Julia Kristeva’s description of differing attitudes taken toward the maternal body, 
which I find apt for their particularly visual qualities that further develop the connections 
between real and mediated objectification. Kristeva writes: “Leonardo Da Vinci and Giovanni 
Bellini seem to exemplify in the best fashion the opposition between these two attitudes. On the 
one hand, there is a tilting toward the body as fetish. On the other, a predominance of luminous, 
chromatic differences beyond and despite corporeal representation” (309). Even when treating 
reproductive representations of the female body, we arrive back at the idea of woman as both 
concrete entity and constructed idea, as fetishized and transcendent. The difference here, though, 
is that in the dialectic that Kristeva constructs, it is unclear whether or not the woman, in either 
state, can gaze back. Nonetheless, the unrepresentable woman evades fetishization in spite of—
or perhaps because of—the manner in which she is mediated and visually represented. 
What role, if any, then, does the reproductive have in relation to the erotic? Mulvey 
suggests none; Young locates a positive relationship, but only for the pregnant woman when 
understood through her own subjectivity; Kristeva posits the possibility of a reciprocal 
relationship between the two. Mulvey’s only mention of reproductive sexuality occurs in terms 
of pointing out woman’s role within the phallocentric psychoanalytic system: “the function of 
woman in forming the patriarchal unconscious is two-fold, she first symbolizes the castration 
threat by her real absence of a penis and second thereby raises her child into the symbolic. Once 
this has been achieved, her meaning in the process is at an end, it does not last into the world of 
	   42 
law and language except as a memory of maternal plenitude and memory of lack” (6-7). While 
the reproductive does have a place in the phallocentric system as a whole, it does not have a 
place for Mulvey within the Hollywood system of desire/ego signification, as this system is 
purely erotic and relies upon female spectacle. It is also worth noting here that according to 
Mulvey, the female figure’s lack of a penis eventually cannot be ignored, and she shifts in the 
perception of the male from erotic object to castration threat; at this point, she must either be 
possessed (“investigating the woman, demystifying her mystery”) or fetishized by the male (13). 
According to Kristeva’s logic, though, representations of the reproductive either cannot exist in 
film at all, or they become fetishized in ways similar to erotic representations. Significantly, this 
works at once to collapse the distance (and difference) between the erotic and reproductive in so 
far that erotic sexuality can lead to reproductive sexuality just as reproductive sexuality can also 
be erotic, but additionally, it illustrates how the reproductive can pose an added threat. Thus, not 
only does the representation of the reproductive—whether through pregnancy (maternal) or 
contraception or abortion (non-maternal)—pose a threat to normative fetishization and 
sexualized objectification, but as Mulvey suggests, also poses at least a theoretical threat to the 
male viewer’s very maleness.  
I mention these critical and philosophical psychoanalytic theories about the 
woman/mother in order to illustrate the ways in which the phallocentric system can stand as a 
parallel to America’s—and Hollywood’s—sociohistorical reality during the interwar period. The 
trajectory of how woman is presented in film via psychoanalysis—woman as erotic object 
becomes woman as potential castrator, which leads to a need to subordinate/punish woman—
demonstrates how the reproductively sexual does not—or can not—really fit within the 
Hollywood system of representation. Yet, it also underscores Hollywood’s need to treat 
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reproductive sexuality as erotic sexuality (although not necessarily while conflating the two). 26  
Neither Kristeva nor Young offer a neat solution to the erotic/reproductive split, but they do 
acknowledge and productively complicate this issue. Hollywood’s separation of the female erotic 
and reproductive ties directly back into film and censorship strictures that I will discuss later in 
this chapter, as the dismissal of a pregnant woman’s erotic sexuality is precisely how pregnancy 
(at least partially) makes its way into NBR-era (National Board of Review) and especially Code-
era films. (As we shall see, the pregnant woman is not fully accepted, as, to borrow Young’s 
phrase, “some may be repelled by her.”) Additionally, while Young maintains that 
desexualization can be positive, I argue that in the context of the films that I discuss in this 
project, it is necessarily destructive, as it limits both the quality and quantity of agency that a 
female character may possess in the interest of limiting options for women both within the 
storyworlds of films and the real lives of female viewers. So too, of course, does 
oversexualization. In the films that follow, I analyze how, unlike pregnant characters in 
contraception/reproduction films, female characters with erotic agency are oversexualized in 
ways that highlight their perceived destructive nature—the same destructive nature that is later 
transferred to women with reproductive agency.   
  
Problems with Erotic Agency: Female Types and Transitional Era Censorship 
In order to examine how the foundation upon which problems with reproductive agency 
and desire are based, let us turn to a few case examples of the most prominent erotically sexual 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  In this way, the abortion spectacle, for example, does not read as abortion; it reads as erotic 
spectacle—as female spectacle—and can thereby pass the Production Code’s specification. 
Similarly, by not showing a pregnant body yet mentioning pregnancy, a film can evade the risk 
of collapsing the reproductive and the erotic while still using the two to promote a conservative, 
heteronormative agenda and/or punish she who does not conform to that agenda. 	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cinematic female types in the first half of the twentieth century. Specifically, I wish to trace the 
following trajectory of female types in order to connect the problems that erotic agency 
encounters with those encountered by reproductive agency: the white slavery film’s eponymous 
protagonist of the 1910s, the vamp and flapper in the 1910s and 1920s, and film noir’s femme 
fatale of the 1930s and 1940s. A cadre of works on women’s erotic sexuality by Shelley Stamp, 
Linda Williams, Lea Jacobs, Mary Ann Doane, E. Ann Kaplan, and Janet Staiger27 illustrate the 
degrees to which the white slave, vamp, flapper, and femme fatale gain—or perhaps more 
accurately, seize—their (erotic) agency, and the circumstances under which they ultimately lose 
it.  
The characteristics of these desiring female types are well established and, as we shall 
see, they are distinct yet not completely dissimilar. And yet, just because they are classic 
character types, this does not mean that there are not new ways to understand their function 
within a film. Through examining a test case for each type, I will analyze the character in 
question as both erotic and reproductive, the latter of which alters the traditional perspective on 
the type. Furthermore, I wish to approach these erotic female figures through a typology of 
agency, for this spectrum will help illustrate the level of erotic agency (as it later corresponds to 
punishment) as well as points of overlap between each type. In this schema, the white slave 
would be at the bottom of the sexual agency spectrum. While, as in the case of Lorna from 
Traffic in Souls, her desire to be a New Woman motivates her choice to go out on unchaperoned 
dates, the choice to do so ultimately lands her in a brothel; at this point, any erotic sexual agency 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27 See the following sampling: Shelley Stamp, Movie-Struck Girls: Women and Motion Picture 
Culture after the Nickelodeon; Linda Williams, Screening Sex; Lea Jacobs, The Wages of Sin: 
Censorship and the Fallen Woman Film, 1928-1942; Mary Ann Doane, The Desire to Desire: 
The Woman’s Film of the 1940s; E. Ann Kaplan, ed., Women in Film Noir; Janet Staiger, Bad 
Women: Regulating Sexuality in Early American Cinema.  
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has vanished, as the white slave is forced to engage sexually with partners not of her choosing. 
The vamp, as Linda Williams notes, possesses a remarkable amount of erotic agency—in fact, it 
fairly consumes her—and she is variously punished for it.28 Her erotic agency is strictly tied to 
her own disinterested pleasure: the vamp does not engage sexually for love, but for self-
preservation and sport. The flapper moves away from the vamp’s treatment of sex as blood sport 
and, as Sara Ross points out, is able to do so through her embrace of the “comic masquerade” 
(409). The femme fatale is similar to the vamp in so far that erotic sexuality functions as a 
weapon or tool, but she differs insofar that her primary function is not (only) to seduce a man, 
but commonly to successfully perpetrate a crime and further her own personal and/or 
professional agenda(s). When her ability to charm and seduce no longer holds sway, however, 
her agency disappears.  
Overall, loss of agency is frequently motivated by the fact that the women in question 
must be punished, assumedly (and ironically) for the crime of being women with agency. The 
punishment at times is simply loss of agency; at others, imprisonment; at still others, death. From 
these themes of punishment and loss of agency comes the connection to women’s reproductive 
sexuality, as the women who embrace their reproductive sexuality ultimately meet with very 
similar double standards, fates, and punishments. Through looking at examples of these types in 
the context of censorship history, I aim to identify a trajectory of cinematic representation that 
vilifies these types through intimately tying sexual agency to punishment. Additionally, these 
representations also make the relationship between erotic agency and punishment causal through 
the conservative move of mapping the perceived transgressions of these types onto their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 See Linda Williams’ treatment of Greta Garbo in Flesh and the Devil in Chapter 1 of 
Screening Sex, wherein she emphasizes the importance of Garbo’s character drowning in the end 
for her alleged unapologetic sins (48).  
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reproductive counterparts. From this foundation, we will be better able to see not only how these 
issues of agency shift from sexy to pregnant, but also how the sexy and the pregnant become 
problematically distanced, separated or divorced from each other completely.  
 
The White Slave and Film’s Changing Legal Limitations 
The white slavery film, a type of social issue film, gained popularity in the early 1910s as 
a means of raising public awareness regarding the problem of forced prostitution and white slave 
trafficking that plagued young women. Directed by George Loane Tucker in 1913, Traffic in 
Souls is one of the first and most prominent of the white slavery films. Traffic in Souls is a 
fictional rendering of the white slave, but its well-known counterpart, Frank Beal’s The Inside of 
the White Slave Traffic (1913), is based on a study commissioned by John D. Rockefeller, Jr. that 
was designed to gather information about its titular subject. Inside purports its educational value 
as an exposé: it opens with several intertitles that mean to establish its basis upon research and 
sociological inquiry, as well as to build its credibility by listing endorsements from prominent 
figures such as author Charlotte Perkins Gilman, philanthropist Mrs. William K. Vanderbilt, and 
several judges. Another intertitle establishes the film as a “pictorial report…without any 
exaggeration or fictional indulgence,” even going so far as to supply the viewer with charts 
defining white slave traffickers’ vocabulary. Yet despite its documentary footage, the film was 
eventually condemned by censors because, as Shelley Stamp suggests, it came to be considered 
among the category of “’indecent pictures,” which simply exploited the phenomenon [of white 
slavery] for the purposes of titillation” (“Moral Coercion” 55). Yet the line between decent and 
indecent is perhaps difficult to navigate, given the dire and sordid situation of the white slave. 
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Oliver Edward Janney of the National Vigilance Committee describes the white slave’s plight in 
1911 as follows: 
The human chattels of these traffickers are practically slaves, for the girls and women 
who are lured, deceived through affection, or in some instances forced into prostitution, 
are held in bondage through subtle but compelling means. Whether the victim is confined 
behind closed doors, or is allowed to go out under close watch, or kept in submission by 
fear of personal violence, she is, under any of these conditions, a slave—one forced to do 
her master’s bidding and obliged to give him the money she receives. (15, emphasis 
original) 
While representation of the processes of entrapment and enslavement vary in the two films, they 
both treat some version of Janney’s description, which underscores the lack of both real and 
perceived agency felt by women affected by the white slave trade. 
In addition to the historical context of the white slave, one must also consider the context 
of the New Woman in Traffic in Souls, as this provides key background information as well as a 
connection to white slave trafficking within the film. In the 1910s, women were entering the 
workforce and taking jobs as factory workers, shopgirls, secretaries, and teachers because these 
jobs “allowed more free time and autonomy” than did domestic work, and such positions were 
especially sought after by “the young, unmarried, and American-born” (Peiss 40-41). As a result, 
younger and unmarried women in the workforce discovered a world beyond the strictures of 
domesticity: they went out in mixed company and on dates, they engaged with popular culture 
(such as film), they discussed their adventures and their relationships, and older or married 
women “shared their acquired wisdom about negotiating the attentions of men, both on the job 
and in their leisure time” (Peiss 50).  
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 It is within this changing social milieu that we meet Traffic in Souls’s protagonists, the 
Barton sisters. The first and elder sister is Mary Barton, who, in her deceased mother’s absence, 
runs the family’s household, cares for her aging invalid father, and works as a store clerk to 
support her family financially. Mary has a sweetheart, Officer Burke (who is, appropriately, on 
the local police force and occupies a place of civic and legal patriarchal authority), but due to 
Mary’s sexual and social conservatism, her family supervises her relationship with Burke, and 
the couple only shows affection in the most chaste and appropriate of ways. Mary’s younger 
sister, Lorna (sometimes referred to as Little Sister), is the complete opposite: she is headstrong, 
irresponsible (often arriving late for work), and avidly desires to participate in the leisure and 
dating culture espoused by the New Woman of the early twentieth century. These modern values 
and desires lead Lorna to accept a date from a young man: a date that she goes on 
unchaperoned—and that yields dangerously unexpected results. As it turns out, Lorna’s suitor is 
a pimp who uses the ploy of a date to lure her away from protected social space, drug her, and 
kidnap her.  
 Lorna’s desire for sexual autonomy ultimately lands her in the bedroom of a nearby 
brothel. In the first bedroom scene of Traffic, Lorna is manhandled and her suitor-cum-pimp 
violently removes her suit jacket. While the removal of an outer layer of clothing might seem 
mundane by contemporary standards, this action is highly suggestive for contemporaneous 
viewers and reads as an act of sexual aggression against a defenseless woman. Lorna is visibly 
upset by this act, and as the pimp and house matron exit, they lock Lorna in the erotically 
charged space of the bedroom to contemplate her fate as a prostitute. The date that began for 
Lorna as a means of asserting control over her public sexual agency ends abruptly in a 
devastating loss of control.  
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This scene, however, is cross-cut with a scene occurring simultaneously in a separate 
but nearby location. Mary, distraught over her missing sister, is staged similarly to Lorna, 
although within the socially appropriate and non-threatening space of her family’s home: both 
women are posed alone and crying in their respective bedroom spaces (Lorna for her rescue from 
the brothel, Mary for Lorna’s safe return). The simultaneity of these two similarly composed 
shots made possible by the cross-cut illustrates the ideology and morality of early cinematic 
representations of female sexuality: according to Stamp, these cross-cut shots do the work of  
“simultaneously censoring and amplifying sexual connotations manifest in the brothel images, 
returning Little Sister’s eroticized posture to that of piety and repositioning the bedroom in a 
domestic setting” (Stamp, Movie-Struck 74).29 Stamp is right to point out that the cross-cut from 
Lorna sobbing in the brothel to Mary sobbing on her bed at the Barton home works, on the one 
hand, to connect the two scenes temporally and to subdue the erotic overtones of Lorna’s 
predicament by domesticating it. On the other hand, however, this erotic/domestic economy 
could also work in the opposite direction and do more than censor or enhance the “sexual 
connotations manifest in the brothel images”; indeed, it can eroticize the domestic. Stamp 
focuses on using Mary’s situation as a lens through which we can read Lorna’s predicament, and 
this crucial reading provides insight into the film’s moral code: she argues that through this 
mapping, “…the narrative suggests the normative morality accorded [Mary’s] position” (Movie-
Struck 75). I agree with this interpretation, but I wish to also consider its inverse. By contrast, if 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 On the subject of Traffic’s form as a transitional-era film, see Ben Brewster’s study, “Traffic in 
Souls (1913): An experiment in feature-length narrative construction,” wherein he argues that 
“feature cinema in the teens is not a simple outgrowth from one-reel cinema,” and that Traffic 
provides an interesting case study of the transitional-era film not simply because it is a feature, 
but rather because of how it “cobbles together available devices from one-reel cinema and 
elsewhere to construct something qualitatively new” (Brewster 226, 236).  	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we read Mary through the lens of Lorna’s predicament, then Mary’s safe and chaste bedroom 
space becomes connected to and threatened by the vice of the outside world. To take this reading 
even further, I would also suggest that Mary’s bedroom, like Lorna’s, has become a prison, too: 
instead of being imprisoned by the specter of forced sexual servitude, however, Mary is 
imprisoned by her own chastity and by dominant social mores. In this way, the film offers a 
critique of arbitrary double standards placed upon women’s erotic agency. Yet, at the same time, 
this potentially subversive moment is steamrolled by the film’s fears that even the chastely 
domestic woman is not safe from sexual corruption via sexual agency.30 
From the cross-cut brothel/bedroom scene, we can see not only how erotic sexual agency 
becomes problematic, but also how even the censored image can and does still signify beyond its 
censored status. For example, Lorna may be in a brothel’s boudoir, but the suit jacket is all of her 
clothing that is removed, and we never see her perform a sexual act—indeed, Officer Burke and 
Mary rescue her before the opportunity arises; and yet, even the vague suggestion of sexual 
activity is enough for the viewer to imagine the worst for Lorna (and possibly also for Mary—or 
for any woman). As Linda Williams suggests, sex—or the implication or threat thereof—is 
screened in two ways, as “screening”	  takes on two primary, contradictory meanings. On the one 
hand, to screen is to reveal or to show; on the other, it is to conceal: “Sex is an act and more or 
less of ‘it’ may be revealed but, as we shall see, it is not a stable truth that cameras and 
microphones either ‘catch’ or don’t catch. It is a constructed, mediated, performed act and every 
revelation is also a concealment that leaves something to the imagination” (L. Williams 2). Her 
emphasis on “leav[ing] something to the imagination” within the dialectic of 
concealment/revelation emphasizes the fact that the viewer’s own attitude towards women’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 For a full account of Stamp’s reading of Traffic in Souls in the context of the white slavery 
film, see Chapter 2 of Movie-Struck Girls.  
	   51 
erotic sexuality can easily be mapped onto a given a film. As Janet Staiger notes, “[p]eople in 
1911 realized that viewers mentally filled in gaps in stories and could do this for supposedly 
taboo scenes” (119). While this does free up potentially subversive space for the viewer’s own 
non-traditional sexual predilections and morals, it also makes the film vulnerable to subjection to 
a larger social master narrative: a narrative that is most consistently and prominently created and 
enforced by the censorship authorities, whether in the form of the National Board of Censorship 
or, from the 1930s to the 1960s, the Production Code. 
Lorna makes her own decisions in Traffic in Souls, and she is arguably punished for them 
with kidnapping, with rough treatment, and nearly with forced sexual servitude. Staiger, 
however, takes an alternate approach to understanding the white slave and her erotic agency. She 
identifies two typical readings of the white slave: “innocent victim” and “woman gone astray” 
(Staiger 126). Regardless of how the woman in question ends up in a brothel, be it through 
naïveté or accident or rebellion, “…the woman could be saved; the difference was in how she 
was to be rehabilitated—whether she was to be merely freed from her house of bondage or 
reeducated to dominant social norms” (126). Ultimately, Staiger argues that in the context of 
Traffic in Souls, the problems women encounter with prostitution are precipitated by “naïveté or 
ignorance (rather than any socioeconomic need or, even worse, [her] sexual desire” (138); she 
uses Lorna as well as the country girl and the Swedish sisters as evidence of women who fell into 
danger for being too trusting or too vulnerable. Staiger insists that “[t]he film does not chastise 
women for entering the public streets or working in heterosocial situations. It does suggest that 
they must keep their wits about them. This position is quite within the norms being advocated for 
the New Woman in modern America: good women are thinking women” (138). First of all, the 
distinction Staiger makes between innocence and desire serves as a reminder of the separation 
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between desire, sex, and pregnancy; with it, she implies that while being a thinking woman is 
better than being a naïve one, being naïve is doubtless better than being desirous of sex. Within 
the storyworld, it is true that none of the women captured by the Madame’s employees want to 
become prostitutes—for any reason—and that this is generally characteristic of white slave film. 
Just because these women are not lead to prostitution by erotic sexual desire, however, does not 
mean that they do not feel said desire. Indeed, we know that Lorna does, for her erotic agency 
and desire are what lead her to her unchaperoned date in the first place.  
Secondly, I agree that the film does not argue in totality against women in the public 
sphere, for Mary Barton works at the very same candy shop as her little sister and does not 
encounter the same type of issues. What I want to challenge here is the role of Lorna’s agency. 
Whether or not there were warning signs that Lorna could or should have picked up on, she 
nonetheless chose to accept the offer of a date from a man she thought to be an honest suitor (but 
who turned out to be a kidnapper and pimp). While there may exist greater social anxiety 
surrounding women making ignorant choices than surrounding women making any choices at 
all, the fact remains that when erotic female agency functions outside of the social norm, it is a 
threat. “Woman and woman’s sexuality were not taboo as topics but were a focal point for 
understanding a changing social order,” yet that “changing social order” can be—and is—in this 
case and in the cases I consider subsequently, a cause for concern and thusly for censorship 
(Staiger 16). To this, I would add that at least in terms of the films I examine, the “changing 
social order” represented by their female leads is not necessarily a positive development—and it 
is certainly one to be monitored. 
One key legal move affecting film and censorship is the passage of the Sims Act in 1912. 
The Sims Act, which results from controversy over African-American boxer Jack Johnson’s 
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prizefight films, declares that the Johnson films are “commerce” and, according to Article 1, 
Section 8 of the United States Constitution, could be “subject[ed]…to interstate commerce 
regulation” (Grieveson, Policing 33). As Grieveson notes, one of the main consequences of this 
decision is that by figuring these films as commerce, cinema becomes conceptually and 
practically (although not yet explicitly) separated from First Amendment freedom of speech 
guarantees. Furthermore, the Sims Act raises new questions of government intervention in the 
film industry, as it is “seen by many as a significant step in the direction of increased 
governmental activism and control in relation to cinema” (Grieveson, Policing 135); increased 
government intervention was what the industry was hoping to avoid with the creation of the 
National Board of Review in 1908-09. 
Also at stake in the creation of the Sims Act is the issue of audience emulation. Since the 
film of the 1910 world-title boxing match between African-American Jack Johnson and white 
Jim Jeffries depicted the actual fight, social reformers feared the influence that these images 
might have on children in particular. Cardinal Gibbons, Archbishop of Baltimore, expressed 
concern that, “…hundreds of children would see [films like this], and…[t]heir morals would not 
only be contaminated, but they would have the wrong ideal of a true hero,” with the heroic figure 
now “a man bespattered with blood and a swollen eye given him by another in a fistic 
encounter.” He continues that, “The boy would go and try to do likewise. This would be a sad 
state of affairs” (Qtd. in Grieveson, Policing 128-129). Archbishop Gibbons’ fear—and the fear 
of others like him—is this: fight films encourage children to fight.31 I would push this assessment 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 In addition to the fear of audience members—especially children—getting the wrong ideas 
from the film, there is also, as Grieveson points out, an attendant fear that this film in particular 
challenges the perceived superiority of the white race. Susan Courtney explores the racial fear 
and anxiety attendant in the Johnson fight footage in Chapter 2 of Hollywood Fantasies of 
Miscegenation. While most scholarly accounts focus on the white regulation of black bodies, she 
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further by stating that, as non-fictional footage of a live event, these films run the risk of 
corrupting the morals of youths because they are not tempered by a narrative frame.32  
And still, there is yet another significant aspect of the legal response to the Johnson fight 
footage that needs mentioning: its relation to the censorship of female bodies, and particularly to 
the white slave. There are two key components to this relationship. Firstly, as Grieveson argues 
in “Fighting Films: Race, morality, and the governing of cinema, 1912-1915”33 with special 
attention to the Johnson footage, “A concern with disciplining the movement of a particular 
black body through social space, closely linked to the restoration of a moral social order, became 
enmeshed with the regulation of moving pictures” (“Fighting Films” 169). Black (violent) bodies 
were not the only bodies whose social and cinematic movement caused anxiety and trepidation. 
Charles Musser’s research shows outcry against footage of the white-on-white boxing bout 
between Robert Fitzsimmons and James Corbett in March 1897, which Reverend Levi Gilbert, a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
posits that we must also consider that the film’s considerable white audience alongside the two-
year gap between the fight and the Sims Act indicate that it “resonated with white viewers in a 
period where white male dominance was widely imagined to be at risk,” as these viewers “might 
take comfort in at least having their fears ‘vividly’ registered” (Courtney 60).  
 
32 Archbishop Gibbons is not the only person to vocalize anxiety about the effect of film on 
youths. This was also a topic of great concern for the Women’s Christian Temperance Union, 
whose pro-censorship opinions “had social power inasmuch as they represented a coherent 
synopsis of public fears concerning the ‘evils’ of film”; in addition to advocating for federal 
censorship laws, they also promoted educational films in move that Alison Parker calls 
“complimentary, not incompatible” (73, 74). To compound the debate, Robert Sklar suggests that 
concern for youths really functions as a more disingenuously polite mask for concerns about 
class: “Since the enemies of the movies could deal only indirectly or covertly with the issue of 
class conflict, they made their case on the ground of protecting the young” (124).   	  
33 Specifically, Greiveson is here interested in the specific censorship and distribution history of 
the Johnson fight films: “Taken together, the curious similarities in the events sketched here 
suggest that a policing of Johnson’s movements shifted to an equally intensive policing of the 
movement of pictures of Johnson fighting” (Grieveson, “Fighting Films” 170). Nonetheless, his 
analysis thereof provides a nice point of connection between these films and the reproduction-
related films that I examine, particularly those pre-Code films that are the focus of Chapter 2.  
 
	   55 
Methodist minister form Cleveland, described as the following: “‘Such exhibitions promote 
criminality by feeding the bestial in man. They debauch the public ideal. Such men sell their 
bodies for merchandise as surely as the harlots of the street’” (Qtd. in Musser 195).34 Here, Rev. 
Gilbert equates (white) boxers to prostitutes—in addition, of course, to sharing his concerns 
about the film lowering the viewer’s morals and inspiring emulation. In so doing, he provides a 
bridge from violent white male bodies to violent black male bodies to, ultimately, female 
bodies—and in particular, to reproductive and/or socially progressive (and transgressive) female 
bodies. Take Lorna in Traffic for example: she has a job within the public sphere, she goes on 
unchaperoned dates, she makes her own decisions relative to her desire. To borrow Grieveson’s 
words in this context, we might identify the problem as Lorna’s display of too much 
“movement”; through Mary and Burke’s rescue of Lorna, the “moral social order” is 
reestablished.  
Secondly, we must also consider as a point of connection the white slavery charges 
leveled against Johnson himself and his ultimate conviction in May 1913. Johnson, famous for 
his sexual relationships with white women, was accused of white slave trafficking for allegedly 
“abducting” one of his (white) lovers, (alleged prostitute and future wife) Lucille Cameron, and 
taking her across state lines, assumedly with the intention of engaging in sexual activity 
(Grieveson, “Fighting Films” 177). Johnson was tried under the 1910 Mann Act, also known as 
the White-Slave Traffic Act, which prohibited the “transport [of] any girl or woman in interstate 
or foreign commerce for the purposes of debauchery or any other immoral purposes” (176). 
Although Cameron refused to testify against Johnson and the charges were temporarily dropped, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 With regard to the Corbett-Fitzsimmons fight, Miriam Hansen also points out that its display 
on film made it accessible to female audiences, with whom it was very popular, although “the 
film’s success with female audiences was more or less accidental” (2).  
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a former lover of Johnson’s by the name of Belle Schreiber testified against him a month later, 
and her testimony helped bring about Johnson’s conviction. Grieveson points out that “[t]he 
prosecution of Jack Johnson as a white slaver in 1912, a few months after the banning of his 
fight films from movement within the nation, crystallized concerns over race, sexual immorality, 
and nationalism that were important to Progressive reform in general and to the construction of 
the white slavery scare in particular” (“Fighting Films” 176). The racial politics at play in the 
Johnson case are no doubt disturbing. Johnson was vilified as a male aggressor—a black male 
aggressor—against white women at a time when eugenics-based fears of miscegenation were 
very real in America; in fact, “[m]iscegenation bills were introduced after Johnson’s conviction 
in half of the twenty states that still permitted interracial marriage” (Grieveson, “Fighting Films”  
178). In addition to Johnson’s films’ implications for the representation of female bodies in film, 
we can also see from this case how issues of protecting female bodies and preserving certain 
conservative ideas about (and ideals of) female bodies come to the fore. And given the Sims 
Act’s concern with audience emulation, we can also see how those concerns bleed over into 
films featuring women who do not embody and promote normative morals and values despite—
or perhaps because of—the fact that Johnson’s fight films catalyze the Sims Act. Additionally, 
while the rhetoric of “commerce” in the Sims Act is not yet explicitly made equivalent to 
“entertainment,” it nonetheless brings cinema one step closer to the decision ultimately handed 
down in Mutual v. Ohio. 
Grieveson identifies these two legal moves—the Sims Act and Mutual v. Ohio—as 
together “situat[ing] cinema as beyond the constitutional guarantee of free speech as enshrined in 
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the First Amendment and in state constitutions” (Policing 33).35  The 1915 Mutual Film 
Corporation v. Ohio State Censorship Ordinance decision rules that films are “entertainment”; 
they therefore are not covered under the First Amendment and may be censored on a state-by-
state basis (Qtd. in Grieveson, Policing 33). Indeed, film “has the distinction of being the only 
medium of communication ever subjected to systematic legal prior-restraint in the history of the 
United States” (Jowett 21). In Mutual v. Ohio, as in the Sims Act, the basis for the ruling in favor 
of Ohio’s right to state censorship hinges upon the potentially socially corruptive power of film; 
Jowett emphasizes this concern over corruption when he notes that film’s “…danger was only 
increased by the enormous inherent attraction the medium held for the public, especially those 
classes that were more susceptible to outside influence” – for example, women (28). Despite 
Mutual’s arguments, which draw attention to the similarities between film and news media and 
assert the news media’s protection under the First Amendment, the Supreme Court ultimately 
decides that this protection does not extend to film. Justice Joseph McKenna rules that while film 
has the potential to be “useful, interesting, educational and moral,” it “may be used for evil, and 
against that possibility the statute was enacted” (Qtd. in Grieveson, Policing 200). According to 
Grieveson, “[t]he logic of the justices’ argument suggested that the ‘pretense to worthy purpose’ 
in film should be avoided, that cinema should be linked to fictional goals and nonpractical ends” 
(Policing 201); this relegation of film to the realm of the fictional and nonpractical all but 
demands a narrative frame. Again, we see that anxiety over projected worst-case scenario 
audience reactions propels preemptive decisions that generally limit cinema’s potential and 
specifically limit its potential to present progressively sexual women. The Mutual v. Ohio 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Garth Jowett notes that the first court case dealing with motion pictures was the 1897 People v. 
Doris. In this case, “the presiding New York judge ruled that pantomime of a bride’s wedding 
night was ‘an outrage upon public decency,’” demonstrating how some form of censorship has 
been in play nearly since film’s first moments (21).  
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decision suggests that while cinema is inherently neither helpful nor harmful, just the possibility 
that it could be harmful warrants its relegation to the realm of “entertainment.”  
This dismissal of film’s capacity as something “useful, interesting, educational and 
moral,” however, does not mean that the causally motivated narrative that has begun to gain a 
foothold has triumphed unequivocally; the relationship between film as entertaining narrative 
and as purveyor of information grows more complex the more both internal and external 
censorship institutions attempt to promote the cinema of narrative integration. And as 
contraception films from the late teens to the early fifties illustrate, narrative takes on a role as 
that which obscures or eliminates the scientifically didactic message. When we consider the 
development of the narrative/didacticism debate alongside the beginnings of censorship 
institutions in America, we can see how a need to monitor and/or disallow images generally 
considered prurient or immoral would arise. As a case in point, Stamp’s research shows that 
Traffic was approved by the National Board of Review without much hassle because “…its 
treatment of white slavery was already embedded within the kind of unequivocal moral language 
that the board sought, serving up a melodramatic plot of punishment and redemption in place of 
an unsparing exposé of urban vice” (“Moral Coercion” 44). The “unsparing exposé of urban 
vice—The Inside of the White Slave Traffic (1913)—did not fare so well, however, largely 
because National Board of Review committee members considered it “‘distinctly an illustration 
of the white slave traffic, thinly veiled as an attempt to educate the public’” (Qtd. in Stamp, 
“Moral Coercion” 53). The problem with Inside, it seems, it not necessarily that it purportedly 
aims at education, but that there is not enough moralizing—or narrative. It is, perhaps, too 
educational, as “[t]he film’s incorporation of greater social critique and documentary footage 
	   59 
mitigated against the elementary moralizing that the Board of Censorship hoped to see in 
pictures of this sort” (Stamp, “Moral Coercion” 55).36  
Given these two legal acts, we can see how the perception of film as negatively 
influential could—and does—exacerbate the threat that, to borrow Staiger’s phrase, “Bad 
Women” potentially pose: a threat that, I will show, continues to lead to greater strictures being 
placed upon how women with erotic and reproductive agency are represented. As Staiger points 
out, it is not simply that women in the public sphere or on the big screen were inherently a 
problem; the problem lies in what they promote and/or represent—or more to the point, what 
they are perceived as promoting and/or representing. She writes, “Images that disrupt the norms, 
the Bad Woman in these cases, display the boundaries and frazzled edges of current norms, and, 
thus, a Bad Woman sets an agenda for change. A Bad Woman does work in excess of her social 
importance, but she exists in order to provide a lesson in narrative about her alternative” (Staiger 
116-117). The “lesson in narrative” is key here, both in terms of what types of lessons are 
permissible and what kinds of lessons film is capable of as it moves closer to adopting the 
paradigm of the classical Hollywood narrative. Grieveson notes that “[r]eformers, entrepreneurs, 
and filmmakers had, as we have seen, championed the educative cultural function of moving 
pictures…but now this stance and alliance was tested, for it was unclear whether—after the Sims 
Act—film could engage with ‘darker’ real-life ‘social problems’ in a way similar to that of other 
social discourse, such as the press” (Policing 153). In other words, how educational—how 
progressive—can film be when the National Board of Review, the federal government, and state 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 In relation to white slavery, the film also criticizes several other social structures: the broken 
legal system that works in favor of the slavers but punishes the women forced into the white 
slavery system; the “out of my house” rule, whereby parents refuse to take their daughters back 
under their roof after a pre-marital sexual encounter; the low wages of shop and factory work 
that force women back into white slavery after they have escaped it.  
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governments place limitations upon it in terms of what can be addressed? What will happen to 
the potential for representations of women to go against norms and mores once narrative 
dominates? 
As I mentioned earlier, it is not that narrative film does not convey a message or have an 
agenda—it does. What I question, though, it what agendas come across and how they do so. 
“Conclusions were consequences, not merely of causality, but also of personal decisions,” as 
Staiger notes before going on to cite contemporaneous screenwriting manual author Epes 
Winthrop Sargent: “‘Stories of murders, thefts, abduction and all crimes are not wanted unless 
the moral is strong and rightly placed’” (Qtd. in Staiger 119, emphasis mine). There must be a 
moral to the bad story—to the story of the Bad Woman—if it is to be told. Another way of 
reading this screenplay suggestion is this: if there is a story about a “Bad Woman,” she must be 
bad, and she must be punished, lest the film run the risk of falling into the category of the Jack 
Johnson boxing match footage. Not only must there be a story, but there must be a moral, and it 
must be the “right” moral, so to speak. 
Now let us consider a hypothetical situation in Traffic. What if, instead of merely being 
threatened with forced sexual encounters, Lorna actually experienced such an encounter and 
became pregnant? By asking this question, I do not mean simply to play of game of “choose your 
own adventure” for Lorna. Rather, I wish to point out how easily erotic agency can lead to the 
necessity of confronting the reproductive. Traffic makes it very clear that it does not wish to 
engage with the reproductive, as Lorna and her situation would inevitably pose an even greater 
social problem that would arguably be much harder to solve. One option would be to completely 
vilify Lorna—in a marked, physical way—for her erotic desire and treated as an even more 
extreme cautionary tale. Otherwise, Lorna’s situation would become problematically ambiguous, 
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as it would force viewers to grapple with her reproductive choices and desires: Is Lorna that 
“bad” if she didn’t really want to have intercourse with her kidnapper-pimp or with a brothel 
patron? Should she be judged for carrying a fetus conceived, more or less, out of rape? Should 
abortion be permitted in Lorna’s case? These just a few of the questions and possibilities that 
Traffic’s avoidance of the reproductive disallows. 
In this way, we can see how Traffic in Souls does not just tap into the Progressive social 
agenda by raising awareness regarding the white slave trade;37 it sets the stage, so to speak, for 
the vilification of erotic female sexual agency. Lorna finds herself in an unsavory predicament in 
the first place because of her engagement with unchaperoned dating and treating culture. Lorna’s 
kidnapping propels the plot towards her eventual rescue from the vice syndicate by the police, 
thanks chiefly to Mary and Officer Burke. This move underscores the moral superiority of the 
traditional woman who does not display a desire for sexual agency, or at least not sexual agency 
outside of prescribed social mores; as Lorna is literally rescued by Mary and Burke, she is 
metaphorically rescued by the traditional heteronormative relationship. Even without going so 
far as having Lorna—or any of the other recently kidnapped girls—actually engage implicitly or 
explicitly in any sex acts, Lorna’s agency and choice to date—and thus her potential desire to 
engage thusly is vilified and undermined. 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Christopher Diffee gives an engaging reading of Traffic in Souls as a text that illustrates 
Progressive Era debates on the public versus the private sphere in “Sex and the City: The White 
Slavery Scare and Social Governance in the Progressive Era.” He argues that “erotic danger 
helped revise the liberal dualism of public and private space,” for while it is commonly believed 
that the private sphere of the home needed to be protected from intrusion by outside social 
corruption and by government intrusion, Traffic in Souls shows us that corruption can come from 
within, and the wholesomely domestic can be preserved through outside intervention (412).  
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The Vamp 
In contrast to the woman whose desire for sexual autonomy lands her in the position of 
the white slave and who then has her erotic sexuality forced upon her, the vamp embraces not 
only her own sense of agency, but she also embraces and explicitly displays her erotic agency—
sometimes for the fun of it, sometimes for a specific goal. Taking Frank Powell’s A Fool There 
Was (1915) as my example, Theda Bara’s character, The Vampire, is snubbed and insulted at the 
film’s outset by Mrs. Kate Schuyler, a wealthy society woman, and thus uses her erotic agency to 
take revenge by seducing Mrs. Schuyler’s husband and ruining her family. Ronald Genini 
differentiates between the modernist vamp and the Victorian vampire, pointing out that “the new 
vampire… was a very human, non-supernatural creature” (14).38 He adds that “[s]exual conquest 
was still a prime factor of her vampirism…her perverse motive was mere destruction” (Genini 
14). The new vampire, then, is presented as a physical and sexually dangerous woman: one who 
uses her erotic agency to prey upon male victims.39  
A review from the New York Dramatic Mirror calls A Fool There Was “‘[b]old and 
relentless; it is filled with passion and tragedy…shot through by the lightning bolt of sex,’”: this 
seems a fitting way to frame the Fool, as the Vamp’s sexuality certainly pervades it from start to 
finish (Qtd. in Golden 41). The Vampire (or more colloquially, the Vamp) is referred to by other 
characters, by newspaper reporters, and by intertitle narration variously as “the woman who did 
not care,” “devil,” “hellcat,” “a certain notorious woman of the vampire species,” “the notorious 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 The modernist vampire is based on Philip Burne-Jones’ 1897 painting, The Vampire, and his 
cousin Rudyard Kipling’s complementary poem of the same name which was included in the 
same exhibit as Burne-Jones’ painting (Genini 13).  
 
39 According to Genini, “the psychic vampire was usually female while the Dracula-type vampire 
was usually male” (14).  
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woman,” and, quite simply, “that woman” (emphasis mine). Unlike the society women who are 
outfitted in stylish yet modest garments, the Vamp is frequently clad in elaborate headdresses 
and dark form-fitting dresses made of lace and patterned cloth. Her costume does more than 
merely enhance her figure (although it certainly does accomplish that aim); it also highlights the 
extravagance of her taste and, most importantly, it constantly reminds the viewer of her 
profession as, for lack of a better term, an independent prostitute for hire. The Vamp dresses so 
seductively in order to attract men and because she attracts men. In other words, once the Vamp 
latches onto “her victims,” as the film’s narration calls them, she takes vicarious control of their 
finances; while the men still believe themselves to be in control, the Vamp is really in charge of 
the checkbook. As such, she receives all of the European vacations, fine clothes, expensive 
evenings out, and decadent food and drink that she desires: “Fallen women might have fallen 
morally, but they might also have risen financially, carried to a higher monetary status through 
their alliance with their lover” (Staiger 147). Another consistent detail of the Vamp’s mise-en-
scene is the presence of roses: she is first shown happily destroying a rose, she wears them on 
her clothing, she carries them with her, she drops their petals on a dying John Schuyler. The rose 
serves here as both a representation of her sexual openness as well as a means of foreshadowing 
her hidden danger.40  
Moving from man to man and bleeding each dry—financially, morally, socially, and 
physically—is the Vamp’s profession, and she is both adept and successful at it. Of the vamp, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 While playing with her mother and aunt, Schuyler’s young daughter picks up a rose form the 
feet of the Vampire. The girl hands it to her mother, who smells the flower, shakes her head no to 
indicate her disgust, and throws it out of the frame, for the threat of the Vamp’s brazen sexuality 
to her daughter is beyond Mrs. Schuyler’s capacity for tolerance. She performs all of these 
actions while standing between the Vamp and her daughter with her back to the Vamp. This is 
the slight that compels the Vamp to declare to the absent Mrs. Schulyer, “Some day you will 
regret that” and to begin to plot her revenge.  
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Staiger notes that “…for the gold digger to be perceived as the parasite, it required her to be 
calculating, intelligent, and willful rather than the object of a man’s choice for elevation” (150). 
Again, we see here a very problematic type of agency, and within the film, John Schuyler is far 
from the first man the Vamp has seduced; others have gone mad, become destitute, or been 
incarcerated, and Schuyler’s immediate predecessor commits suicide right in front of the Vamp. 
This scene and the one that precedes it serve as a good example of the Vamp’s sexual agency. In 
the preceding scene, the Vamp lounges in her current lover’s apartment in a revealing nightgown 
and learns from a newspaper article that John Schuyler sails for Great Britain the next day. She is 
packing her trunk for her voyage of vengeance when her lover, a young man named Parmalee, 
grows angry that she would “ruin” and then “discard” him. After kissing him and convincing him 
she was only bluffing, she rejoices over the fact that he’s gone and accidentally left his wallet 
full of cash, which the Vamp happily appropriates as funding for her trip. A few scenes later, 
Parmalee has snuck aboard the ocean liner with gun in tow, ready to put an end to the Vamp. 
When he finds her on the ship’s deck, however, she quickly turns his anger and murderous intent 
to frustration and self-loathing. With Parmalee’s gun pointed at her chest, the Vamp merely 
smiles and succeeds in getting Parmalee to lower the gun by hitting it with a rose. When she 
leans in to Parmalee and utters her infamous, “Kiss me, my Fool!,” he seems momentarily to buy 
into her ploy, but then regains his composure and lifts the gun to his own head. The next we see 
of Parmalee, he is lying dead on the deck with the Vamp nowhere to be seen, indicating that 
Parmalee has just committed suicide. As a crewman sops up Parmalee’s blood with a rag, he 
informs Schuyler that “[o]nly a boy he was, Sir, and she standing there and laughing like a 
devil.”   
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This succession of scenes encapsulates the erotic agency of the Vamp (both specifically 
and as representative of the type) in several key ways. Firstly, we know that in general her 
motive is self-preservation, but not in the way we would see depicted in a melodrama about a 
widow or other pitiable female type who has fallen upon hard times or has encountered a 
difficult situation. Self-preservation for the Vamp is more about maintaining a particularly 
moneyed and pampered existence. As she has no home of her own in the film, it is imperative 
that she be on the constant lookout for opportunities to move from one lover-benefactor to the 
next. In this sense, I disagree with Genini’s characterization of the Vamp as “a wicked woman 
who ruins honorable men by seducing them with her primitive, almost magical sexuality, then 
destroys the helpless creatures as they grovel at her feet with passion,” and not the least because 
he himself defines the modernist vampire as “non-supernatural” (21). True, the Vamp does use 
and discard men, but oversimplifying her motives does a disservice to the film’s complexities 
and ambiguities, as I shall continue to discuss. Furthermore, I wish to call attention to adjectives 
like “wicked” and “primitive, almost magical,” as they highlight how non-traditional erotic 
female agency becomes vilified (even by contemporary critics) even as it is simultaneously 
revered as an unknown entity.   
Self-preservation is not the Vamp’s only motive, however. Specifically in A Fool There 
Was, the Vamp is also motivated by the desire for revenge: the desire to, in an oddly poetic way 
that seems to largely disappear with the institution of the Production Code, defend her own honor 
after being denounced as a lesser and unfit woman through Kate Schuyler’s cold dismissal. 
While seemingly randomly Machiavellian in her designs and actions, the Vamp, in the case of 
her affair with John Schuyler, is not only interested in self-preservation, but more so in teaching 
the judgmental and classed society that surrounds her a lesson about condemning women who 
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embrace their sexual autonomy in non-traditional, non-conservative (although not necessarily 
progressive) ways. In this way, the lesson that the Vamp wishes to convey—that she deserves to 
be treated with respect—is at odds with the lesson that other women are not to emulate her. 
Genini’s research shows that Fox, the film’s production company, emphasized that Bara’s 
character in the film was intended not to corrupt, but to point out the evilness of the Vamp as not 
worth emulating—a sentiment echoed by Columbia professor Victor Freeburg in 1917:  
[He]…opined to Roberta Courtlandt of Motion Picture about Theda’s “potent 
influence for good.” “Most girls are good,” he asserted, “but good girls do not 
want to see other good girls on the screen. There’s no interest, no fascination, in 
that for them. This is another reason for Miss Bara’s success; she shows them 
something vastly different from the life they know. Few are either daring enough 
or desirous enough of leading a vampire existence, but through the medium of 
Theda Bara they can do her deeds and live her life. Their emotions are enriched 
by just that much. (Qtd. in Genini 57)  
 
Here we see that the spin being put on audience reception and the anxiety of imitation by both 
Fox and Freeburg are not the same, but they aren’t completely unrelated, either. Fox suggests 
that the Vamp is so bad that no woman would (should?) want to be like her. Freeburg 
hypothesizes that for most women, vicariously being like Theda through their imaginations is 
sufficient. Fox claims that Bara’s character isn’t really harmful; Freeburg argues that she’s 
providing a service. Both overlook (or at least neglect to address) the possibility of women 
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actually wanting to be like the Vamp—maybe not to the extent of seducing men to death, but 
maybe to the extent of having some modicum of sexual freedom.41  
Additionally, the Vamp also possesses a calm sense of power, confidence, and 
resourcefulness. When confronted by the gun-wielding Parmalee, the Vamp does not panic, 
despite the fact that there is a gun to her chest (suggesting that like the mythical Victorian 
vampire, she can die only from a pierced heart). She does not make a scene, even though the 
medium long shot of the couple reveals other travelers milling on the deck in the background 
who might have come to her aid. She does not beg for forgiveness or for her life in an effort to 
persuade Parmalee to drop the gun. Instead, she meets a fatal threat with a cool, dismissive smile 
and an assertion of her sexual agency—and she prevails. Literally knocking Parmalee’s phallic 
gun out of the frame with her rose demonstrates not just that the Vamp has sexual agency, but 
that this agency is powerful: more powerful than violence, more powerful than masculinity, more 
powerful than its negative connotations. In fact, fueled by the negative perception of erotic 
female sexual agency, the Vamp redirects masculine violence back upon itself. Even the fact that 
the Vamp appears in the center of the frame facing Parmalee, who stands to the left, shows how 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 It is worth pointing out that while Bara’s public persona was carefully cultivated to make her 
seem, in real life, like her on-screen vamp characters, this was merely a promotional ruse put up 
by production companies and Bara alike. In public, Bara would pull stunts like speaking with a 
European accent, giving a fake personal history, and dressing in opulent furs, all in order to 
cultivate a sense of mystery and the exotic—as she did for a press visit to Chicago in the middle 
of summer 1915. Yet according to Genini’s account of that interview, “the instant the last of the 
press was gone she had thrown off the stifling furs and thrown open the windows, yelling, 
‘Gimme air!’” (Qtd. in Genini 17). Eve Golden also recounts moments of Bara’s discomfort with 
aspects of the vamp persona, such as the time she “nearly quit [Fool] when she discovered that 
one of her costumes was a one-piece bathing suit,” which was considered very risqué at the time 
(36). These conflicts between Bara’s private and public lives further complicate Freeburg’s 
comment about female viewers not wanting to see their own lives reflected back to them through 
“good girls on the screen”: Freeburg seems to suggest that Theda the Vamp is not a persona at 
all, but a real person. In so doing, Freeburg makes the mistake of conflating the character with 
the actor—although even Freeburg’s “mistake” may be a deliberate attempt to reinforce the 
constructed reality of Bara’s persona. 
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she physically dominates the space, poised but a step away from edging him out of the frame—
and her life. 
Yet perhaps what is most remarkable about this film is the ending. In the final scenes, 
Schuyler, who has fallen prey to the Vamp’s sexual wiles and destroyed his career, his marriage, 
and his high social standing, lays dying on the floor of his city townhome. He has aged decades 
in a matter of months, reduced to a white-haired, trembling, crippled old man by what we are led 
to believe is the Vamp’s destructive presence. With Schuyler supine and immobile before the 
fireplace, the Vamp enters the frame and, in a move that recalls her opening action, she happily 
drops rose petals onto Schuyler’s near-corpse. The intertitle declares, “Some of him lived, but 
the most of him died,” and we are left to assume that the Vamp returns to her newest wealthy 
lover, leaving Schuyler to finish dying, whether alone in his townhome or in the company of his 
estranged family.  
And yet, shortly before this takes place, Kate pays a visit to Schuyler with their daughter 
in tow as a last ditch effort to win him back to his family. As father and daughter embrace 
downstairs, the Vamp watches from above for a moment and looks as though she might take pity 
upon the ailing man and his suffering family; however, her self-interest wins out as she swoops 
down the stairs and showily displays her affection for Schuyler in front of Kate and the little girl, 
thus sealing the fool’s fate. The Vamp’s appeal is that she is not Kate—she is the dangerously 
erotic to Kate’s assuringly maternal. And yet, I would argue that there are traces of the maternal 
in the Vamp. In addition to her momentary softness at seeing Schuyler with his daughter, the 
Vamp, as we recall, also bends over and smiles at the Schuyler girl when she runs over to 
retrieve a rose that has fallen at the Vamp’s feet early on in the film. The only lapses—though 
fleeting—in the Vamp’s ruthlessness seem to be when Schuyler’s daughter is involved. And yet, 
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were the Vamp to be portrayed as possessing any reproductive agency at all, she would only 
come off as more threatening instead of less. As Kate’s quick and snobbish intervention in the 
rose scene between the Vamp and the Schuyler’s daughter suggests, the Vamp’s erotic agency 
has the capacity to corrupt, and the thought of her as a mother corrupting her own daughters 
combines the erotic with the reproductive—or, rather, does not sufficiently separate them—to 
potentially disastrous effects.    
Thusly, the Vamp is made to read as purely erotic, and it seems at first as though the 
Vamp faces no negative repercussions for her actions. She is not punished for her sexual 
escapades. She is not arrested, nor jailed, nor left penniless and destitute. While there is certainly 
a moral anti-adultery lesson to be taken from this film in so far that Schuyler is most certainly 
punished for his dalliances (even though he is absolved somewhat through the moniker “Fool,” 
indicating that his affair did not result from his active desire for extramarital sex but rather that 
he was tricked), I argue that there is another more interesting and more positive lesson to be 
taken as well: erotic female agency must be acknowledged. The film does not, however, suggest 
that this erotic agency must be accepted. In fact, it is society’s blatant refusal to accept the 
Vamp—as manifested through the behavior of Kate Schuyler—that motivates the plot in the first 
place, and we could therefore argue that the Vamp’s punishment of social ostracism comes at the 
beginning of the film instead of at the end. Additionally, any positive reading is tempered by the 
film’s singular representation of unchecked erotic female agency as dangerous and destructive. 
Non-traditional female sexuality and erotic agency is acknowledged as a choice, albeit a choice 
that is nonetheless not accepted in mainstream American culture at the time and that does not 
really allow for female financial independence.  At best, the Vamp is an outcast. At worst, she is 
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a cold-blooded murderer. In either event, she is labeled thusly for openly manifesting erotic 
agency and acting upon her personal and sexual desires.  
 
The Flapper 
As a type, the flapper is not so far removed from the vamp: the flapper is commonly 
represented as a golddigger with a great deal of erotic agency who is interested primarily in fun, 
fashion, and flirtatiousness. Unlike the vamp, however, the flapper is imbued with a sense of 
sexual innocence that counters the mercenary-like ruthlessness of the vamp. As Sara Ross 
argues, this innocence results from the comic nature of the flapper and the situations in which 
she finds herself. Speaking specifically of Clara Bow and Colleen Moore, Ross coins the term 
“comic masquerade” to describe their flapper characters, positing that “[t]heir performances 
contributed to a successful blending of sexual and social rebellion with girl-next-door innocence 
in their films, a blend which served to deflect controversy and, in the process, helped to create a 
new screen type” (Ross 409).42 Images from pressbooks for flapper films like Flaming Youth 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Stanley Cavell identifies another type born out of comedy, albeit a genre and not a character: 
the comedy of remarriage in the 1930s, which focuses on a married couple divorcing and 
reconciling. He relates this genre more to the principles of Old Comedy than New “because of its 
emphasis on the heroine,” and he goes on to discuss in the Introduction how the comedy of 
remarriage “require[d] the creation of a new woman, or the new creation of a woman, something 
I describe as a new creation of a human” (Pursuits 1, 16). By this, he means that the genre 
reconsiders and reconfigures the “consciousness of woman” as something that accounts for the 
psychology of viewing women as well as the psychology of how women view themselves (17). 
To extrapolate a bit on the comedy portion of Cavell’s theory and replace pregnancy with 
remarriage, there are two films that come to mind from that are just beyond his temporal 
boundaries of 1934-41: Frank Borzage’s Bad Girl (1931) and Preston Sturges’ The Miracle of 
Morgan’s Creek (1944). Bad Girl focuses on Dorothy (Sally Eilers) and Eddie (James Dunn), a 
quick-witted couple who falls in love and marries in spite of themselves. As newlyweds, Dorothy 
becomes pregnant and considers abortion because she fears dying in childbirth—and because she 
feels that her husband resents feeling forced to use his savings for the child instead of for 
purchasing a radio store (which has been his dream). However, the loving and devoted Eddie 
competes in boxing matches on the side to earn money for a quality obstetrician for Dorothy. 
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(1923) and Ella Cinders (1926) support this claim: Flaming Youth’s pressbook features a variety 
of illustrated silhouettes ranging from Moore’s flapper frolicking outdoors and chasing 
butterflies, to high-kicking a men’s top hat while smoking a cigarette, to flicking her foot back 
while held in an embrace by a tuxedoed gentleman. (In these images, although not in all of the 
images, the female cartoon is clad in a gauzy gown that reveals her curvy figure beneath.) Ella 
Cinders’ press materials repeat the gesture, as one sheet contains multiple images of Moore—
although not silhouetted and therefore identifiable as Moore—that show her naïvely arriving in 
Hollywood, posing scantily clad in an exotic fringed costume, and kissing her beau. Even in 
these films’ promotional materials, we observe the flapper as holistically naïve, flirtatious, 
scheming, silly, and erotically charged.   
These press materials help to illustrate how, although comedy tempers the flapper’s 
remarkable erotic agency, that same erotic agency nonetheless remains. Clarence G. Badger’s 
film It (1927), starring Clara Bow, serves as a particularly apt test case for examining the 
Hollywood divide between the flapper’s erotic and reproductive agency, as It actively engages a 
hypothetical reproductive scenario for the film’s heroine, Betty Lou Spense (Clara Bow). With a 
tacit push against Mulvey, Marsha Orgeon claims that It “invites the gaze of its female spectator, 
largely to identify with the film’s heroine and with her decidedly sexualized and empowered 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
There are some other “Gift of the Maji”-like complications, the baby is born, Dorothy is fine, 
and everything works out in the end; despite these heady situations, the film is largely a comedy. 
The Miracle of Morgan’s Creek features Trudy (Betty Hutton), a young woman who marries a 
soldier one night after becoming inebriated at a USO show. She doesn’t remember which soldier 
she married, though, and this becomes a problem once she realizes she’s pregnant. Although her 
community ostracizes her, Norval (Eddie Bracken), a local boy unfit for service, marries her; 
instantly, Trudy and her six sons are welcome to rejoin society under the protection of a 
legitimate marriage where the husband’s identity is known (and, to boot, the weakling Army 
cast-off becomes “manly” thanks to fatherhood). Just as comedy allows the flapper to get away 
with erotic agency, comedy allows a bit more of the taboo into films treating reproductive 
agency as well. 	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modes of seeing and being. The film celebrates its female star’s rebellion against traditional 
modes of passivity…In other words, It seems every bit as much made for the male gaze as for its 
often neglected female counterpart” (83, emphasis mine).43 While I agree with Orgeron’s 
empowered reading of the film, she considers It in terms of commodity culture, and I wish to 
explore the degree to which the film inspires emulation or to which her rebellion is championed 
when considered in the context of the reproductive. 
 It opens with an intertitle describing the “It” quality as popularized by novelist and 
screenwriter Elinor Glyn44: a “magnetic force” of attraction that enables its possessor to win the 
man/woman of her/his dreams. The “It” theme continues as we enter Waltham’s department 
store, billed in an early shot with the subtitle “World’s Largest Store,” where heir-apparent Cyrus 
Waltham (Antonio Moreno) and his man-about-town friend “Monty” Montgomery (William 
Austin) discuss Glyn’s latest article concerning “It” and its vital importance to one’s love life. 
Shortly thereafter, we are introduced to Betty Lou Spense, the “It” girl herself: in a medium shot, 
Betty Lou, a shopgirl at Waltham’s, holds a lingerie top up against her dress, modeling for 
prospective customers and smiling coyly to help make the sale. Orgeron reads a type of 
innocence into this scene through the looks shared between Betty Lou and the “respectable-
looking” couple shopping at Waltham’s: “As the man and woman smile and nod, the division 
Hansen notes between ‘looking’ and ‘having’ is blurred. Since both the department store 
consumer and the cinema spectator are expected to desire what they see, the scene appropriately 
figures consumption as both an economic exchange and a mode of ideologically sanctioned 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  43	  Orgeron’s article, “Making It in Hollywood: Clara Bow, Fandom, and Consumer Culture,” 
focuses on the commodity culture surrounding Bow, from film to fan magazines; she argues that 
the two entities form a type of dialectic. 	  
44 Glyn not only co-wrote the screenplay for It, but she also makes a cameo appearance in the 
film.  
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pleasure” (84). In other words, the context of the shared gaze works to establish its naïveté. 
Overall, the film’s initial scenes do much to establish the tone of flirtatiousness and naïve 
sensuality suggested by the opening intertitle and subsequent close-up of a passage from Glyn’s 
most recent “It” article; they make it clear that Bow the flapper is not your typical big-city 
shopgirl, but a spritely and ambitious young woman plotting to win the heart of no less than 
Waltham himself.  
Betty Lou’s cheerfulness and innocent mischievousness take on a new dimension about 
midway through the film, however, as she saves her roommate’s child from being taken to a state 
home by two representatives of the local child welfare service. Betty Lou’s roommate, Molly, is 
a single mother who, since the birth of her child, has been too ill to work. In an effort to help her 
financially strained friend, Betty has been cheerfully supporting Molly and the baby with her 
meager department store salary. One day when Betty Lou returns home to find the welfare 
representatives about to seize custody of Molly’s child, she picks up the baby, pushes Molly 
offscreen into a curtained area, and declares, “This is my baby! I’m the baby’s mother—I’m not 
sick—and I’ve got a job! Laugh that off!” The medium close up of Betty Lou and the baby 
reinforces the pair as a family unit—which is where Betty Lou’s romantic troubles begin. Betty 
Lou’s would-be suitor, Monty—who also happens to be Waltham’s right-hand man and close 
friend—stands just outside the apartment, overhearing everything. The welfare representatives 
assume the Monty is the child’s father, but Betty Lou’s and Monty’s denial of his paternity 
prompts them to inquire suspiciously, “Who is your husband? Have you a husband?” Betty Lou 
replies with a curt “None of your business!” and affirms her maternity to Monty by asserting the 
similarities between her and the baby’s appearance: “Are you blind? Can’t you see the 
resemblance?” (Betty Lou later redirects the family resemblance to Molly and the baby when 
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trying to prove to Monty that the child is not hers.) The tension in this serious situation is 
mitigated by the comic sincerity with which Betty Lou insists upon her maternity. Indeed, for the 
audience who is in on the ruse, even “None of your business!” takes on a darkly comic appeal. 
And yet, while the film never judges Molly for being a single mother (and while it never explains 
why she is a single mother), it also presents as ridiculous the very idea that someone like Betty 
Lou would be a single mother: the flapper simply cannot possess or display reproductive sexual 
agency. Although Betty Lou wins the battle against the women from child and family services, 
her burgeoning relationship with Waltham is thrown into question when Monty relays the 
misinformation about her so-called maternity. 
It’s romantic plotline follows Betty Lou’s attempts to win the heart—and engagement 
ring—of Cyrus Waltham. Her plan seems to be progressing nicely until, of course, Waltham 
comes to believe that she has an illegitimate child. In this comedy of errors, however, Betty Lou 
is not aware that Waltham knows about her kindly maternity stunt—that is, until he makes her an 
indecent proposal after Betty Lou declares her love for him: “I’ll buy you diamonds—clothes—
everything you want--,” to which Betty Lou indignantly replies, “What are you trying to do? 
Offer me one of those left-handed arrangements?” Indeed, that is precisely what Waltham is 
trying to do. Someone of his class position surely cannot announce an engagement to a woman 
with a fatherless child—but he can take her as a mistress. Waltham tries to smooth over his 
proposition by pleading, “I’m crazy about you! Isn’t that enough?,” but an insulted and enraged 
Betty Lou storms out of his office after retorting, “I suppose that’s what you men call love!”; an 
intertitle informs us that “Betty was too poor to quit her job—and too proud to stay. So she quit!”  
As a comedy, everything works out in the end for Betty Lou and Waltham. Although 
Betty Lou planned to entice Waltham into proposing to her just so that she could have the 
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satisfaction of rejecting him, she realizes after doing so that he really does love her and accepts 
his proposal. And with that little misunderstanding about the illegitimate baby cleared up, Betty 
Lou transforms from inappropriate choice of partner back into charming “It” girl. Although not 
addressed in the film, we can assume that with the lead couple reunited, the future Mrs. Cyrus 
Waltham now has the means to continue to care for Molly and her baby as long as is necessary. 
Even though Betty Lou’s maternity charade is ultimately reconciled, it nonetheless remains that 
It presents us with a remarkably explicit hypothetical reproductive situation. If the flapper’s 
erotic agency were to become reproductive agency, she wouldn’t be the flapper any longer; this 
we see in the case of Molly. Molly used to work at Waltham’s store with Betty before her 
pregnancy, and we can assume that the two roommates would both be categorized as flappers. 
After her pregnancy, however, Molly looks haggard and unkempt and her appearance is dull and 
sullen, partially on account of her unnamed illness, and partly, perhaps, because she can no 
longer lead the exhilarating, carefree life that Betty Lou still can and does lead. As I mentioned, 
we as the audience are in on the Betty Lou’s maternity joke—a joke in keeping with her 
character, a joke played to protect her friend. Because we are in on the joke, we can understand it 
as another of Betty Lou’s schemes, as another day in the life of a flapper. For those like Monty 
and Waltham who are not in on the joke, however, the essence of the flapper is destroyed by the 
possibility of the reproductive. Within the logic of the film, the flapper cannot be a mother—or at 
least cannot be an unwed mother.  
In a move to differentiate Bow’s flapper films from Colleen Moore’s, Ross points to the 
scene in which Betty converts her work dress into an evening gown for a night on the town, 
positing that “[t]hough Betty Lou is clearly pretending to be something that she is not in these 
momentary poses, in the context of the entire sequence there is no great distinction between the 
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poses she adopts and the character’s ‘real’ personality” (Ross 418). Ross contends that Betty Lou 
evinces a certain fluidity between the comic and the sincere, such that it becomes difficult to tell, 
for example, whether she really wants to be accepted by the Ritz’s elites or whether it’s all just a 
game of posturing. I would apply this idea to Betty Lou’s maternity charade. We know that Betty 
Lou lies to protect Molly and her baby, but at the same time, she doesn’t care that Monty, her 
neighbors, and the reporter poised in her doorway take her seriously. What we have, then, is a 
flapper who seems comfortable with being perceived as a mother, although “perceived” is the 
operative word here, for she is not actually a mother. Betty Lou’s maternity posturing is not the 
same as her class posturing: while high-class airs are in keeping with the expectations of the 
flapper, motherhood is not. Thus, I would extend Ross’ overall argument about the flapper in 
light of the reproductive: while erotic agency and sexuality is mitigated by humor for the flapper, 
reproductive agency and sexuality transgresses a boundary that even comedy cannot render 
acceptable.  
  
The Femme Fatale 
Of the white slave, the vamp, and the femme fatale, the agency of the lattermost of these 
groups is arguably the most threatening to the masculinist status quo, for instead of wielding her 
erotic sexuality for its own sake, she wields it to a specific end that usually works to subvert 
male authority: her career advancement, her financial gain, and/or her criminalism. Contrasting 
the vamp with the femme fatale, Genini notes that “[t]he femme fatale…has no spooky quasi-
supernatural exoticism. She is physical, not demonic; neurotic, not evil; and, unlike the vampire, 
she possess a conscience, albeit a suppressed one” (14). The femme fatale does not hold 
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traditional feminine values; she eschews domesticity, family, and motherhood for personal and 
sexual agency. 45 
We can understand how erotic female agency could pose a threat in most cinematic 
contexts, but this threat is especially pressing in the film noir considering its historical context 
and point of origin. From the American tradition of the roman noir that began in the 1920s and 
continued into the 1930s, noir directors in the 1940s and 1950s look to the likes of Dashiell 
Hammett, James M. Cain and Raymond Chandler for source material. To point to these giants of 
the roman noir, however, necessitates a look at their origins: the pulp magazines, such as Dime 
Detective and Black Mask, that began to appear in America in the early 1920s.46 Many of the 
stories written for these magazines that later became films noir in the 1930s faced the problem of 
censorship, which either delayed their release until the 1940s or resulted in “the watering down 
of those hard-boiled texts that did get made in the thirties” (Lyons 17). Especially between 1930 
and 1934—the period in Hollywood that saw the institution but not yet the enforcement of the 
Hays Code—Hollywood films walked a fine line of salaciousness, for while the Hays Code 
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  As Sylvia Harvey observes, there exists a serious paradox regarding marriage and erotic 
sexuality in Western culture: “Although marriage is the only place where sexual activity is to be 
sanctioned, oddly enough (or perhaps it is not so odd) mothers and fathers are seldom 
represented as sexual partners…[s]o that, although married couples—that is, mothers and 
fathers—are the only ones allowed to engage in erotic activity, these parents or potential parents 
are normally presented in a totally de-eroticized way” (24). In this way, we encounter a type of 
catch-22: only married heterosexual partners are sanctioned for sexual activity, yet the 
legitimacy of the married state renders individual erotic sexuality unnecessary if not 
inappropriate. 	  46	  Arthur Lyons recounts how Black Mask, which was founded in 1920 by H. L. Mencken and 
George Jean Nathan, met with immediate popular success and was then sold six months later to 
George Sutton and Henry North.  While Black Mask originally featured detective stories along 
with other genres, “[u]nder North’s editorship, the magazine began to lean more toward detective 
stories, and a new hero—the private eye—debuted in its pages. The year was 1922” (Lyons 13-
14).  
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sought to enforce a conservative sense of dignity upon cinema that placated conservative and 
religious groups, the fact remained that America had entered an economic depression, and sex 
sells; “sex” in the context of the film noir means female sexuality and the display thereof.47  
Arthur Lyons, in his study of American noir B movies, identifies the heyday of the 
American noir as 1939-195948, and notes that the American noir was “not just a product of 
history but also a product of Hollywood” (2). Here, it is imperative to read “product” not merely 
as “result,” but also as commodity, since the noir existed as a genre and therefore was marketed 
based upon its recognizable style. It is generally agreed upon that the film noir features “a 
relentlessly pessimistic narrative, a dubious morality, dramatically contrasted lighting, and 
masculinity in crisis” (Vincendeau 31). Gerald Petievich also mentions the importance of an 
urban setting in the film noir (2). Lyons’ invocation of history is representative of standard 
historical readings; to say that film noir is a product of history is to say that it is a product of the 
American socio-cultural situation: that it began in the twenties, continued to gain momentum 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 As a result, even though American films noir were being made in the 1930s, the term “film 
noir” was not coined in the American context until the 1940s when exemplars of the genre were, 
ironically, exported to France. Under the Nazi occupation of WWII, the importation of American 
films into France was strictly prohibited. After the war drew to a close, however, the ban was 
lifted, and in the summer of 1946, several recent American films noir saw their French premiers. 
The most notable films that comprised this group of French imports include the following: The 
Maltese Falcon (John Huston, 1941); Laura (Otto Preminger, 1944); Murder, My Sweet (Edward 
Dmytryk, 1944); Double Indemnity (Billy Wilder, 1944); The Woman in the Window (Fritz Lang, 
1944) (Petievich 2). French film critic Nino Frank is credited with first using the phrase “film 
noir” to describe this cinematic collection. 
 
48 It is worth noting here the very brief overlap between the classic American noir period and the 
French Nouvelle Vague (New Wave), which began in 1958. While I am by no means suggesting 
a causal relationship between the classic American noir period and the French New Wave, I do 
wish to point out the popularity of the American noir immediately preceding the advent of the 
New Wave.  
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during the Great Depression, and thrived during WWII and the postwar period because it served 
so effectively as a mirror for the frustrations, fears, and anxieties of the typical American.49 
Brigid O’Shaughnessy from Dashiell Hammett’s The Maltese Falcon arguably stands as 
one of the most infamous femmes fatales in noir film or literature. Based to varying degrees 
upon the 1930 novel, three versions of the The Maltese Falcon were produced between 1931 and 
1941: The Maltese Falcon/Dangerous Female (1931), Satan Met a Lady (1936), and The 
Maltese Falcon (1941). John Huston’s 1941 version met with the most success and has become 
the most canonical of the three; this is the version to which the following comments refer.50  
Mary Astor stars as Brigid O’Shaughnessy, a high-stakes, money-driven criminal whose 
involvement in a plot to gain possession of the invaluable titular bird sculpture drives her to 
subterfuge and ultimately lands her behind bars.  
Whatever sense of agency Brigid demonstrates is linked directly to her erotic sexuality; 
thus, when placed in a situation wherein this sexuality has no purchase, agency is lost. In her 
interrogation of the threat that the femme fatale poses, Mary Ann Doane posits that “[h]er power 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 While the American film noir is certainly a product of Hollywood, the extent to which it is a 
product of history is what usually becomes obscured. Ginette Vincendeau takes another approach 
to conceiving of the American film noir as a “product of history,” however. Historically the term 
“film noir” originated in France in the 1930s, but as Vincendeau argues, “cultural amnesia” arose 
around this point of origin (31). Drawing from Charles O’Brien, Vincendeau posits two possible 
accounts for this phenomenon. First, as the original French usage of the term was intended as an 
insult, it needed to be divorced from this context so as not to unfairly taint the positive spin being 
given it in an American context. In this way, American film noir was able to define itself as a 
genre precisely through erasing its French past. Alternatively, though not mutually exclusively, 
this amnesia allowed American noir to “reach back to earlier traditions, such as surrealism and 
German expressionism, untainted by the German Occupation” (31-32).  
 
50 The 1931 version, Dangerous Female, is the second most faithful version after Huston’s, yet 
this earliest version also contains a nude female bathtub scene and a female strip search, this 
earning it the condemnation of the Hays Office and marking it distinctly as a pre-Code film. The 
1936 version, also done by Warner Brothers, diverges the most from the source material and was 
intended as a passable version of the 1931 film.  
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is of a peculiar sort insofar as it is usually not subject to her conscious will, hence appearing to 
blur the opposition between passivity and activity. She is an ambivalent figure because she is not 
the subject of power but its carrier…” (Femmes Fatales 2). With this, Doane suggests that any 
power or agency seemingly attributed to or related to the femme fatale is not really in her 
possession. Doane goes on to claim that “[i]ndeed, if the femme fatale overrepresents the body it 
is because she is attributed with a body which is itself given agency independently of 
consciousness. In a sense, she has power despite herself. […] She is not the subject of feminism 
but a symptom of males fears about feminism” (Femmes Fatales 2-3). While Doane follows her 
claims with the notion that undergirds her various examinations of the femme fatale—that these 
representations nonetheless have the capacity to do work beyond the context of what is obvious 
or intended—I am most interested in her diagnosis of masculine fear, as it inflects Lyons’ 
assertion that the film noir in general reflects Americans’ frustrations, fears, and anxieties with a 
more specifically gendered element. Perhaps it is in effort to quell these fears that the potency 
and capability of Astor’s character—as well as of the film itself—is severely watered down in 
publicity material. One publicity article claims soothingly that “[b]esides Bogart, there is 
charming Mary Astor in the romantic lead” in a film that is “a well concocted mystery drama 
with a liberal dash of comedy and romance,” making Brigid seem more like a flapper in a 
romantic comedy than a film noir femme fatale (‘Maltese Falcon”). Through the portrayal of 
these female characters whose agency is eventually taken from them—if it was ever really there 
in the first place—and through the punishment of this highly contingent agency, the femme 
fatale gives voice and materiality to abstract fears such as masculinity in crisis, and yet is also 
able to present at least one possible solution to the fear: keep women’s erotic sexuality under 
control.  
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In The Maltese Falcon, Brigid, who initially dupes private eye Sam Spade (Humphrey 
Bogart) in order to increase her chances of becoming the sole possessor of the bird, relies heavily 
upon her sex appeal in order to get her way. At one point, Brigid spends the night at Sam’s 
apartment ostensibly because she is falling in love with him. In actuality, however, Brigid is 
more interested in keeping tabs on Sam’s whereabouts; ironically, this backfires when Sam, ever 
suspicious of Brigid, takes leave of her early in the morning with her keys in order to search her 
apartment without her knowledge. The promise of potential sexual access to Brigid may have 
been one of the contributing factors to Sam’s decision to take her case, as full of holes as her 
story may have been, and that same sex appeal may momentarily get her what she desires, but 
this economy cannot be sustained.  
Near the end of the film, as it becomes clear to Sam Spade that the other criminals in on 
the Maltese falcon job, Gutman and Cairo, are looking to scapegoat Spade and/or Brigid for 
murders committed in pursuit of the figure, Brigid appeals to her love for Spade in order to spare 
her life and freedom. However, Spade, whose profession as a private detective works to his 
benefit and enables his emotional detachment from his cases and his relative protection under the 
law, has no sympathy for Brigid, even if he does believe her confession of love. At the end of the 
film, Spade will go back to his single life at the agency, while Brigid will likely receive a prison 
sentence. Her sexual agency was able to carry her for a considerable amount of time, but when 
her sexuality is no longer (immediately) appealing (or not sufficiently appealing when it entails a 
possible prison sentence), Brigid loses not only her agency but also her freedom as a citizen. 
While seemingly punished for breaking the law—theft, murder, subterfuge—Brigid is also, and 
more significantly, punished for using her sexuality as a tool for personal advancement.  
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As is the case for the vamp, the femme fatale’s dangerous appeal lies in her overt 
sexuality. If, as Vincendeau notes, the film noir is characteristically about masculinity in crisis, 
and if a sexual affair with the femme fatale is one way of allaying that crisis, then the option of 
reproductive agency must be precluded from the film noir. Furthermore, if the femme fatale 
herself, as Doane suggests, stands as “a symptom of male fears about feminism,” then she must 
remain erotic without being reproductive (Femmes Fatales 3). If that line were to be 
transgressed—if Brigid were to have become pregnant by Sam as a result of their sexual 
liaisons—then she is no longer just a sexualized body, but a woman with, to recall Young and 
Kristeva, an inaccessible pregnant interiority and subjectivity. This, combined with the demands 
that would then likely be placed upon the man for commitment and support that could be 
perceived as impediments to his freedom, would only exacerbate instead the masculinity crisis 
inherent in film noir instead of diminishing it. 
In this way, the punishment of the femme fatale reinforces the same assumption that 
underlies the vamp: female erotic sexuality is dangerous and destructive, and adding 
reproductive sexuality to the equation only makes it more so. But looking at each of these types, 
I suggest not only that their leading ladies’ erotic agency is threatening, but also that, were it to 
be attached to reproductive agency, it would pose an even greater threat. Women with erotic 
sexual agency cannot be trusted. They have their own agendas, they make their own decisions 
even when the outcomes thereof do not seem likely to be favorable, and they do not place the 
same value (or any value, in some cases) upon traditional sex and gender expectations and/or 
social mores. Fascinatingly, these same descriptions apply equally well to women in 
transitional/classical Hollywood cinema who take control over their own reproductive agency. 
To be more specific, the overlap between erotic sexual agency and reproductive sexual agency is 
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most noticeable when the choice that the woman in question makes is to go against the norm. If 
we were to create a set of analogies between female erotic and reproductive agency, it would 
look something like this: chastely kissing one’s fiancé is tantamount to becoming pregnant 
intramaritally and giving birth to one’s child, while having sexual encounters premaritally or 
extramaritally is tantamount to speaking about/using contraception and/or having an abortion. 
Women who go against the conservative, traditionalist, masculinist grain with their reproductive 
choices in transitional/classical Hollywood films meet with punishments very similar to those 
met with by the women who make similarly non-conservative erotic choices. In this way, despite 
their differences, we can see how women with erotic agency and reproductive agency are treated 
in much the same ways narratively, ideologically, and morally. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
Contraceptive Education: Morals, Science, and Eugenics 
 
In Lois Weber’s 1916 Where Are My Children?, several early scenes in the film focus on 
the plight of the minor but crucial Dr. William Homer. As we first encounter the Margaret 
Sanger-like Homer, he stands trial for the dissemination of eugenic birth control materials: an act 
which violates the 1873 Comstock Act banning, amongst other things, the distribution of 
information about birth control and abortion. Homer attempts to defend his actions through the 
use of two analeptic narrative vignettes: one depicts a dying baby surrounded by its viscerally 
grieving parents; the other, a poverty-induced fight between a husband and wife in front of their 
too-numerous children. Through the dissemination of birth control information, he argues, such 
saddening and wholly undesirable situations could well be avoided. Nevertheless, Homer is 
found guilty by “a jury of men.”  
Running alongside Dr. Homer’s narrative thread is that of Mrs. Edith Walton, wife of 
District Attorney Richard Walton—the very attorney who successfully prosecuted Dr. Homer. 
Unbeknownst to anyone but her closest girlfriends, Edith has had at least three abortions during 
the course of her marriage to Richard. Edith’s secret history is ultimately revealed, however, in a 
trial scene near the film’s end that parallels Dr. Homer’s trial near the beginning. This time, 
though, the abortionist Dr. Malfit stands trial; when his appointment book is summoned as 
evidence, Richard is shocked to find his own wife listed among Malfit’s well-to-do patients. 
Although Edith never officially stands trial for her repeated abortions, the film makes it clear that 
she is punished for her actions extrajudicially. As a result of her abortions, Edith is now unable 
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to conceive, and she is thus condemned to suffer the loneliness of old age: years later, Edith and 
Richard sit in front of their fireplace as the ghosts of Edith’s aborted fetuses appear before them 
as lovely children and age to the handsome adults who would otherwise be caring for them in 
their twilight years. 
Common to both Homer’s storyline and Edith’s is the judgment framework that initially 
suggests a compatibility between the two: both Homer and Edith espouse progressive stances on 
reproductive rights in spite of legal stipulations, and both suffer for their progressive ideologies. 
In fact, scenes of Edith giving abortion advice to a girlfriend over tea are cross-cut with the 
scenes of Homer’s trial. These cross-cuts emphasize Homer’s and Edith’s shared plight and point 
to the irony and injustice of prosecuting a man like Homer: without his brave actions, Edith 
would assumedly not even have any advice to give. Yet a closer look begins to tear at their 
seemingly common purpose. These same cross-cuts could also illustrate the very problem with 
men like Homer, as Homer stands in metonymically for any agent that makes it possible for fine, 
eugenically sound, upper-class women like Edith and her female cohort not to become mothers. 
In this way, although Homer advocates for contraception and Malfit practices abortion, the two 
figures and their purposes become conflated.  
From these contradictory readings, we can see how Children raises the issue of the 
educational purpose of abortion and contraception films: What types of educational aims are 
present? Do these aims change over time? Do these aims work in concert with one another, or do 
they conflict? While Code-era abortion and contraception films evidence more of an interest in 
promoting a moral education than a fact-based one, social problem contraception and abortion 
films from the 1910s are more geared toward objective scientific education, albeit within a 
narrative frame. We must bear in mind, however, that the films from the teens are produced 
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during cinema’s transitional period directly following the Mutual v. Ohio decision that deemed 
cinema “entertainment” and removed it from the First Amendment’s protection. This, as I will 
explore, has significant bearing upon what information is included in these films, how it is 
presented, and how the films are received. The other significant influence I examine is eugenics 
discourse, as eugenics is foundational to the early birth control movement and cannot be 
divorced from ideologies of contraception and abortion in the 1910s and 1920s. Eugenic theories 
provide the point of departure even for progressive theories of birth control, such as those 
advocated by Margaret Sanger. I center my discussion around Lois Weber’s Where Are My 
Children? (1916), for as I have indicated, it stands as a prime example of the struggles within 
these types of films between scientifically and morally educational elements. It strikes me as the 
film that is most obviously playing with a balance of the moralistically educational and the 
scientifically educational, and I believe that the contraception and abortion film’s reliance upon 
eugenics—a discourse at once moralistic and scientific in the 1910s—makes it an ideal type of 
social problem film for examining issues of narrative, education, and women’s reproductive 
rights. Additionally, the ambiguity of the film’s messages makes it an ideal text for the 
consideration of the several and nuanced attitudes toward contraception and abortion espoused at 
the time. I will supplement my reading of Children with other contemporaneous 
abortion/contraception films: Leopold and Theodore Wharton’s The Black Stork (1917) and its 
reframed 1927 version Are You Fit to Marry?; The Law of Population, or Birth Control (1917); 
Weber’s Hand That Rocks the Cradle (1917) and Margaret Sanger’s controversial Birth Control 
(1917) to the extent that information about them has survived. I will also consider several more 
scientific sex education films from the 1920s, such as Personal Hygiene for Girls (1922) and 
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Personal Hygiene for Boys (1922) from the Science of Life series, as well as Margaret Sanger’s 
and Dr. Hannah M. Stone’s Biology of Conception and Mechanism of Contraception (1922). 
Eugenics discourse is the chief sociohistorical lens through which I read these films: one 
simply cannot talk about the early birth control movement without also considering eugenics, as 
eugenics discourse was intimately bound up with and exerted a heavy influence upon birth 
control discourse in the 1910s and 1920s. Through the inclusion of eugenics—and in some cases, 
the explicit promotion of birth control information—these transitional contraception and abortion 
films can—and do—make claims to their scientifically educational value; thusly, they could 
present an argument for First Amendment protection. Yet, at the same time, films such as 
Weber’s Where Are My Children? are Hollywood films with a discernible classical narrative arc 
which foregrounds, even as it muddles, the moral lessons of a film—lessons which sometimes 
challenge and sometimes support the scientific aim. I am interested in examining this nexus of 
interplay and struggle between the scientifically and morally didactic in these early contraception 
and abortion films in order to understand how, by 1930, contraception and abortion films 
demonstrate a near total disregard for the genre’s beginnings in the early birth control movement. 
I contend that, through this interplay of the scientific and the moral, the transitional-era 
contraception and abortion films begin to map the problems of female erotic agency explored in 
Chapter 1 onto reproductive agency. This, in turn, exacerbates the distinction between popular 
and prescribed beliefs about contraception and abortion.  
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Where Are My Children?, Margaret Sanger, and On-screen Birth Control: Eugenics as  
 Scientifically and Morally Educational 
 It is no surprise that both the scientific and the moral are at play in birth control 
discourse, as a.) birth control discourse has its basis in the early twentieth-century eugenics, and 
b.) eugenics discourse encompasses both of these aspects. What is surprising, however, is how 
these discourses interact with and affect one another within the context of the transitional birth 
control films. But how does eugenics and connect to and shape the narrative structures and 
variously didactic messages of these films? Relatedly, how does narrative structure interact with 
eugenics to help produce didactic messages? And ultimately, what are the consequences of 
reading contraception and abortion films from the late 1910s and early 1920s as scientific or 
moralistic, progressive or conservative, didactic or entertaining? 
 The 1915 Supreme Court case of Mutual v. Ohio, which I addressed in Chapter 1, 
stripped film of its protection under the First Amendment. As a chief result, film becomes more 
susceptible to censorship; what censorship means and how it operates on a film-by-film basis 
now varies on a state-by-state basis. In the wake of this landmark decision, a group of 
contraception and abortion films emerge and begin to test the limits not only of censorship, but 
also of film’s capacity as a medium. The first and most popular of these films is Lois Weber’s 
1916 production Where Are My Children?.  
 Children’s central plotline revolves around Richard Walton, “District Attorney [and] a 
great believer in eugenics,” and his wife, Edith. Despite Richard’s intense desire for fatherhood, 
the couple has no children, supposedly for reasons of biological incapacity on Edith’s part. This 
supposition, however, is only half-true: while the couple’s childlessness is indeed Edith’s “fault,” 
it is not due to her infertility. Unbeknownst to her husband, Edith has had at least three abortions 
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because she feels that motherhood would hamper her lifestyle. What’s more, early on, the film 
contrasts Edith with Richard’s sister and brother-in-law, a eugenically sound couple who has 
recently produced a very eugenic baby.51 An intertitle describes their baby as “a source of great 
interest” to Richard, thus further underscoring not only Richard’s fervent wish for children, but 
more largely the importance of eugenic discourse to the film. Shots of Richard pining over his 
sister’s infant, however, are cross-cut with shots Edith clinging awkwardly to edges of the 
crowd—perhaps out of guilt, but more likely, I would argue, out of disinterest. The film 
construes Edith’s desire to avoid pregnancy and motherhood as extreme selfishness, and this 
selfishness is echoed in her female cohort—all of whose names appear in the aptly-named 
abortionist Dr. Malfit’s appointment book at the film’s end. Children’s central plot follows the 
Waltons as Richard eventually discovers Edith’s secret abortions.  
 In order to engage with the scientifically and morally educational by way of eugenics, I 
will begin at the beginning with Children’s opening intertitles: 
The question of birth control is now being generally discussed. All intelligent 
people know that birth control is a subject of serious public interest. Newspapers, 
magazines and books have treated different phases of this question. Can a subject 
thus dealt with on the printed page be denied careful dramatization on the motion 
picture screen? The Universal Film Mfg. Company believes not.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 By the mid-1910s, “better baby” contests—competitions wherein the eugenic fitness of 
youngsters was judged and rewarded—were quite popular. The ubiquity of these contests 
demonstrates the extent to which eugenic-based thought permeated American life. “Better baby” 
contests also show us that eugenic-based judgments were not just reserved for adults. See 
Annette K. Vance Dorey’s Better Baby Contests: The Scientific Quest for Perfect Childhood 
Health in the Early 20th Century. 	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The Universal Film Mfg. Company does believe, however, that the question of 
birth control should not be presented before children. In producing this picture the 
intention is to place a serious drama before adult audience, to whom no 
suggestion of a fact of which they are ignorant is conveyed. It believes that 
children should not be admitted to see this picture unaccompanied by adults, but if 
you bring them it will do them an immeasurable amount of good. 
Even in the first moments of the film before the introduction of characters or plot, we observe 
Weber’s choice to frame Children with questions of one’s personal responsibility to both 
scientific and moral education. With respect to the moralistic, the opening intertitles skew in two 
different directions. One the one hand, they emphasize an overall moral value in properly 
educating oneself on the subject of birth control, which would seem to be in keeping with the 
ethos of the early birth control movement. However, the second intertitle declares that “the 
question of birth control should not be presented before children” and suggests that without 
proper parental guidance, children who view the film may be adversely affected by exposure to 
adult material; this idea indicates something implicitly inappropriate and immoral about the very 
subject of birth control. This theme of competing moral messages will continue to surface 
throughout Children’s plot. 
With respect to the scientific, we notice the intertitles’ appeal to film’s ability to engage 
with popular and important subjects that interest “intelligent people.” While it seems as though 
the film snidely and implicitly dismisses those with no interest in the subject as unintelligent, this 
dismissal is not, however, a slight against the disprivileged. Rather, I read the opening intertitles’ 
function as quite the opposite, and as progressively moralistic at that: this line is a dig at the 
educated yet prudish elite who wish to disregard discussion of contraception as impolite and 
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inappropriate. Additionally, the second intertitle clarifies that Where Are My Children? deals 
implicitly with sex and explicitly with reproduction. It specifies that while children should not 
view the film unsupervised, as mentioned earlier, a viewing under the guidance of parental 
supervision could be beneficial. The film’s producers believe that Children contains educational 
information regarding sex and pregnancy that young viewers might not understand on their own; 
accompanied by an explanation from a trusted adult, however, Weber’s production could be 
scientifically educational and therefore of value to audiences of all ages.  
Thus, the effort on the part of the first intertitle to frame birth control discussions as 
relevant news information is particularly noteworthy with regard to the Mutual decision, as we 
recall that film no longer has First Amendment protection; in this way, Universal’s fight for 
Children’s approval challenged film’s potential. The National Board of Review’s early 
objections to Children concerned not the subject matter of the film, but rather its scientific 
accuracy. According to the NBR’s chairman, Cranston Brenton, films like Children “‘must have 
the unanimous approval of medical men rather than an emotional endorsement, however sincere, 
of those who may overlook scientific significance’” (Qtd. in Stamp, “Precautions” 275). 
According to Stamp’s assessment, “[t]he board, in other words, was holding a dramatic film to 
the standards of journalistic accuracy” (“Precautions” 275). The NBR’s insistence upon more 
accurate scientific information in Children becomes complicated in light of what is considered to 
be its worth as cinematic entertainment. As Stamp points out, one of the main reasons for the 
success, popularity, and ultimate passing of Where Are My Children? is its entertainment value. 
Indeed, “Weber…defended her film on the grounds that it must serve as entertainment first and 
propaganda second, in effect rejecting the board’s view of the medium” (“Precautions” 281). 
This marks at least a momentary shift in the NBR’s attitudes toward narrative film and 
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didacticism: “[w]hereas three years earlier the board had insisted that moralistic narratives of 
punishment and redemption accompany screen portrayals of white slavery and prostitution, here 
they were troubled by the film’s ‘emotional appeal,’ calling instead for more precise 
information” (Stamp, “Precautions” 275). While the desire on the part of the National Board of 
Review to hold film to this level of “journalistic accuracy” fades as the classical Hollywood 
narrative paradigm takes hold, this moment remains telling nonetheless, as it illustrates the 
potential for Children specifically—and film more generally—to be both entertaining and 
educational, as well as to contain elements of both scientific and moralistic messages. 
One idea that I find particularly striking in Stamp’s passage above is that for Weber, 
Children “must serve as entertainment first and propaganda second,” (“Precautions” 281, 
emphasis mine). Propaganda here connotes not simply a desire to inform the public, but more so 
a desire to encourage the public to espouse a particular opinion regarding birth control. Again, 
we see the moral and scientific bound up with one another. The educational information which 
the film claims that it will share with its viewers should be, according to Brenton, scientific—and 
at least to the extent that Children shows abortion as an option, one could argue that it is; 
however, the film is also simultaneously moralistic, as “propaganda” suggests an inherent 
agenda. For the moment, let us set aside the question of what exactly Children as propaganda 
wishes to accomplish in order to first address eugenics, as eugenic discourse stands at the very 
core of the tension between this film’s—and other transitional contraception/abortion films’—
scientific and moralistic aims.  
In the context of social problem films from the late teens, discussions of birth control 
education necessitate discussions of eugenics, sexually transmitted diseases, and abortion; in 
turn, these issues raise questions about sex, class, race, and ethnicity, as well as a host of wildly 
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varying moral and ethical concerns. Regardless of how eugenics is used in various 
contraception/abortion films, there is no doubt about its crucial role in early sex education efforts 
and later modes of cinematic representation regarding social issues. Birth control crusader 
Margaret Sanger understood birth control and eugenics as nearly inextricable. As her grandson 
Alexander Sanger explains, “Eugenics at that time was not only ‘scientific’ but also much more 
respectable than birth control, which under [Sanger’s] leadership was seen as the cause of 
radical, feminist lawbreakers. Eugenics was there to be co-opted and used” (“Margaret Sanger 
Revisited” 213).52 And that is precisely what Margaret Sanger does: she uses eugenics to 
legitimate and call attention to the birth control movement. In addition to her pamphlets and 
books,53 Sanger’s monthly magazine founded in February 1917, The Birth Control Review, takes 
on a decidedly eugenic tone. As we can see in this excerpt from a November 1919 BCR article, 
Sanger wastes no time using eugenics to demonstrate why birth control is not only of critical 
importance to society, but even more critical importance than eugenics:  
Before eugenists…can succeed, they must first clear the way for birth control. 
Like advocates of Birth Control, the eugenists, for instance, are seeking to assist 
the race toward the elimination of the unfit. […] We who advocate Birth Control, 
on the other hand, lay all our emphasis upon stopping not only the reproduction of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 In this article, Alexander Sanger attempts to better contextualize Margaret Sanger’s espousal 
of eugenics within the birth control movement. In an effort to address accusations regarding his 
grandmother’s alleged racist or classist ideologies, Alexander Sanger does acknowledge that she 
believed in sterilization for those who “were incapable of understanding birth-control 
information” as well as immigration bans on “‘unfit’ people” (“Margaret Sanger Revisited” 216). 
Moreover, though, he emphasizes her dedication to feminism and, relatedly, to reproductive 
rights—especially for “the women she took care of as a nurse—the poor, the uneducated, the 
immigrant” (A. Sanger, “Margaret Sanger Revisited” 217). 	  
53 Examples include The Case for Birth Control (1917), Woman and the New Race (1920), and 
The Pivot of Civilization (1922).   
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the unfit but upon stopping all reproduction when there is not economic means of 
providing proper care for those who are born in health. […] Eugenists imply or 
insist that a woman’s first duty is to the state; we contend that her duty to herself 
is her first duty to the state. (Qtd. in A. Sanger, “Margaret Sanger Revisited” 213-
214) 
Specifically, Margaret Sanger advocates a positive eugenic approach. This approach to eugenics 
encourages those who are deemed most “fit” (i.e. upper-class, educated, healthy, white) to have 
children; on the other hand, negative eugenics seeks to prevent the “unfit” (i.e. working-class, 
immigrant, ill or having family members with a heritable disease, non-white) from 
reproducing.54 One of the most dangerous ill effects issuing from the negative eugenic approach 
is that the category of “feeble-minded” was used by those in positions of gendered and racial 
power to dismiss—and in many cases institutionalize and/or sterilize—whomever they saw as a 
threat, namely those of low socioeconomic status, women, and African-Americans.55 The 
grounds for categorization as “feeble-minded” were also impossibly vague and wide-ranging, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 It is important to note, though, that even amongst those who Margaret Sanger believes should 
become parents, she nonetheless stresses the importance of not having more children than a 
couple can financially support—or more children than is physically advisable for the mother’s 
health. 	  
55 As Harry Hamilton Laughlin observes in his 1922 study, Eugenical Sterilization in the United 
States, eugenic sterilization in the United States had been taking place on a state-by-state basis 
since at least 1907, when Indiana first legalized it (1). Additionally, even though the first statute 
is passed in Indiana in 1907, one was proposed as early as 1905 in Pennsylvania (Laughlin 1). 
All of this significantly predates the 1927 Buck v. Bell Supreme Court decision which officially 
legalizes forced sterilization on a state-by-state basis.  	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including anything from criminalism and prostitution, to alcoholism and sexually transmitted 
disease, to disabilities such as mental retardation or deafness.56  
The concepts of positive and negative eugenics, while popularized in the 1910s, 
originated in the nineteenth century and stemmed from the work of Sir Francis Galton. Galton 
first coined the phrase “eugenics” in 1883 as “the study of all agencies under human control 
which can improve or impair the racial quality of future generations,” although he had been 
working with eugenic concepts long before he developed a phrase to succinctly describe them 
(Qtd. in Black 18).57 In his 1865 article, “Hereditary Talent and Character,” Galton identifies 
intelligence and talent as traits inheritable from both parents; along these lines, he asserts that 
“[t]here is no reason to suppose that, in breeding for the highest order of intellect, we should 
produce a sterile or feeble race” (Galton 11). Galton’s emphasis on positive eugenics—the 
promotion of “good genes”—paves the way for later nineteenth- and early twentieth-century 
thinkers such as Cesare Lombroso, Max Nordau, Henry Goddard, and Lothrop Stoddard. 
According to Galton’s optimistic prognosis, proper breeding should bring an end to the 
propagation of what he considers dysgenic persons “in a few generations” (13). As eugenic 
theory moves into the twentieth century, however, eugenists espousing Galton’s theory of 
positive eugenics notice that “inferior” persons are not being “bred out,” so to speak; what’s 
more, American eugenists fear that dysgenic persons are reproducing at faster rates that eugenic 
ones. This anxiety spurs theories of negative eugenics, which prompt action to stop the 
reproduction of “bad genes” through institutionalization and sterilization.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 For these reasons, I find it important to use this historically accurate term, although I will use it 
in quotation marks.  	  
57 Edwin Black takes this from “Notes on the Early Days of the ‘Eugenics Education Society.’” 
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Edwin Black, through his attempts to recover what he argues were Galton’s noble 
intentions, posits that, “[w]hat Galton hoped to inspire in society, others were determined to 
force upon their fellow man” (19). A few of the main instances of eugenics tracts that I will 
examine alongside films in this chapter include the following: Charlotte Perkins Gilman’s 
Concerning Children (1900), Henry Goddard’s The Kallikak Family: A Study in the Heredity of 
Feeble-Mindedness (1912), Lothrop Stoddard’s The Rising Tide of Color Against White World-
Supremacy (1920), and the Buck v. Bell Supreme Court decision (1927). Gilman’s work 
examines positive eugenics through the lens of parental self-improvement, Goddard’s text treats 
class-based negative eugenics, Stoddard’s focuses on race-based positive eugenics, and Buck v. 
Bell, while certainly operating upon classist grounds, also draws our attention to perhaps the 
most obvious—but also under-examined and particularly problematic—categories for structuring 
eugenic thought: sex and gender. 
Classifying persons as fit or unfit under the rubrics of positive or negative eugenics 
certainly poses some serious and fraught questions: How are these judgments to be made? Upon 
what grounds? By whom? Do those deemed unfit have any recourse, legal or otherwise, for 
challenging this judgment? And with specific regard to how these issues manifest themselves in 
contraception and abortion films, what sorts of narratives are constructed around such persons? 
Where Are My Children?, The Hand That Rocks the Cradle, and Birth Control deal primarily 
with positive eugenics, whereas negative eugenic rationale and practice are apparent in The 
Black Stork/Are You Fit to Marry? and The Law of Population, or Birth Control. Despite 
differences in eugenic approach, however, the following remain constant: the struggle between 
scientific and moralistic education, and as a result, the ambiguity of the message we as 
viewers—both contemporaneous and contemporary—take from the films.  
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Educational struggle and ambiguity are present in Children through the contrasting 
plotlines of Edith Walton’s abortions and the abortion undertaken by the Walton’s maid’s 
daughter, Lillian. After an all-too-brief flirtation, Lillian becomes pregnant outside of marriage 
after engaging in sexual intercourse with Edith’s rakish younger brother, Roger. Lillian consults 
Edith about the matter, and Edith refers her to Dr. Malfit. Unfortunately for Lillian, the abortion 
goes poorly, and she dies as a result in a particularly melodramatic manner.  
These two plotlines are distinct in certain respects. Edith and Lillian occupy different 
class positions, and they are at different stages of their lives. They seek out abortion services for 
different reasons: Edith out of vanity and Lillian out of shame. They face different consequences 
for their decisions to follow through with abortion: Edith must bear the loneliness of 
childlessness in her old age, while the price of Lillian’s decision is death. Yet one of the most 
striking differences between the two women’s cases is the film’s contrast between stances on 
their decisions and its ambiguity even within those stances. Shelley Stamp’s research into the 
censorship, distribution, and reception history of Where Are My Children? shows that 
contemporaneous reactions to the film on the part of members of the National Board of Review’s 
Review Committee betray confusion as to what the film is really trying to convey. Interestingly, 
after the NBR’s Review Committee initially voted to pass the film, more inquiry into the film’s 
suitability for release was called for; ultimately, Children faced opposition and was voted down 
instead because the film “contained medical misinformation…confused contraception and 
abortion…[and] contained mixed messages about the use of both, seeming to advocate family 
planning ‘in order to protect young girls from the consequences of their misdeeds,’ and 
appearing to oppose any form of birth control in the plot involving the Waltons” (Stamp, 
“Precautions” 274). Working from the popular eugenic ideas of the time, Stamp points out a 
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counter-claim to those reviews which explains this apparent inconsistency: “The film advances a 
eugenic argument not uncommon in birth control movements during these years, many of which 
tied their appeal to racist and classist fears about ‘race suicide’” (“Precautions” 275). She points 
out that it is not outside the norms of the period to observe proponents of eugenics advocating 
the use of contraception amongst working-class and non-white women, but not amongst 
privileged white women (Stamp, “Precautions” 275). I agree with Stamp’s assessment of the 
situation, as the attitudes toward eugenics that she identifies were commonly held and advocated 
in a move that is not contradictory, but that instead combines positive eugenic approaches 
(wealthy white women should have children) with negative ones (working-class and/or non-
white women should not have children). At the same time, though, I also agree with the 
reviewers to a certain extent. It is not so much that I think the film contains “mixed messages,” 
but rather that the film is ambiguous about some of its messages—namely, those related to 
Lillian’s subplot. For example, the film is unclear regarding what types of reproductive options 
should be available to working-class women like Lillian, as well as under what circumstances 
and why availability should occur.  
One way to begin to potentially parse out the film’s message is to differentiate between 
birth control and abortion. A common misconception about those who advocate birth control and 
reproductive rights—in the 1910s and today—is that these groups and individuals are pro-
abortion. Margaret Sanger, for example, did not advocate abortion, but she instead promoted the 
use of contraceptives as a means of helping women avoid abortion. In her introduction to The 
Case for Birth Control (1917), she shares the story of a wife and mother of three who nearly died 
from a “self-attempted abortion” (M. Sanger, Case 6). This woman begged for information on 
contraception, which her doctor would not give to her. A few months later, Sanger is called to 
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this woman’s bedside as she lay dying from yet another abortion, this time at the hands of a 
“cheap abortionist,” after having immediately become pregnant following her previous abortion 
(M. Sanger, Case 7). In frustration over this woman’s needless death, Sanger vows, “I would 
never take another case until I had made it possible for working women in America to have 
knowledge of birth control” (M. Sanger, Case 7). Abortion, for Sanger, is a practice that would 
be rendered unnecessary if women had proper education on contraception and access to 
contraceptive devices. With regard to Weber’s Where Are My Children? and The Hand That 
Rocks the Cradle, Martin Pernick argues that “[t]hese widely misunderstood films support birth 
control but oppose abortion. Their primary point is that birth control provides a safe way for 
women to avoid dangerous and immoral abortions” (139). However, Pernick concedes, 
“…Weber’s films also depict a need to control lower-class fertility” (139).  
It might seem as though separating abortion-as-detrimental from contraception-as-
beneficial would work to clarify educational aims within these films. In fact, an anonymous 
article in the inaugural issue of Sanger’s Birth Control Review under the section heading of 
“What the Birth Control Leagues are Doing” seems to suggest the same in this review of a 
screening of Children in Portland:  
‘Where Are My Children?’[,] a film play purporting to deal with birth control, but 
really exploiting abortion, played for a week in a downtown theater in Portland. 
The league objected to the method of advertising the film as a ‘tremendous 
preachment on birth control.’ The management allowed H. C. Uthoff, president of 
the local league, to speak to the audience of the theater three times daily on the 
difference between contraception and abortion, outlining the position of the 
[Birth Control] League. Thousands were reached in this manner who had 
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probably never given the subject of birth control serious consideration. (11, 
emphasis mine) 
Here, we notice a few important moves on the part of Portland’s Birth Control League relative to 
education. Firstly, the local Birth Control League wishes to differentiate between birth control 
and abortion within Children. The phrase, “purporting to deal with birth control, but really 
exploiting abortion,” suggests that the reviewer believes that the film does not offer scientifically 
educational contraception information whatsoever, but instead favors the lewd exploitation of 
abortion. This leads us, secondly, to the fact that BCL does not find the film sufficiently 
educational. “Preachment” is a curious choice of phrase, as it denotes not only a moralistic 
exhortation to a dogmatic mode of conduct, but an exhortation that is perhaps overdone. The 
problem is that the film is not presently a “preachment on birth control,” but that it should have 
been. Or, alternatively, the Portland BCL objects to the fact that the film purports to be a 
“preachment on birth control,” but is instead a preachment on abortion. In either event, Children 
is not doing or saying what the reviewer or the BCL wants it to do or say. Thirdly, then, the local 
arm of the BCL arranges for its president to provide the missing educational information about 
contraception and offer its desired narrative regarding contraception and abortion. In this way, 
the League may temper and interpret Weber’s narrative, put its own stamp of approval on the 
information shared, and use Weber’s film as an opportunity for public education within movie 
theaters.  
 We may observe a similar move in another anonymous article in the April-May 1917 
issue of BCR. This article, entitled “Exploiting Falsehood and Boycotting Truth,” begins by 
unfavorably reviewing the film Will You Marry Me?, which the National Board of Review 
recently rejected because “‘[t]he theme of the picture…is abortion, disguised as birth control,’” 
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which it deems “‘objectionable in detail’” and “‘perniciously misleading to general audiences’” 
(Qtd. in “Exploiting Falsehood” 10). The author goes on to name Where Are My Children? 
specifically as operating in the same vein,58 along with two other films: Race Suicide (1916) and 
The Unborn (1917)59. Claiming that “clever lies go, but clean facts don't,” the review lambastes 
exhibitors for showing these films while displaying “servile timidity with regard to the one 
genuine birth control film on the market”—Margaret Sanger’s 1917 film Birth Control, naturally 
(“Exploiting Falsehood” 10).60  
 Interestingly, another article from the February 16, 1917 edition of the St. Louis Argus, an 
African-American weekly newspaper, reviews The Unborn favorably. The author notes that the 
film “exposes the quack doctor’s nefarious methods and handles the subject [of birth control] in 
almost unobjectionable manner” and “has been produced to serve a moral purpose and as such it 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 Annette Kuhn notes that Children was received unfavorably in Britain because “it was exactly 
its construction as a ‘sermon’ which prevented the film from reaching large audiences and 
achieving commercial success” (37).  
 
59 One reel survives of Race Suicide, a Siegmund Lubin picture produced by Lubin’s son-in-law 
Ira Lowry and directed by George Terwiliger and Raymond L. Ditmars. Modeled after D. W. 
Griffith’s Intolerance, Race Suicide is structured episodically; as such, all episodes could be 
screened together or shown separately. Joseph P. Eckhardt notes the oddness of the film, which 
began “with a reel devoted to insect and animal reproductive and child-rearing habits” and which 
“progressed through several periods from prehistoric man to the present” (219). Eckhardt cites an 
unfavorable Motion Picture World review of the film as evidence of its poor reception. The 
review argues that the film is harmful and conveys no point unless the audience accepts the 
belief that “‘a young married couple should have children as soon as possible, irrespective of 
their ability to support them’” (Qtd. in Eckhardt 219). Nothing more specific is known about the 
film’s content relative to birth control. The Unborn is completely lost; however, I was able to 
locate a review of the film in the St. Louis Argus.  
 
60 The author also entreats the reader at the end of the article to “Ask your ‘movie man’ if he 
intends to let you see the real birth control film and, if not, why not!” (“Exploiting Falsehood” 
10, emphasis mine). Overall, the article encourages potential viewers to boycott films that do not 
present the correct information—or any information—about contraception and to instead support 
Sanger’s film. 	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is an excellent and vivid preachment” (1). “Preachment” appears again as a means of describing 
the film, although its usage here is clearly positive. The article also mentions weekday matinee 
screenings for female patrons only which will be accompanied by lectures from a local nurse. 
The film’s perceived educational value is also apparent in the assertion that The Unborn is 
“especially enlightening for parents” (1). Although no copy or screenplay of this film is 
available, the Argus article makes it seem as though, contrary to the opinion of the BCR 
reviewer, The Unborn effectively differentiates between contraception and abortion (even if by 
failing to mention abortion) and presents contraceptive information effectively. Also worth 
noting is the consistency of the practice of framing the film with a lecture delivered by a member 
of the community educated on birth control. Beyond simple difference in opinion, we might 
account for these opposing reviews by considering publication along with audience. Although 
Sanger did not discriminate amongst women in need of contraceptive information, the BCR’s 
target audience is largely working- and middle-class white women. The St. Louis Argus, as an 
African American newspaper, targets a primarily black audience. This distinction raises 
questions of eugenics’ impact upon how certain populations received these films in the 1910s. 
Eugenics may be problematically in play in so far that the primarily white audience takes a 
critical view of a film like The Unborn and wishes to distinguish between birth control and 
abortion, while the primarily black audience supports the film and makes no such distinction.  
 In both unfavorable reviews of Children, we observe the push for a move toward the 
separation of birth control and abortion practically, theoretically, and visually. But the 
underlying point, however, is that the film does not separate the two—or at least, it does not do 
so in a clear-cut manner. Recalling Pernick’s comment on Weber’s films, I acknowledge that 
Children, for example, could certainly be read as promoting birth control while discouraging 
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abortion. I would add, however, that it could also be read as tacitly promoting abortion under 
certain circumstances and conditions, as well as critiquing abortion as it is unsafely practiced: 
behind closed doors, by untrained persons, away from the care of legitimate doctors and nurses. I 
will explore this reading further in the next section. Abortion and contraception are two 
completely separate practices, and Children’s BCR reviewers are right to point out the 
importance in not conflating them. On the one hand, the push for perceived separation between 
contraception and abortion could be read as a reaction against women’s popular conflation of the 
two. As Leslie J. Reagan notes, women “did not make a distinction between contraception and 
abortion, but saw them as part of the same project—a way to avoid unwanted childbearing” (41); 
elsewhere, she specifies that working-class women in particular did not differentiate between the 
two until the 1930s (Reagan 6). Overall, Reagan emphasizes that “[a]bortion was a moment in a 
woman’s reproductive life…[that] cannot be separated from sexual relations or reproduction as a 
whole” (17).61 In Children, Edith exemplifies this viewpoint. At no point does the film indicate 
that Edith uses birth control; for Edith, abortion is her means of contraception. I would contend, 
though, that Children does not conflate the two, and that it is this separation that raises the 
question of what class and/or race of women should have access to and/or should use which 
method. And in this way, I wish to expand Pernick’s assertion that “…Weber’s films also depict 
a need to control lower-class fertility” to also include a need to control other types of fertility 
under the banner of eugenics, which in turn further complicates the issue of the scientific and 
moralistic educational aims of films like Children (139). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 Reagan later cites contemporaneous studies on abortion rates. In one of them, “A study of ten 
thousand working-class clients of Margaret Sanger’s birth control clinics in the late 1920s found 
that 20 percent of all pregnancies had been intentionally aborted. Surveys of educated, middle-
class women in the 1920s showed that 10 to 23 percent had had abortions” (Reagan 23). See 
Reagan’s Chapter 1, footnote 10 of When Abortion Was a Crime for further information.  
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Another Progressive-era film, The Black Stork, further complicates the separation 
between contraception and abortion. One might have higher educational expectations of a film 
written by a medical doctor, but Stork, while seeming to exclude abortion altogether, ultimately 
includes it by redefining it under the rubric of euthanasia. Leopold and Theodore Wharton’s The 
Black Stork (1916) and its reframed 1927 version Are You Fit to Marry?, directed by W.H. 
Stafford, engage similar educational tactics via eugenics as does Where Are My Children?, yet 
they also drive the wedge further between the coexistence in a film of the scientifically and the 
morally educational. While The Black Stork and Are You Fit to Marry? are two separate films 
distributed eleven years apart, I consider them together in this chapter for two keys reasons. First, 
the repackaged 1927 version contains most of the original film.62 Second, the 1927 addition of a 
frame narrative to the original happens concurrently with the Supreme Court’s Buck v. Bell 
decision; this decision legalizes eugenic sterilization on a state-by-state basis, and in this context, 
the films lend themselves to a productive continued discussion of eugenics. 
 The Black Stork tells the story of Claude Leffingwell, who the film describes as a man 
“blessed with wealth and position, but whose inheritance includes the blood taint of an indiscreet 
ancestor.” Even from the film’s first introduction of Claude, the phrase “blood taint” indicates 
that the film will deal heavily with eugenics—and most likely with syphilis, which was known as 
a blood disease. Claude wishes to marry the lovely Anne Smith, but he is encouraged not to do 
so by Dr. Dickey, a doctor who advocates abstinence from marriage and sex if one knows 
oneself to be the carrier of hereditary disease. A strict believer in eugenics, Dr Dickey also 
advocates the euthanasia of severely ill or disabled children both for the sake of the child and of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 For a detailed account of changes or cuts made between the 1916 version of The Black Stork 
and the version included in Are You Fit to Marry?, see Chapter 8 of Martin Pernick’s The Black 
Stork.  
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the race. Claude ignores Dickey’s advice and marries Anne without informing her of his 
condition. At the birth of their first child, a crippled syphilitic son, the doctor asks Anne what she 
would like to do while also making his preference known through the way he characterizes her 
options: mercifully allow the infant to die, or prolong what will be a hard a tortured life for the 
boy. The answer is revealed to Anne in a divine dream vision, wherein the lifespan of the boy 
presents itself before her: he suffers ostracism throughout his life for his afflictions, is jailed for 
murdering the doctor who convinced his mother to let him live, and, after his release from jail, 
ultimately wreaks his vengeance upon society by marrying a working-class woman and having a 
brood of syphilitic children. Upon awaking from her vision, Anne declares, “God has shown me 
in a vision what my child’s life would be. Save him from such a fate,” and as Dr. Dickey touches 
the child, its soul flies into the arms of a waiting Jesus. 
In Are You Fit to Marry?, all of this is framed by the narrative of another young couple, 
Jack Gaynor and Alice Worth. After newly betrothed couple announces their nuptial plans to 
Alice’s parents, Mr. Worth takes Jack for a drive to the local “psychopathic hospital,” where Mr. 
Worth narrates for Jack—and the audience—what can happen when the dysgenic propagate: 
“For the salvation of our race and the health and happiness of every individual we must stop at 
its source the pollution of the blood stream of the nation by passing sane eugenic laws that would 
prevent marriages among the unfit.” Jack is upset at the thought that he must have a venereal 
disease exam in order to marry Alice, and so Mr. Worth tells him the cautionary tale of Claude 
Leffingwell, a “boyhood friend” of his. After hearing the sad tale of the Leffingwells, Jack reads 
up on the subject of heredity, takes the VD test, and passes. Alice is thrilled to hear the news, and 
the films ends with the line, “Yes, we’re fit to marry.” 
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In order to properly understand the educational bent of this film, we must consider that it 
was made by and stars Dr. Harry J. Haiselden of Chicago. Like the character Dr. Dickey, who is 
based on and played by Haiselden, Dr. Haiselden himself was an outspoken advocate of eugenic 
marriages and the euthanasia of what he considered defective babies. Haiselden first gained 
national attention with the case of the Bollinger baby in 1915. At German-American Hospital in 
Chicago, Anna Bollinger gave birth to a baby boy with serious health problems, and Haiselden 
was called in for consultation. While “Haiselden concluded that surgery could correct the 
intestinal defects and thus save the infant’s life…gross physical and mental abnormalities would 
remain, and he urged the parents not to request an operation. The Bollingers agreed, and five 
days later the baby died” (Pernick 3-4). According to health and science historian Martin 
Pernick’s research, Haiselden admitted in the wake of the Bollinger case that he had allowed 
“many other infants he diagnosed as ‘defectives’ to die” in the past ten years, and “over the next 
three years, he withheld treatment from, or actively speeded the deaths of, at least five more 
abnormal babies” (4). While there were many vocal detractors of Haiselden’s mercy killing 
practices, he also found overwhelming support from reformers and doctors alike, including 
Clarence Darrow, Helen Keller, and Baltimore’s Cardinal James Gibbons, among other notable 
persons.63 
Given Haiselden’s medical background, it is reasonable to expect that Stork would be 
both scientifically and morally educational. But what is this film advocating and how is it doing 
so? One might argue that the film uses eugenically-grounded science to discourage syphilitic 
persons from having children: an opinion that also carries moral overtones in so far that 
abstinence from parenthood—and, implicitly, from marriage—is presented as the morally sound 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 For a more complete list of supporters and detractors, see Pernick 6-7.  
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choice for carriers of hereditary diseases. Interestingly, despite Stork’s emphasis on eugenic 
education about syphilis and procreation, the advocacy of birth control measures and practices is 
explicitly absent from the film. This is understandable to a certain degree, as the ostensible focus 
of the film is on entering into eugenic marriages and producing eugenic children—a goal to 
which even Maragret Sanger is not opposed.64 Yet there are other related alternatives that the 
film does not mention. For example, a couple with one ill partner could choose not to have 
children or could instead decide to adopt a child from an orphanage.65 Additionally, the film 
could highlight the fact that women need policies in place to help them know whether their 
sexual partner is a carrier of an STD or other disease with no outwardly physical symptoms or 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 In her November 1918 essay in English Methods entitled “When Should a Woman Avoid 
Having Children?,” Sanger declares that “By all means there should be no children when mother 
(or father) suffers from such diseases as tuberculosis, gonorrhea, syphilis, cancer, epilepsy, 
insanity, drunkenness or mental disorders. In the case of the mother, heart disease, kidney trouble 
and pelvic deformities are also a serious bar to pregnancy” (243). Unlike most eugenic texts of 
the day, and unlike Haiselden, Sanger acknowledges that hereditary diseases may come from a 
child’s mother or her/his father. The import of this break in the trend of blaming women for 
propagating disease and “dysgenic” children will be explored more fully later in this chapter. 
Also divergent is Sanger’s concern for the mother’s health outside of concern for congenital 
diseases alone.  	  
65 Adoption was gaining momentum in the 1910s, especially after President Theodore Roosevelt 
called the first White House Conference on the Care of Dependent Children in 1909. The 
outcomes of this Conference “included the establishment of the Foster Care Program, the 
formation of the Federal Children’s Bureau, regular inspection of foster care homes by the state, 
and education and medical care for foster children” (“History” 3). Despite this step in the 
direction of advocacy on the part of abandoned and orphaned children, eugenists such as Henry 
H. Goddard dismissed adoption as a eugenic risk. In his 1911 article, “Wanted: A Child to 
Adopt,” Goddard contends that whether a child’s background is unknown or partially known, 
her/his background cannot be sound, or the child would not be in need of adoption. When an 
abandoned or orphaned child is adopted, then, even if she/he seems “normal,” that child still 
could produce dysgenic children in adulthood and ruin her/his adoptive family—at least in name, 
if not also genetically (as in the case of a marriage between one’s biological and adopted 
children, which Goddard specifically cites as an example) (“Wanted”). In sum, Goddard sees 
adopting a child as a means of perpetuating generations of “feeble-minded” progeny, and he 
concludes his argument by stating the following: “It is neither right nor wise for us to let our 
humanity, our pity and sympathy for the poor, homeless, and neglected child, drive us to do 
injustice to and commit a crime against those yet unborn” (“Wanted”). 
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with symptoms not apparent outside of sexual intimacy. Yet far from promoting this policy 
change, we instead observe Dr. Dickey exacerbating the problem: he knows of Claude’s 
condition but does not tell Anne, perhaps because of confidentiality, or perhaps because he is 
protecting a fellow male. Whereas Sanger argued in favor of birth control access for all 
women—especially the working class—Haiselden overlooks the fact that birth control education 
could be of critically help lessen the number of children born with congenital birth defects. 
Margaret Sanger’s films—Birth Control (1917) and Biology of Conception and 
Mechanism of Contraception (1922)—perhaps come the closest to displaying educational value, 
even while still maintaining the ambiguities of scientific and moralistic discourse under the 
banner of eugenics. Amongst these two films, Biology is without a doubt the more scientifically 
focused of the two. This two-reeler was directed in a joint effort by Sanger and Dr. Hannah M. 
Stone and presented by the Birth Control Federation of America, Inc., which was formerly 
known as the American Birth Control League and the Birth Control Clinical Research Bureau. 
This film demonstrates, through highly detailed and specific microscopic footage, the effects of 
various types of spermicides upon spermatozoa. It describes the length of the sperm, their rate of 
movement, and how many spermatozoa one would expect to find alive at various levels of 
spermacidic potency. The only narrative is the scientific one: there is no frame narrative; there is 
no dramatization; there are no Hollywood trappings. Biology is chiefly scientifically educational. 
However, simply through its title and the material that it presents, it also contains the implicit 
moral message that having knowledge of how conception occurs and how to prevent it is good 
and useful information.  
Sanger’s Birth Control, which preceded Biology by five years, not only demonstrates a 
clear narrative frame, but that narrative frame is based upon critical moment in Sanger’s career 
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and serves as “a dramatized reenactment of her struggles as a nurse turned birth control activist” 
(Norden, “Reproductive Freedom” 263). Although a copy of the film has not survived, film 
historian Martin Norden has discovered what he describes as “a heavily detailed scene-by-scene 
scenario…that had been entered into the legal record as part of a deposition” which provides us 
at least with some information about the film’s plot and structure (“Reproductive Freedom” 264). 
Birth Control is split into two parts: the first, “The Martyrdom of Progress,” relies heavily upon 
references to Joan of Arc to, as Norden puts it, “find Sanger’s place within the general history of 
people, particularly women, persecuted for the their ideas” (“Reproductive Freedom” 268). One 
intertitle makes the comparison between Joan of Arc and Sanger explicit: “‘To the aid of those 
mothers comes America’s most recent Joan of Arc, who, for her IDEA—Birth Control—has 
willingly accepted persecution and imprisonment.’” (Qtd. in Norden, “Reproductive Freedom” 
268-269). Even with this intertitle, we can see how while the film does mean to spread the news 
of contraception, it is also designed as a publicity vehicle to promote Sanger’s work and 
reputation. As Norden argues, it was Sanger’s attempt at “redefin[ing] herself and her work to 
American mainstream society” (“Reproductive Freedom” 264).  
The second section, “The Story of Margaret Sanger’s Fight Against Society’s Prejudice,” 
continues in the same vein. This section tells the story of Sanger’s interactions as a nurse with 
Sadie Sachs, the very woman Sanger describes in her introduction to The Case for Birth Control. 
Sachs, renamed “Helen Field” in the film, is a working-class wife and mother who desperately 
requests information on contraception, but to whom Sanger must deny said information based 
upon the Comstock laws. Without contraceptive knowledge, Sachs becomes pregnant again, 
seeks out an abortionist, and dies from a botched abortion. Following this vignette, Birth Control 
presents “another, more extensively fabricated story” wherein a newspaper publicist and 
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opponent of Sanger’s work creates an elaborate plan to catch Sanger in the act of breaking the 
Comstock laws and distributing contraceptive information. Despite the fact that a female 
informant hired by Sanger’s opponent, Andrew McDade, changes her mind and sides with 
Sanger, Sanger’s clinic is raided by police and she is arrested.  
Like Children, the NBR initially passed Birth Control. Reviewers from Variety wrote in 
favor of its tone and presentation of a difficult subject, saying that the films employed a “‘deft 
touch and intelligence’” (Qtd. in Norden, “Reproductive Freedom” 272). As a result, Sanger 
planned a tour of the film, but the tour was cancelled when Birth Control met opposition from 
New York City’s license commissioner, George H. Bell. While Bell claimed initially that his 
objections did not issue from personal opinions about contraception, he later expressed that, “‘we 
felt that it would be a bad thing, particularly in these times of war, to permit the exhibition of a 
moving picture advocating the limiting of birth’” (Qtd. in Norden, “Reproductive Freedom” 
273). Later, Judge Nathan Bijur ruled against Bell and in favor of Sanger’s right to show the 
film, but this ruling was later reversed on the grounds that, under Mutual v. Ohio, Birth Control 
was “essentially a commercial product” and therefore not within the bounds of First Amendment 
protections.66 Whether or not Bell personally agreed with Sanger’s pro-contraception message, 
the larger issue here is a difference in Bell’s and Sanger’s stances on eugenics. Bell’s position 
recalls the opinion of Theodore Roosevelt published in the October issue of Metropolitan 
Magazine as “Birth Control—From the Positive Side,” wherein the former president argues that 
birth control should not be promoted because we should not limit American birth rates. In her 
retort, Sanger counters Roosevelt by emphasizing that the practice of birth control helps to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 For a more detailed account of Birth Control’s legal problems, see Norden, “Reproductive 
Freedom” 272-276. 	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increase the quality of those Americans born: “We advocates of birth control know that one 
cannot make quality by insisting on quantity. One cannot make better people by simply by 
having more people” (M. Sanger, “Answer” 13). Thus, while problems with Sanger’s film 
ostensibly arose from its content, it is more accurate to argue that problems arose based upon 
differing views regarding how eugenics should function—or, to take the problem one step 
further, it is more accurate to argue that problems with the subject of birth control were masked 
by the veneer of differing opinions about eugenics.  
Lois Weber’s second birth control/abortion film, The Hand That Rocks the Cradle 
(1917), copycatted and further dramatized Sanger’s fight for birth control and her eventual 
imprisonment, hunger strike, and release. In it, Weber herself stars as the Sanger-like Lois 
Broome who, like Sanger, believes that the dissemination of eugenically-based birth control 
materials will improve the quality of women’s lives and render abortion an obsolete practice. 
When Lois’ husband, Dr. Frank Broome (played by Weber’s real-life husband and filmmaking 
partner, Phillips Smalley), refuses contraceptive information to women in need, Lois, as scholar 
Kay Sloan puts it, “took the matter into her own hands” (Sloan 341). Despite its narrative nature, 
one might expect the film’s extreme likeness to Sanger’s biography to help solidify its pro-
contraception, anti-abortion advocacy. Yet, like the ambiguity of scientifically and morally 
educational aims we find in Children, Cradle’s blatantly ambiguous ending makes us question 
the film’s stance on contraception and abortion along clearly drawn class lines. The films ends 
with Dr. Broome, Lois, and George and Priscilla, two of their more well-off friends, offering 
varying opinions on contraception; these opinions range from being in favor of stifling public 
discourse regarding contraception (George) and eschewing birth control for “self control” 
(Priscilla), to the more progressive views of quietly providing contraceptive counsel (Broome) 
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and openly providing contraceptive counsel in order to end abortion (Lois). Noticeably absent is 
the viewpoint of any of the female characters in the film who have needed, suffered without, 
and/or benefitted from birth control information. One might argue that Lois represents this 
viewpoint, but these working-class women are still denied visibility at the last. Ultimately, 
Cradle’s closing intertitle asks the audience, “What do you think?”—a move that only reinforces 
the film’s ambiguous stance.   
Although Birth Control is a dramatization of events in Sanger’s life and some details are 
altered or embellished, the core of the film is nonetheless real events from the life of a real 
person. In this way, its scientific and educational aims are less ambiguous than those in Children, 
as Birth Control has a real-life analog in Margaret Sanger. If a viewer wonders what educational 
messages the films attempts to convey, she can look no further than one of Sanger’s many 
publications to find that Sanger a.) distinguishes between contraception and abortion and b.) 
advocates the former as a means to avoid needing the latter. Issues of the Birth Control Review’s 
bias aside, in this way, perhaps Sanger’s is “the one genuine birth control film on the market” 
(“Exploiting Falsehood” 10). With its fictional narrative, however, Weber’s Where Are My 
Children?, as I have indicated, is much more ambiguous in its educational aims, and this has 
everything to do with the strong presence of narrative within the film.  
 
Narrative Integration as Educational Framework: The Visual Rhetoric of Eugenics 
Although the contraception/abortion social problem films appear during film’s 
transitional era, film began its shift to narrative integration about a decade prior with the 
formation of the Motion Picture Patents Company (MPPC) in 1908. Within this shift, 
“filmmakers began to center their work on the task of storytelling” (Gunning, Griffith 25). Tom 
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Gunning identifies D.W. Griffith as a pioneer of the narrator system, which Gunning describes as 
functioning largely like the cinema of narrative integration in general. Amongst other 
possibilities, narrator systems allow for the expression of “a range of moral judgments” (Griffith 
27). A main impetus behind this shift is the desire of filmmakers and censors to make cinematic 
images less potentially offensive by tempering them with a narrative frame. With an integrated 
narrative in place, the imagined viewer runs less of a risk of drawing the wrong ideas from a 
film—ideas primarily involving the emulation of crime, vice, or other wrongdoings. In order for 
these actions to function as parts of a cautionary tale, and not as attractions,67 the viewer 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 The earlier cinema of attractions that dominated film from its inception was premised upon, as 
Gunning notes, “its ability to show something,” making it an “exhibitionist cinema” (Gunning, 
“Attractions” 57). The cinema of attractions was designed to arrest the attention of the viewer 
without the use of a causally motivated narrative. Gunning, drawing upon the theories of 
spectatorship and display posited by Sergei Eisenstein, defines the cinema of attractions as “a 
cinema that displays its visibility, willing to rupture a self-enclosed fictional world for a chance 
to solicit the attention of the spectator” (Gunning, “Attractions” 57). The cinema of attractions 
embodies Eisenstein’s conviction that “an attraction…is…any demonstrable fact…that is known 
and proven to exercise a definite effect on the attention and emotions of the audience and 
that…possesses the characteristic of concentrating the audience’s emotions in any direction 
dictated by the production’s purpose” (Eisenstein 35-36, emphasis mine). In the early period, the 
attraction is both sub-narrative and spectacular. Yet, as film moves more confidently toward the 
cinema of narrative integration in the transitional period, the latter part of Eisenstein’s definition 
becomes crucial, for it is precisely the “production’s purpose” that so profoundly complicates the 
role of sub-narrativity and spectacle within the narrative and that enmeshes questions of narrative 
within questions of censorship. 
I am defining sub-narrativity along the lines of E. M. Forster’s distinction in Aspects of 
the Novel between story and plot. For Forster, story is, generally speaking, “a narrative of events 
arranged in their time-sequence. A plot is also a narrative of events, the emphasis falling on 
causality” (86). Story is tantamount to sequence, while plot denotes causal motivation. Although 
Forster uses the word narrative in both instances, I differentiate between the two by assigning 
“narrative” to movement that exhibits a causal relationship, and “sub-narrative” to movement 
that exhibits only a sequential relationship. Part of the rationale for this distinction is to limit the 
associations of “narrative” to instances of causality. However, I also wish to explore the role of 
sequence with relationship to causality, and more specifically, to explore sequence as a form of 
narrative movement that operates simultaneously with causality yet that is not the same as nor 
that is always already part of the causal system. In this way, I conceive of the sequential sub-
narrative as that which could be rationalized into the causal narrative system, but also as that 
	   114 
witnesses—the viewer must witness—the negative consequences of said act, and not only the 
“immoral” act itself. This is not to suggest that moments of spectacle do not exist within 
narrative film—they certainly do. Their function, however, can vary: at times, spectacle works in 
concert with the main dominant narrative; at times, it coexists with the dominant narrative in a 
manner that neither adds to nor detracts from it; at times, it is at odds with the dominant 
narrative. More specifically, I would identify the moments of spectacle that occur within the 
contraception/abortion social problem films as didactic spectacle: sub-narrative moments that 
contain educational value and/or narratives of their own outside of the film’s central narrative 
plot and causality.68 How might we characterize the relationship between moments of didactic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
which could operate outside of causal logic in a manner that could support, undermine, or have 
no significant effect upon the causal narrative.  
 	  
68 Causality is a key characteristic of a narrative’s plot. On the distinction between plot and story, 
see p. 86 of E. M. Forster’s Aspects of the Novel (1927) and p. 5 of Frances Patterson’s Cinema 
Craftsmanship (1920). With regard to the relationship between plot and spectacle, I do not mean 
to suggest that narrativity must be present in order for a didactic message to come across, nor 
that the seeming indispensability of narrative was in way inevitable, nor that the causal narrative 
possesses any formal superiority to sub-narrativity. David Bordwell suggests a formal superiority 
to the classical narrative which accounts for its role in the classical Hollywood cinematic 
paradigm; I would like to explore the implications of the possibility that it is not the inherent 
superiority of the classical narrative that ultimately makes it, in Roman Jakobson’s sense of the 
term, the dominant. Rather, narrative becomes a necessary means by which censorship 
institutions believe that what they consider to be potentially lascivious images and morally 
questionable information might be monitored and audience reaction to these images and 
information might be controlled. 
According to Jakobson, “the dominant may be defined as the focusing component of a 
work of art: it rules, determines, and transforms the remaining components. It is the dominant 
which guarantees the integrity of the structure” (82). Jakobson also notes that within “literary 
evolution,” there exist “shifts in the mutual relationship among the diverse components of the 
system” which indicate “a shifting dominant” (85). Within the context of the classical 
Hollywood narrative, Bordwell identifies the causal narrative as the dominant. However, while 
he posits that the classical filmic system’s integrity “deserves to be seen as a dynamic one, with 
the subordinated factors constantly pulling against the sway of the dominant,” he nonetheless 
holds that “the causal dominant creates a marked hierarchy of systems in the classical film” 
(Classical 12). With this, Bordwell allows for some movement within the classical filmic system, 
	   115 
spectacle and the holistic educational aims of the films in which they appear? What effect might 
this relationship have upon how we observe the scientifically and morally didactic functioning 
within contraception/abortion social problem films? 
In Where Are My Children?, we as viewers observe a few different moments of didactic 
spectacle, all of which are based upon and motivated by eugenics, although with varying 
narrative results. Two such instances revolve around Dr. Homer’s testimony during his trial for 
the dissemination of eugenic birth control materials. In the first instance, we observe didactic 
spectacle in the form of a series of close-up shots of the very birth control tract for which Homer 
is on trial. After a close-up displaying the book’s title and author—“Birth Control by Wm. 
Homer M.D.”—Weber gives us three more close-ups of fairly long duration (18 seconds, 15 
seconds, and 20 seconds, respectively) that all but force the reader to focus on the information 
being conveyed: “When only those children who are wanted are born, the race will conquer the 
evils that weigh it down”; “Let us stop the slaughter of the unborn and save the lives of unwilling 
mothers”; “Because men and women are ignorant and undisciplined, does it follow that 
unwanted children should be born to suffer blindness, disease or insanity?”. Herein lies a stark 
example of the educational possibilities of a film that even the director herself identifies 
primarily as entertainment. The politics of eugenics in the suspiciously Sanger-like pro-birth 
control message of Dr. Homer’s book are clear, and these politics express the mix of positive and 
negative eugenics commonly espoused by the early birth control movement, but without the 
extreme negative eugenic measures of institutionalization or sterilization. Nonetheless, there are 
frequently racial eugenic undertones present in Children as in the other contraception/abortion 
films of this era. Dr. Homer’s tract, like many of Sanger’s publications, promotes education and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
but not enough to enable an “evolution” of the type that Jakobson suggests as a possibility within 
a given textual system.	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contraceptive practice for the good of individual women and also of the white race. As 
Alexander Sanger reminds us, it was crucial for Margaret Sanger to align her birth control 
movement with the preexisting discourse of eugenics. Despite her good intentions, however, this 
alliance unfortunately produced some classist and racist results: “Margaret Sanger tried to co-opt 
eugenics in a bid for respectability. It failed miserably and the damage continues to this day” (A. 
Sanger, “Margaret Sanger Revisited” 217). Despite the ill effects of this alliance, however, we 
must not lose sight of the critical emphasis that Sanger placed upon education—an emphasis that 
defines contraception/abortion films in the 1910s, albeit in complex and sometimes contradictory 
ways.  
With regard to Children’s central narrative and educational aims, this series of close-ups 
is educational in and of itself. When we approach this courtroom scene and its attendant 
analepses within their own subplot, Children includes both scientifically and morally educational 
information in so far as it promotes birth control but not abortion: Homer’s entreaty to “stop the 
slaughter of the unborn and save the lives of unwilling mothers” certainly criticizes anyone who 
understands abortion and birth control as synonymous. When we consider Homer’s courtroom 
scene in relationship to the scenes with which it is cross-cut, however, suddenly abortion enters 
the birth control conversation; as discussed in the introduction this chapter, Homer’s trial scene 
is cross-cut with a scene in which Edith offers abortion advice to a friend. In this way, within the 
exact same sequences, contraception/abortion are both conflated and separated from one another. 
Alone, Homer reads as a martyr; in the context of Edith’s actions, he reads as complicit with the 
promotion of abortion. Thus, as we consider narrative frames and the moral aims they attempt to 
ascribe to Children, we must also consider competing narrative frames within the film itself as 
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well as within the film’s dominant sociohistorical discourses on contraception/abortion—
especially eugenics.  
The eugenic bent of Homer’s opinions on contraception becomes more visually explicit 
in its second instance, which occurs later in the same trial scene. Feeling that the court should 
“help instead of hinder” him, Homer launches into two flashbacks of visiting with poor families 
who could have benefited from the family planning information that we the viewers see in the 
close-ups of Homer’s book. In the first flashback, Dr. Homer pays a visit to a woman in the 
slums. She looks weary and harried and is tending to a baby when he enters. Two other small 
children are at a table in the background. We then see a close-up from the doctor’s point of view 
of the baby vacantly staring into the distance. As we return to a medium long shot that exposes 
more of the family’s squalid surroundings, the mother, crying and shaking with sadness and fear, 
stands and clings to Homer’s shirt. He pats her on the back and tries to comfort her, for it is clear 
to him that the baby is gravely ill and cannot be saved. When the father arrives home moments 
later, dressed in a torn jacket and slacks, his wife tells him the news, and he falls to the bed, 
sobbing convulsively. The doctor gathers his bag and exits.  
 The second flashback opens upon the interior of a home. Three children are lying 
together in one bed, which highlights the family’s cramped living space and lack of resources. 
We then see their mother and father having a physical dispute. When the husband slaps his wife, 
she threatens him with her fist, and he retaliates by striking her. Outside of their tenement, a 
crowd has gathered while the altercation continues inside. Dr. Homer enters the apartment, 
attempts unsuccessfully to break up the fight, and is ultimately pushed out of the room by the 
couple.  
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With a prolepsis back to the present trial, Dr. Homer declares, “These conditions prove to 
me the necessity of world-wide enlightenment on the subject of birth control.” These educational   
analepses employ parallel narratives in order to demonstrate, quite literally, what it looks like 
when society does not heed the advice the doctor is criminally accused of sharing; they provide 
dramatized illustrations of the ideas we see in print immediately before. Although the 
contraception/abortion films from the 1930s and 1940s demonstrate how narrative and its 
moralizing effects can eclipse the educational, Where Are My Children? shows us how narrative 
presence and dramatization can help enhance the educational by making it more practically 
understandable and relatable. When Dr. Homer is found guilty at the end of the courtroom scene, 
I would argue that an element of moralizing enters into his sub-narrative in so far that the film, 
through its presentation of the scientifically educational, throws its sympathies to the side of Dr. 
Homer. Also, the manner in which the verdict is delivered indicates the film’s allegiance to Dr. 
Homer’s dispersal of contraceptive information: an intertitle declares that “A jury of men 
disagreed with Dr. Homer’s views” (emphasis mine). While the norm in 1916 would be for any 
jury to be comprised solely of men, “men” stands out in this statement because of the trial’s 
nature: while technically Dr. Homer is the one on trial, that which really stands trial is women’s 
rights to contraceptive information—and more fundamentally, to reproductive agency. The 
phrasing of the verdict implies that a jury of women would have decided differently. 
Like Weber’s shots of poor, overpopulated working-class families in Dr. Homer’s 
courtroom flashbacks in Where Are My Children?, the Wharton brothers and W. H. Stafford 
employ similar visual rhetoric in The Black Stork/Are You Fit to Marry?, although to more 
obviously negatively eugenic ends. Dr. Harry J. Haiselden began plans for what Martin Pernick 
calls “the most explicit depiction of negative eugenics to reach the silent screen” shortly after the 
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Bollinger case made headlines (Pernick 143). Although the film initially ran into difficulties 
getting approval from the National Board of Review, it eventually enjoyed several decades of 
showings until at least 1942, especially when repackaged as Are You Fit to Marry?.69 Given 
Haiselden’s dedication to eugenics and desire to prevent the propagation of disabled babies and 
help these children to avoid what Dr. Dickey calls the “dreadful sentence of life,” it seems only 
natural that his film would have an educational bent. In the frame narrative Fit, Dr. Worth, a 
somewhat toned down version of Dr. Dickey, gives Jack—and us—the tour of the “psychopathic 
hospital”: the camera pans across a collection of individuals with darkened eyes and smudged 
faces who Dr. Worth describes as representative of the “thousands of poor demented souls 
incarcerated in this asylum.” Firstly, the pan serves to accentuate the sheer number of so-called 
“demented souls.” Additionally, since we see the patients from Worth’s and Jack’s perspectives, 
the pan illustrates what Martin Norden terms the “able-bodied point of view” characteristic of 
most films that include disabled characters (Isolation 1). Norden explains that the “strategy” of 
privileging the “able-bodied point of view” has two chiefs effects upon the audience: “it 
enhances the disabled characters’ isolation and ‘Otherness’ by reducing them to objectifications 
of pity, fear, scorn, etc.—in short, objects of spectacle—as a means of pandering to the needs of 
the able-bodied majority, and it contributes to a sense of isolation and self-loathing among 
audience members with disabilities” (Isolation 1, emphasis mine). In the instance of Stork/Fit, 
we might understand “the needs of the able-bodied majority” as the enforcement of negative 
eugenic practices upon those not included in said majority. I wish to draw special attention to 
Norden’s use of “spectacle,” as the “hospital” patients in these scenes certainly function as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 For a more detailed history of the film’s censorship, see Pernick 150-158. 
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scientifically and morally educational spectacle—as the living example of exactly the kind of 
dysgenic children the film argues one should avoid having at all costs. 
  Similarly, we observe parallel sights along with Anne, Claude’s betrothed, in Stork’s 
cautionary narrative. Anne, as an upstanding and socially-minded upper-class woman, performs 
charity work at a local hospital for those afflicted with physical and mental disabilities. There, 
Dr. Dickey shows her—and us—a survey of health conditions: a mircocephalic baby “with only 
a shadow of a brain” for whom “the worst is yet to come”; a boy who appears to have Down 
Syndrome; a sixteen-year-old girl with a terrifying smile who would likely be generically 
classified as “feeble-minded”; a “hopeless cripple.” These images, as in Children?, provide a 
visualized dramatization of the informational eugenics material that we read in the intertitles. 
Like Children?, these films also promote a negative eugenic agenda. Although these films do not 
explicitly advocate sterilization, the shots of the “hospitals” for the disabled imply that 
institutionalization and segregation are certainly fine. While not addressing the topic of abortion, 
Stork certainly has a radical agenda in its promotion of euthanasia for severely ill infants. Again, 
although never mentioning abortion, one implication of the eugenic and reproductive logic 
behind euthanasia in Stork is that had the women who gave birth to these disabled persons had 
abortions, all who are involved would have been better off, and euthanasia upon birth thus reads 
rather strongly, I would argue, as an extremely late-term abortion. 
Stork’s shots of the “psychopathic hospital” strongly echo photographs included in Henry 
Goddard’s The Kallikak Family: A Study in the Heredity of Feeble-Mindedness (1912), wherein 
Goddard argues for class-based negative eugenics using copious doctored photographs and 
genealogical charts to bolster his claim. The Kallikak Family traces one New England 
bloodline’s heritage in order to elucidate how the dysgenic genes gained such prominence and to 
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determine a course of action for dealing with the “feeble-minded.” Martin Kallikak, the 
pseudonymous although historically real patriarch,70 begot children by his “normal” wife and a 
“feeble-minded” woman.71 Although he produced only one child with his lover and several with 
his wife, both lines continue for six generations.  
Of particular note in Goddard’s study is his inclusion of pictures of various members of 
the dysgenic Kallikak line. While the composition of the shots is unremarkable—children 
gathered on a porch, a woman posing outdoors near a tree, a young boy sitting near the bottom of 
a wood pile—the details of these individuals’ faces are disturbing. In the photo labeled “Great-
Grandchildren of Old Sal,” one boy’s face appears smudged, another boy’s face is disjointed and 
clay-like, and the little girl’s features look as though they have been drawn in with pen (88). The 
boy described as “an imbecile of the Mongolian type” in “Great-Grandson of ‘Daddy’ Kallikak” 
has darkened eyebrows, nearly-erased eyes, and a straight, dark, unnatural mouth line (Kallikak 
84). Edwin Black, after consultation with James H. Wallace, Jr., director of Photographic 
Services at the Smithsonian Institution, confirms Stephen Jay Gould’s accusation that Goddard 
doctored the photographs of the “feeble-minded” Kallikaks included in the book, “darkening and 
distorting the eyes, mouths, eyebrows, nose and other facial features to make the adults and 
children appear stupid” (77, emphasis mine). Black suggests that “the consistent addition of 
sinister features allowed Goddard to effectively portray the Kallikaks as mental and social 
defectives” (77). Goddard’s main point of concern was that mental degeneracy was invisible and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 As Edwin Black notes in Chapter 5 of War Against the Weak: Eugenics and America’s 
Campaign to Create a Master Race, Goddard arrived at this new family name “by combining the 
Greek words for ‘beauty’ and ‘bad’” (77).  
 
71 In the genealogical chart of Martin Kallikak and the generation of his progeny, the two women 
with whom he fathered children are listed as “The Lawful Wife” and “The Nameless Feeble-
Minded Girl” (Goddard, Kallikak 37).  
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could not outwardly be detected; thus, by tampering with the Kallikak photographs and assigning 
visible physical characteristics to these bodies, Goddard attempts to make them identifiable and 
therefore containable.  
Goddard points to the continuation of the dysgenic line as a major dilemma, and he posits 
two plans in response. In the first, he suggests confining the “feeble-minded” in colonies, and 
urges his reader that he “would insist that segregation and colonization is not by any means as 
hopeless a plan as it may seem to those who look only at the immediate increase in the tax rate” 
(Goddard, Kallikak 105). Through reducing the so-called “feeble-minded” from human beings to 
dehumanized, objectified tax beneficiaries, he completely denies their agency and personhood.72 
Furthermore, the rhetoric of “segregation” echoes the relationship between class and race and 
shows how race can double back to structure class in a eugenic feedback loop.  
While class-based mental deficiency comprised one front of the war on degeneracy, race 
comprised another. Lothrop Stoddard, one of Goddard’s contemporaries and a founding director 
of Margaret Sanger’s American Birth Control League, makes his concerns with race explicit. 
Lothrop Stoddard brought race to the forefront of the American consciousness with the 1920 
publication of The Rising Tide of Color Against White World-Supremacy, in which he identifies 
an endangerment of white racial superiority that results from rapid and dysgenic non-white 
procreation, as well as from the numerous casualties of World War I’s white-on-white violence. 
He describes whites as “ranking in genetic worth well above the various colored races,” such as 
blacks, and he warns, “If the present drift be not changed, we whites are all ultimately doomed” 
(Stoddard 162, 304). Furthermore, Stoddard’s rhetorical use of “we” forges a bond between his 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 In Fit, Dr. Worth makes a similar argument as he explains, “there are millions spent in caring 
for these defectives.”  
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readers and himself: as he doubtless considered his audience to be “superior” whites, the 
resultant sense of intimate unity creates an immediate need to band together and quell this “rising 
tide of color.” The Nordic racial identity is an example of Stoddard’s wishful yet increasingly 
unrealistic construction of U.S. national identity.  
 Stoddard aligns with Goddard insofar that he believes each individual to be the recipient 
of either the gift or curse of heredity, particularly on the mental level,73 and he ends his book-
length tirade by blatantly asserting, “We now know that men are not, and never will be, equal” 
(306). He advocates the acquisition of “a true race-consciousness, which will,” among other 
things, “exorcise the lurking spectre of miscegenation” (Stoddard 306, 309). The need to stop 
dysgenic procreation, in Stoddard’s view, goes beyond the “feeble-minded,” raising questions of 
miscegenation and minority procreation. Stoddard’s decision to describe the threat of 
miscegenation as a “lurking spectre” is crucial for its inherent anxiety. As his book’s title 
suggests, the “rising tide of color” is noticeable—in fact, its visibility prompted the study—as 
persons of non-white racial backgrounds procreate and their populations increase; inversely, 
women of white racial backgrounds are blamed for not producing enough children. 
Miscegenation is different, however, for while the child of a white and a non-white parent might 
appear to be of mixed race, this child might also pass for white and eventually produce more 
children with another white person. The real terror for Stoddard is the dilution of the white race 
by undetectable threats.74  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 Stoddard cites each “race-type” as possessing “not merely the physical characters…but moral, 
intellectual, and spiritual characters as well” of a particular race (165). 
 
74 In nationalistic terms, the fear is not that “diluted” persons become un-American, but it’s 
precisely that with the right numbers, these persons will redefine Americanness. 	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Susan Courtney, in her discussion of Edwin S. Porter’s What Happened in the Tunnel 
(1903), emphasizes the importance of anxiety within films that treat the topic of miscegenation. 
She argues that in Tunnel, “we find a structure that at once allows for the expression of anxiety 
about the unstable state of dominant racial and sexual affairs but also offers, in its dovetailing of 
said affairs, means of negotiating its multiple anxieties” (Courtney 9). One key idea here is that 
race is bound up with other social categories, such as gender and sexuality. I would add that class 
is another such category. Specifically, Courtney suggests that when the accepted social 
boundaries of these categories, or “registers,” are breached in some way, the boundaries of 
another category are strengthened to account for that breach: “This kind of interplay, wherein 
temporary transgression of one register of difference is negotiated or stabilized through the 
reassertion of another, is a regular feature of interracial screen fantasies…” (4). By expanding 
Courtney’s theory to include class differences, then, we can see how, as I suggest, race becomes 
coded as class, and class differences are reinforced with social problem contraception/abortion 
films.    
Class coding and the anxiety surrounding potentially undetectable dysgenic threats factor 
heavily into a key subplot in Children involving Lillian, the Walton’s maid’s teenaged daughter, 
and Roger, Edith’s rakish younger brother. After an all-too-brief flirtation, Lillian becomes 
pregnant outside of marriage. She consults Edith about the matter, who then refers Lillian to Dr. 
Malfit, the abortionist whose name alone suggests a poor fit within society as well as a level of 
dysgenic unfitness (for himself, for the women seeking abortions, for their fetuses). 
Unfortunately for Lillian, the abortion goes poorly, and she dies as a result in a particularly 
melodramatic manner.  
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Where Are My Children? makes it clear that Edith was wrong to have gone through with 
any abortions at all—especially without the consent of her husband—and she is punished for it in 
the end. Her reproductive agency becomes tantamount to race suicide in this scenario. This type 
of clarity is not always the case, however, and Lillian’s situation is much more ambiguous. The 
narrative implies that Lillian does not want to carry or give birth to her child due to the shame 
and scorn she associates with bearing a child out of wedlock. From the moment Lillian exits Dr. 
Malfit’s office building, the formerly vivacious teen appears weak and stumbles about; shortly 
thereafter, she lies wanly upon a spare bed at the Walton’s home, ill from the botched abortion. 
With her mother at her deathbed, Lillian apologizes to her and dramatically breathes her last, 
leaving her grieving mother crying hysterically. In this case, the causal narrative trappings 
multiply the possibilities of what the moralistically didactic message might be. Lillian is 
punished with death for the moral transgression of engaging in sexual intercourse outside of 
marriage, but her melodramatic death makes it difficult to pinpoint the film’s stance on Lillian’s 
abortion. Is the message that the causal narrative is working to convey that, eugenically, lower-
class women should practice greater sexual restraint, but that abortion is a fine alternative to 
pregnancy and motherhood; that, moralistically, women should not have abortions at all 
regardless of their class standing; or, in the interest of women’s health, that lower-class women 
should be able to have abortions without sacrificing their lives? Is Lillian to blame for her 
demise, or are we to blame Edith or Dr. Malfit? One might think that, logically, Roger would 
have no small amount of culpability for Lillian’s situation, and yet he disappears from the film 
completely once Lillian’s abortion has been carried out. Within the logic of the narrative, Mrs. 
Walton’s abortions are presented as wrong because they are undertaken for selfish reasons—and, 
arguably, because she is eugenically sound and has, with her attorney husband, the financial 
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means to support children. By contrast, the narrative frame makes Lillian’s abortion wide open to 
interpretation.  
On the one hand, a eugenic reading suggests that Lillian’s death, albeit melodramatic, is 
simply not very important—within the text and in the film’s larger sociohistorical context. 
According to eugenic theories in the film and at large, it almost seems unfair that Lillian is 
punished with death for ultimately doing the “right” thing and having an abortion; nonetheless, 
the film still makes it seem as though her death is not of dire consequence and that Lillian, as a 
lower class girl, is expendable—an idea supported by the fact that once Lillian has died, the film 
does not revisit her subplot. On the other hand, a contemporary feminist reading would 
emphasize the unfairness of Lillian’s death in so far as it was entirely unnecessary: her death 
could have been prevented if only Lillian had been properly educated on birth control methods 
and had been granted access to contraceptive materials.  
Now, on yet another hand, my critical reading of Lillian’s death is that such a death was 
needless in so far that it could have been prevented by proper medical intervention. Due to the 
illegal status of abortion before the Supreme Court’s controversial 1973 Roe v. Wade decision, 
Leslie Reagan points out that many women talked amongst their families and peers about 
abortion, but they did not speak of it publicly. The stories of women who underwent fatal 
abortions were most commonly told, but “their deaths, however, were unusual. Most women 
survived their abortions and never had to tell anyone unless they chose to” (Reagan 22).  
Nonetheless, deaths did occur, and “though class did not absolutely determine access to or safety 
of abortion, class position helped define when a woman felt she needed an abortion and affected 
the type available to her” (Reagan 16). Although Children is not explicit about the details of 
what happens in Dr. Malfit’s office, we do know that Edith, many of her girlfriends, and Lillian 
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all sought out Dr. Malfit’s services. We know that of that list of women, the only one who died 
from her abortion is Lillian. We also know that Lillian is the only woman on that list who is not 
of ample social and financial means. This suggests that perhaps there is some type of class-based 
discrimination at play that contributed to the fatal result of Lillian’s abortion. Had Lillian been 
able to access a non-discriminatory, safe, and legal abortion, her death could have been avoided. 
Instead, Lillian is not punished by the law, but by the moral majority with death for attempting to 
take control of her reproductive agency and choosing to abort her fetus. 
Thus, in the context of Where Are My Children?, whatever message about abortion we 
are to glean from Lillian’s subplot issues not just from her choice to go through with her 
abortion, but also from the consequences thereof. And yet even still, as I read these films, the 
continued presence of the scientifically didactic in addition to the morally didactic tempers the 
status quo morality that the narrative helps put in place by offering a competing non-moralized 
narrative. These two competing narratives, while not totally separable, also cannot be totally 
equal within a given narrative film: thus, the ostensible split that we observe between 
entertainment films and science films. But the transition to narrative integration precedes this 
split—precipitates it, even—which is why I find the contraception and abortion films from the 
1910s such rich material for analysis.  
There is one final aspect that I wish to address from Where Are My Children? and its 
engagement with eugenics discourse and class passing, and that is Edith Walton’s abortion. As I 
mentioned earlier with regard to Lillian’s subplot and its attendant ambiguities, Edith’s situation, 
by contrast, appears at first very direct in terms of how the film presents her decisions to have 
abortions. According to the film, Edith’s abortions were “bad” in part because they were done 
for selfish reasons. In part, too, the film criticizes her decisions because she is a prime eugenic 
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specimen for propagation—she assumedly comes from a good family, she is married to a 
wealthy lawyer who comes from a eugenically sound family (as evidenced primarily by his 
sister, her “eugenic marriage,” and her very, very eugenic baby), and she can afford to provide 
and care for a child (or two or three). But how eugenically sound is Mrs. Walton? Children 
seems to suggest that, on the one hand, she is eugenically sound, which accounts for why she is 
punished with barrenness for her abortions. On the other hand, though, the case can also be made 
that she is eugenically unsound because she would even consider, as a woman of means, the 
option of abortion.  
This may seem like a stretch until we consider it in light of the set of eugenic theories 
outlined earlier and some of the prime fears and beliefs that were expressed amongst them, 
namely that inherited degeneracy is invisible and that degeneracy follows matrilinearly. Mrs. 
Walton looks “normal”; she is well kempt, she dresses fashionably, she is socially popular, she 
keeps her home and behaves outwardly in a way befitting a woman of her high class status. The 
film implies that there is nothing visibly wrong with Mrs. Walton, and yet it is discovered at the 
end of the film that she has had several secret illegal abortions for seemingly no good reason, 
which, I would argue, suggests that perhaps there has been something wrong with Mrs. Walton 
all along, such that a woman would choose to have several secret illegal abortions for seemingly 
no good reason. Here we have some pretty heavy conservative moralizing that contrasts 
noticeably with the progressive moralizing from Dr. Homer’s courtroom scene: instead of Edith 
as a brave woman rightfully in charge of her own reproductive agency, we see Edith as a 
degenerate criminal. In this way, then, perhaps her abortions were for the best—according to 
eugenics’ own logic—for they prevented the birth of children who could have inherited such 
“criminalistic” impulses form their mother—to borrow a phrase from the genealogical charts in 
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Goddard’s The Kallikak Family. Furthermore, we must also wonder about the eugenic fitness of 
Edith’s brother; to borrow another of Goddard’s heritable traits, Roger, as we know, is “sexually 
immoral.” If both brother and sister suffer from invisible dysgenic traits, then such traits must 
run in the family, and Richard and Edith’s children would be at risk of inheriting such traits. In 
this way, perhaps Edith’s situation is not so dissimilar from Lillian’s in so far that the same 
questions about, health, fitness, and abortion apply. One key difference, however, is class status, 
as this is what causes Lillian to be identifiable as potentially dysgenic but Edith to pass. 
Ultimately, though, I argue that Edith Walton is dysgenic because she makes her reproductive 
choices.  
 
Female Degeneracy: Dysgenic Invisibility and the Gendering of Blame 
As seen in the cases of Lillian and Edith, these women make their own reproductive 
choices but are punished—with death and sterility, respectively—for those choices. Additionally, 
all responsibility for those choices is placed upon them as women—or at least this is true when 
they act outside of the norm as women with reproductive agency. In this way, Where Are My 
Children? contains elements of the progressively scientifically educational and the 
conservatively (and scientifically flawed) moralistic. We see this illustrated again in the film’s 
opening scene, as well as in The Black Stork/Are You Fit to Marry?, where it plays out somewhat 
differently.  
In each film, these attitudes towards female culpability for dysgenic propagation can be 
traced back to eugenics discourse that culminates in the 1927 Buck v. Bell decision. While 
Lothrop Stoddard does not explicitly code degeneration as female, there is an implied pressure 
for eugenic white procreation placed upon the female. The immediately post-WWI context of 
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Stoddard’s publication reminds the reader of the large number of recent white male casualties 
and suggests that the pressure for procreation is largely upon American (particularly “Nordic”) 
women. Furthermore, when we consider Stoddard’s administrative involvement in Margaret 
Sanger’s birth control crusade, it becomes clear that the burden of family planning, for Stoddard, 
falls upon female shoulders. According to his reasoning, while we don’t want eugenically sound 
women having abortions, as in Children, this course of action is acceptable, if not encouraged, 
for less eugenically sound women. 
Henry Goddard takes a more extreme and negatively eugenic approach to the prevention 
of dysgenic propagation by proposing the castration or sterilization of the feeble-minded, and he 
targets the female progeny of Martin Kallikak and his lover in his study of genetic “feeble-
mindedness.” By 1912—when Goddard publishes The Kallikak Family—forced sterilization is 
not new in idea or in practice. Eugenic sterilization in the United States had been taking place on 
a state-by-state basis since at least 1907, when Indiana first legalized it (Laughlin 1).75 In 1922, 
Harry Hamilton Laughlin assembled a then-to-date volume of eugenics-related legal cases; this 
evidence suggests that eugenic sterilization throughout the 1910s was “equal opportunity,” so to 
speak: both women and men were subjected to sterilization procedures, often without their 
consent. Despite this fact, however, we can see how dysgenic propagation is gendered female as 
early as 1912. While the focus of The Kallikak Family is ostensibly on Martin Kallikak, and the 
study suggests his culpability in the continuation of his dysgenic line (which, genetically, is true), 
I would argue that Kallikak’s culpability is negated by the very presence of his eugenic line. 
Thus, the real fault for Kallikak’s dysgenic family tree lies with “The Nameless Feeble-Minded 
Girl,” especially when we consider Kallikak’s absence in the quotidian lives of the “feeble-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 Even though the first statute is passed in Indiana in 1907, one was proposed as early as 1905 in 
Pennsylvania (Laughlin 1). 
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minded” lover and her family, since she is the one visibly associated with the dysgenic progeny 
(Goddard, Kallikak 37). 
Charlotte Perkins Gilman, celebrated author of “The Yellow Wallpaper” and Herland and 
notable proponent of women’s rights and suffrage, was also an outspoken advocate for race-
based eugenics. Although her theories do not expressly place the blame for hereditary issues 
solely upon women, her emphasis upon generational considerations becomes a rhetorical and 
ideological basis for the later Buck v. Bell decision. In Concerning Children (1903), which 
interestingly predates the Goddard and Stoddard tracts, Gilman argues that in order for the white 
race to continue improving with each new generation, heavy emphasis and attention must be 
placed upon each generation of children. She contends that if traits can be and are passed from 
parent to child, then potential parents must do as much as possible to improve themselves (their 
intelligence, their goodness, their character, their physical constitution) before reproducing. For 
Gilman, this ensures that they are optimally fit and able: “The way to have them [children] born 
better is to make all possible improvement in the individual before parentage” (21). Given, 
according to Gilman, that “at about fifteen the individual comes to a keen new consciousness of 
possibility” and that twenty-five is “the average beginning of parenthood,” she sets as the 
foundation for her study the notion that, as she calls it, the “precious ten” (the ages of fifteen to 
twenty-five) is the time of greatest possible personal improvement (17-18, 16, 21).  
And yet, at the same time, the emphasis that Gilman places upon children also plays into 
eugenic thought and rhetoric in a way that, when appropriated by later modernist eugenic 
thinkers, can be used retroactively to condemn a child’s forbears to false conclusions about their 
health, character, competency, and right to reproduce that result in slander, libel, 
institutionalization, and/or sterilization. Additionally, her focus upon racial improvement sets the 
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stage for action in the decades to come that codifies racist attitudes toward non-whites and 
immigrants, such as the 1924 Johnson-Reed Act.76 As Gilman writes,  
Such young people, easily appreciating what could be done for themselves and the world 
by right living, would pour their rich enthusiasm and unstrained powers into real human 
growing,—the growing that can be done so well in that short, wonderful ten years,—that 
must be done, if the race is to be born better. Three or four generations of such growth 
would do more for man’s improvement than our present methods of humaniculture 
accomplish in as many centuries. (24, emphasis mine) 
Here, we can see the generationally-minded thinking that echoes ideologically in Goddard and 
Stoddard and almost verbatim rhetorically in Buck v. Bell. One of the few really progressive 
points Gilman makes, in addition to mostly espousing positive eugenics, is her positioning of 
hereditable traits, both good and bad, as coming equally from both parents, as opposed to later 
moves to position negative traits as inherited matrilinearly. 
However, we must bear in mind that the telos of this personal improvement, while of 
course a boon to the individual in question in the immediate term, is long-term race 
improvement: “There is a splendid wealth of aspiration in youth, a pure and haughty desire for 
the very highest, which ought to be playing into the current of our racial life and lifting it higher 
and higher with each new generation (23). Gilman’s focus on children, and more specifically on 
teenagers and young adults, could be read as a benign entreaty for parents to reexamine their 
parenting techniques and to do more for their children during their formative years so that they 
are positioned to flourish as conscientious, critical young people during their “precious ten.” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 According to the Johnson-Reed Act, also known as the Immigration Act of 1924, the number 
of immigrants to be allowed in the United States annually was limited to 2% of the total of that 
immigrant population already living in the United States in 1890. 
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Furthermore, her emphasis upon the value of self-improvement could work, in a way, to counter 
eugenic beliefs that one’s genetics (what one is born with) and environment (what one is born 
into) fix an individual to a certain fate or path—a logic that we will see very starkly and 
harmfully in Buck v. Bell. Nonetheless, we cannot ignore the sense of responsibility placed upon 
the parent—the mother—and what the results of shirking that responsibility could mean. 
These instances are foundational to the starkest example of female gendering of dysgenic 
propagation: the 1927 Supreme Court case of Buck v. Bell, which garnered considerable 
nationwide attention. Carrie Buck, a supposedly “feeble-minded” teenager who had been 
institutionalized at the Virginia State Colony for Epileptics and Feeble-Minded after becoming 
pregnant as the result of rape, suddenly became the central figure in an ongoing debate over the 
sterilization of alleged degenerates. The prosecution argued that it wasn’t enough to contain 
degenerates; they must be sterilized as well for the betterment of the human (read: white) race. 
Claiming that Buck’s mother, who was also institutionalized at the State Colony, as well as her 
newborn daughter were also of dangerously sub-average intelligence, the prosecution cited these 
three generations as evidence that mental inferiority is a hereditary trait. The defense, not 
wanting Buck to win, threw the case; this move indicates that while persons who were even 
apprised of their potential sterilization did technically have legal recourse, availing oneself of 
this recourse made no practical difference. In his ruling, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes decided 
to allow states the right to sterilize those who posed a “genetic” threat. “Prevention of 
procreation by degenerates would benefit society,” he concluded, “because ‘[t]hree generations 
of imbeciles is enough’” (Qtd. in Ragan 98). Here we observe the echoes of Gilman’s emphasis 
on the generational, although the generational has now been turned toward the ends of negative 
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eugenics so that it may be used to prevent certain (classed, raced, gendered) persons from 
reproducing. 
Furthermore, I suggest that the Buck v. Bell decision represents the codification of 
degeneracy as female, for the “three generations of imbeciles” alluded to in Holmes’s decision 
are three female generations of imbeciles. The underlying argument for sterilizing “feeble-
minded” women is that they lack the moral constitution to control their sexual urges. In this way, 
they are placed on par with prostitutes (another group that comes under eugenic attack, in 
particular by Cesare Lombroso and Max Nordau); the key distinction between the two is that the 
prostitute willingly operates outside the bounds of morally proscribed action, while the “feeble-
minded” woman is too simple to even understand what morally appropriate action is. In either 
case, the woman in question is reduced to her sexuality—a move that would seem to essentialize 
women and keep them in a position of subordination to men. When we consider this in the larger 
context of women’s issues in the first decades of the twentieth century, however, we can see how 
the attempts of elitist white men to further suppress women through eugenics are seriously put to 
the test by the advances of first wave feminism, such as public education on birth control, 
emphasis on family planning, and the passing of the 19th Amendment in 1920 guaranteeing 
women’s suffrage; we observe both of these lines of thought on female dysgenic propagation 
played out to varying results in the transitional social problem contraception and abortion films.   
One of the most apparent connections is between The Kallikak Family and The Black 
Stork. In the film, we learn that Claude Leffingwell has syphilis because of his grandfather’s 
sexual indiscretion. As Claude says to Dickey, “It [syphilis] is not my sin but my grandfather’s. 
He had a servant – an unclean creature. One day while in a drunken stupor---“ and is interrupted 
with a dramatized flashback of a man in colonial-era clothing seducing a maid in a bedroom. As 
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Pernick points out, the chronology here is off: “allowing an ample thirty per generation would 
make [Claude’s grandfather] a figure from 1856,” yet his colonial mise-en-scene “evoke[s]…the 
early Republican horror of aristocratic decadence” (147). He continues that it “also draw[s] on a 
newer association between colonial days and contaminated heredity established by the highly 
publicized colonial-era pedigrees of such families as the ‘Jukes’ or ‘Kallikaks” (Pernick 148). As 
I mentioned earlier, Martin Kallikak’s absence from the lives of the “nameless feeble-minded 
girl” and her offspring makes it seem as though she is the one to be held solely responsible for 
the degenerate children, when in fact Kallikak is equally culpable. I argue that we see the same 
erasure and shift of blame happening in Stork with Claude and Anne. Blaming Grandpa 
Leffingwell’s bad decision for Claude’s situation implies that Grandpa Leffingwell contracted 
syphilis from the maid—from a female carrier. Furthermore, while it is Claude’s fault that Anne 
contracted the disease (as Anne was unaware of Claude’s illness), Anne, as the carrier of the 
fetus, is also responsible for infecting the fetus with syphilis—and any future offspring from 
Anne or her child could also be infected, as we see ominously illustrated in Anne’s dream vision. 
In this way, all real reproductive agency is taken away from Anne, and the only agency she 
really maintains is her decision regarding the euthanasia of her son, which the film codes as 
morally upright through its use of religious rhetoric and imagery.  
In fact, while Anne does eventually get to exert some reproductive agency when she must 
decide whether to save her son or allow him to die, it almost seems unfair that she is the only 
parent saddled with such a difficult decision; Claude does not weigh in on the decision, and as 
Pernick notes, he is completely absent from her divine dream vision, and we are never told why. 
Pernick surmises that this could be because his syphilis finally killed him, because Anne 
divorced him once she learned his secret, or because Claude abandoned his family out of guilt 
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and shame (148). I would add that there is another possible reason why Claude is absent from the 
divine dream vision: in keeping with my argument about eugenics discourse placing the blame 
for hereditary degeneracy upon women, I would claim that Anne, as the crippled boy’s mother 
and someone also now, through Claude, infected with syphilis, becomes the one blamed for the 
child’s many physical and mental defects. 
Female culpability, while still present, looks quite different in the opening scenes of 
Where Are My Children?, however. Following the film’s previously discussed opening 
intertitles, another intertitle informs us that we are now in Heaven, or at least some type of 
heavenly holding pen, indicated by golden-hued gates flanked by angels and around which 
smoke, which stands in for baby-souls, swirls: “Behind the great portals of Eternity, the souls of 
little children waited to be born.” We are then introduced to three types of baby-souls: “chance 
children,” “unwanted” children, and “prayer” children. The chance children are those conceived 
accidentally. This is the largest category, and the intertitle notes that these baby-souls “went forth 
to Earth in vast numbers.” The unwanted children are those who were aborted, “constantly sent 
back,” “marked morally or physically defective” and who “bore the sign of the serpent.” When 
these children are mentioned, the previously joyful music changes to somber tones. Shortly 
thereafter, with the music joyful again and with a glowing cross now atop the heavenly gates, we 
meet the last group: the prayer children, those “fine and strong” baby-souls whose appearance 
was planned and desired by their parents who are “marked with the approval of the Almighty.” 
While this interlude certainly bears the mark of melodramatic set-up, it also sets up the eugenics 
discourse to come, for intercut with vignettes showing off Richard’s sister’s eugenic baby and 
showing Edith give abortion advice to a friend, we find ourselves in Richard Walton’s courtroom 
as Dr. Homer, a distributor of birth control information, stands trial.  
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Furthermore, these heavenly opening scenes foreshadow what we will learn about Edith 
and her several abortions. In this way, Edith and her girlfriends are later linked with the baby-
souls and thusly figured as the party solely responsible for the return of the “unwanted” children 
to Heaven. Tellingly, the only husband pictured in the film is Richard, and we know that did not 
have knowledge of Edith’s actions nor does he approve of them once he discovers them; this 
only reinforces the point that the women are responsible for aborting their “morally or physically 
defective” children—children who are apparently so whether born or unborn. The film does not 
specify whether the baby-souls were defective pre- or post-abortion, but this ambiguity serves to 
underscore the catch-22 situation the film sets Edith and her female peers up to face: they 
shouldn’t have their children, but they also shouldn’t not have their children. Instead of 
applauding Edith and her friends for not carrying dysgenic children to term, as does Stork, these 
women are vilified doubly—for carrying dysgenic fetuses and for aborting them.  
 
*** 
  
In addition to the narrative films discussed in this chapter, the late 1910s and early 1920s 
also saw the development of more purely scientific contraception and birth control films. Even 
these more educationally-driven films, however, are not completely devoid of the trappings of 
the Hollywood causal narrative. The science films might initially seem to present a kind of stasis 
in the trajectory of the contraception/abortion film in so far that they more purely place a 
premium upon scientific, educational knowledge. Upon closer analysis, however, I would 
suggest instead that, with the exception of Margaret Sanger’s Biology of Conception and 
Mechanism of Contraception, the trappings of the classical Hollywood narrative in these films 
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turn them into a destabilizing force. While the films previously discussed in this chapter 
generally are narrative films containing educational information and advancing arguments about 
that information, the science films from the 1920s make no pretense to narrative, yet nonetheless 
use it in disturbing ways. Even though the science films seemingly have no overarching narrative 
frame or moral aims, the burgeoning classical Hollywood paradigm of causality seeps into the 
contraception/abortion science films and compromises their objectivity.  
The Law of Population, or Birth Control (1917) stands out as a point of transition to the 
1920s split between more morally didactic films and more scientifically didactic films. It opens 
with the familiar didactic spectacle of a eugenic tract, contains footage of cautionary “feeble-
minded persons,” and uses a dramatization to illustrate the eugenic principles it espouses. 
However, described by Pernick as “a crude imitation of [Weber’s] work,” this lower-budget film 
lacks the star power, promotion, and production value to compete in the same camp as Weber’s 
films. Its narrative is more shoddily put together and seems almost an afterthought or a way of 
conforming to established tropes. Through it, we begin to observe the transition to the true 
contraception and abortion science films of the 1920s. 
Two examples of the 1920s science film are Personal Hygiene for Girls (1922) and 
Personal Hygiene for Boys (1922), both from the Science of Life film series. Personal Hygiene 
for Girls makes claims of scientifically educational value, as it contains copious diagrams of the 
female reproductive system and explanations of the processes of conception and gestation. 
However, it also contains a very generic frame narrative about a female’s overall development 
and contextualizes these developments largely in terms of a girl’s potential as a mother, which, I 
argue, compromises the objectivity of the information it presents; with the frame narrative comes 
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a values-based moral judgment about the importance of (eventual) motherhood77. Most 
interestingly, though, while clearly a science film, we begin to observe the pervasiveness of a 
certain kind of limited causality. Take this example of three intertitles in a row, for instance: 
“Menstruation is a perfectly normal occurrence and not an illness. In case of pain or discomfort a 
physician should be consulted. Light exercise should be taken; also daily baths, but not with cold 
water. Promiscuous sexual relations often result in the spread of two diseases, -- gonorrhea and 
syphilis. If the father has syphilis, the child may be deformed or defective.” These statements are 
followed by a shot of a horribly emaciated baby who we are to assume was born syphilitic. It is 
true that a young woman capable of reproducing could contract a sexually transmitted disease 
during intercourse and later give birth to a baby affected by the disease, but there are also many 
other possibilities and possible outcomes for sexual contact. This move of taking a situation that 
contains many possibilities and winnowing those possibilities down to a very limited narrative 
and set of causal consequences is a move that we see developing in these science films from the 
classical Hollywood narrative; in turn, these science films’ use of limited causality eventually 
makes its way into the contraception/abortion exploitation films from the 1930s and 1940s that I 
will examine in my later chapters. 
Lois Weber’s Where Are My Children? serves as a predecessor to the 
contraception/abortion exploitation film in so far as it features a courtroom narrative that runs 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 Personal Hygiene for Boys operates in largely the same way with regard to information about 
the male reproductive system. As in Children and Stork, Boys remains in keeping with the theme 
of female culpability in general, and specifically culpability regarding the transmission of 
venereal disease. As the intertitles state, “men who indulge in loose sexual conduct…expose 
themselves to pain and suffering” in the form of venereal disease contracted from the women 
implicated in their “loose sexual conduct.” While the film does acknowledge the role of a man 
infected with a venereal disease in the potential propagation of infected offspring—as illustrated 
with a medium close up of a child with a deformed mouth and a close up of am emaciated 
infant—his responsibility is mitigated by the female carrier who infected him initially.  
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from Dr. Homer to Dr. Malfit to Edith Walton, with Richard Walton as District Attorney filling 
the retroactive role of a sort of private investigator. While Drs. Homer and Malfit stood actual 
legal trial for their respective crimes of distributing eugenic birth control information and 
performing abortions, Edith stood a type of unofficial moral trial for her crimes of having an 
abortion—of having three abortions, actually, and of doing so without Richard’s consent, no less. 
Crane Wilbur’s 1934 film Tomorrow’s Children also aids in bridging the gap from the 
scientifically didactic films of the 1910s to the 1930s abortion exploitation films. In this film, the 
involvement of the well-meaning Dr. Brooks in a welfare case leads to a government 
investigation into the supposedly “feeble-minded” family of the seemingly “normal” Alice 
Mason, our protagonist. Brooks’ investigation results in a judge’s ruling that the entire family of 
degenerates must be sterilized lest they lose their welfare assistance from the government. The 
remainder of the film focuses on the efforts of Alice, her fiancé Jim, Dr. Brooks, and the 
Catholic priest Fr. O’Brien to clear Alice of the charge of “feeble-minded,” which they 
ultimately succeed in doing.78 In both films, a woman stands reproductive trial, and although 
Alice is not accused of abortion, she is charged with degeneracy more generally—degeneracy 
which the court does not wish for her to inflict upon her own potential offspring.  
The contraception and abortion films from the 1910s, through their heavy reliance upon 
and indebtedness to eugenic discourse and thought, are truly progressive in so far that they seek 
to educate women about birth control and encourage women to take control over their 
reproductive lives. Furthermore, by addressing such topics in an open manner, these films seek 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 The deus ex machina that comes to Alice’s aid in Tomorrow’s Children is very same plot 
device used in The Black Stork’s subplot for Claude and Anne’s friend Miriam, who fears 
marrying her sweetheart, Tom, and having children because her mother is an epileptic. Both 
Alice and Miriam’s names and bloodlines are cleared of any charges of degeneracy upon 
learning that they are not biologically related to the feeble-minded family members who raised 
them; thusly, they are fit for marriage and for motherhood. 
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to erode the taboo surrounding conversation—public and private—about reproductive issues. 
However, they still cannot circumvent the status quo prescribed morality of the time that 
denigrates, vilifies, and ignores women’s reproductive choice, and the characteristics that make 
these films progressive, combined with anti-choice prescribed morals, set the stage for the 
sensationalist version of contraception/abortion film we see emerge in the 1930s: the abortion 
exploitation film, which uses contradictory narratives to acknowledge progressive reproductive 
ideologies beneath narratives that, despite their pretension toward the scientifically didactic, 
overtly advance an anti-choice agenda. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
Reproductive Agency on Trial: The Criminality of Choice in 1930s Abortion Exploitation 
Films 
 
Many narrative films treating the topics of contraception and abortion in the 1930s 
present themselves as scientifically educational: they employ intertitles extolling the virtues of 
sex education, they reference sex ed materials, and/or their characters discuss the importance of 
contraceptive knowledge. However, these films simultaneously present salacious, hyperbolic 
narratives redolent of the exploitation film. At once sensational yet also purporting to convey 
dramatizations of real problems facing young women, parents, and American society’s moral 
well-being, the abortion exploitation film utilizes contradictory narratives to simultaneously shed 
a progressive light upon the subject of abortion while keeping abortion squarely within the 
bounds of the criminal.  
Filmmakers are able to evade censorship in several different yet related ways that, in my 
analysis, draw primarily upon abortion history, the notion of prescribed versus popular morality, 
the conventions of exploitation films, and the use of contradictory narratives. The female 
protagonist of these abortion exploitation films functions as a hybrid of the erotic female types 
outlined in Chapter One: the white slave, the vamp, the flapper, and the femme fatale. She seeks 
some modicum of independence (from parents, siblings, husband) and unchaperoned access to 
the public sphere; she exudes an erotic energy; she is dangerous. She exhibits at times the naïveté 
of the white slave or flapper, but without the flapper’s comic relief. Her intentions are not quite 
as mercenary as the vamp’s, but she resorts to murder when necessary as the vamp or femme 
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fatale would. And overall, she is erotically and reproductively active, commonly outside the 
bond of marriage. This last criterion, I will argue, places our protagonist in a league of her own; 
yet, it is also precisely what ties her to these other female types that threaten normative sex and 
gender expectations, which thus necessitates punishment for her reproductive agency.  
Through examining the moral and legal ambiguities of abortion practice in the interwar 
period in conjunction with exploitation films treating abortion, I wish to question and complicate 
who and/or what exactly stands trial in the abortion exploitation films. The protagonists (and I do 
wish to call them protagonists) in films like Guilty Parents and Gambling With Souls are not 
ostensibly accused of abortion (although they each did carry through with their own abortions). 
Given that abortion is illegal in the 1930s, why it the case that their abortions are not part of their 
criminal charges at all? To what extent does abortion factor into their alleged crimes of murder? 
For what crime are these women really on trial? 
Lois Weber’s Where Are My Children? serves as a predecessor to the legal aspects of the 
abortion exploitation film in so far as it features a courtroom narrative that runs from Dr. Homer 
to Dr. Malfit to Edith Walton, with Richard Walton as District Attorney retroactively filling the 
role of a private investigator of sorts. While Drs. Homer and Malfit stood actual legal trial for 
their respective crimes of distributing eugenic birth control information and performing 
abortions, Edith stood a type of unofficial moral trial for her “criminal” abortions—three in total, 
all of which were done without Richard’s consent, no less.  
The birth control and abortion films from the late 1910s covered in Chapter 2 focused 
primarily upon using a narrative to convey scientific facts and information about birth control 
methods and abortion to their audiences. This information was decidedly colored by eugenics-
based discourse that, somewhat ironically, complicated the scientific with moral considerations. 
	   144 
By the 1930s, the eugenics angle has all but disappeared from Hollywood birth control and 
abortion films (although the trappings of matrilineal degeneracy remain), and the scientifically 
didactic purpose indicated by framing intertitles and content has been replaced by overtly 
morally didactic aims that are similarly indicated by formal means. Interestingly, though, the 
women who stand trial in abortion exploitation films are not directly on trial for abortion, but for 
the more mainstream crimes that issued from either their or a loved one’s abortion scenario. In 
this way, abortion exploitation films can evade censorship by not making abortion the obvious 
focus of the film and dealing instead with other crimes, such as prostitution or murder.  
Yet, at the same time, abortion is characterized as a crime that corrupts and begets other 
crimes. The two primary films in this chapter that illustrate this are Jack Townley’s Guilty 
Parents (1934) and Elmer Clifton’s Gambling with Souls (1936). In another version of the 
abortion exploitation film, it is not the woman who carried through with or who is associated 
with the abortion who is on trial, but rather those members of the medical profession who 
practice “bad” and unsafe abortions. For this type of the abortion crime film, I turn to S. Roy 
Luby’s Race Suicide (1937) and Del Frazier’s Unborn Souls (1939). These two films deal with 
investigations into abortion crime rings, and while abortion itself is not always figured as a bad 
or immoral act, the fact that it becomes bound up with crime makes it criminal by proxy and 
reminds us that, in the 1930s, abortion is legally a crime in its own right. Through attention to 
these two different but related types of exploitation films that treat reproductive crime and 
reproduction as crime, I aim to illuminate the possibilities of representing reproductive agency 
during the early years of the Code, as well as the productive ambiguity of the status of abortion 
in both film and reality. I argue that through the use of contradictory narratives regarding 
abortion, abortion exploitation films comply with prescribed moral norms for how society 
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should view abortion in order to slyly acknowledge popular moral norms that present abortion 
not as a crime but as a real and necessary part of women’s lives. In this way, they create a 
narrative dialectic that tacitly challenge the predominance of prescribed anti-abortion sentiment 
as they simultaneously acknowledge popular moral norms. Without the assertion of prescribed 
moral norms, the subtle advancement of popular norms would not be possible.  
 
Moralizing the Illegal: Abortion Practice and the Exploitation Film 
 With this section, I want to look at and establish a background for the two different 
historical contexts that I feel centrally inform the films I wish to examine: abortion practice and 
exploitation films in the 1930s. I will begin with abortion history in order to show how its 
attendant ambiguities (moral and legal) could easily bleed over into and overlap with those 
commonly found in contemporaneous exploitation films addressing other sex ed-related topics. 
Furthermore, understanding the ambiguous nature of abortion in early twentieth century 
America—the discrepancy between law, popular representations (such as those in the films I 
discuss) of abortion, prescribed morality, and popular morality—is critical to an understanding of 
how reproductive agency is represented and understood in these films.  
 Eric Schaefer’s excellent work on the history of classical exploitation films lays the 
groundwork for my inquiry, as the sex hygiene exploitation film, which grew out of WWI 
venereal disease films, commonly included topics such as sex education and abortion (Schaeffer 
166). In his landmark study, “Bold! Daring! Shocking! True!”: A History of Exploitation Films, 
1919-1959, Schaefer contends that unlike mainstream classical Hollywood films, “exploitation 
films were about difference. In exploitation films, we find our society constructing many of its 
myths about ‘the Other.’ Of course, exploitation movies do not tell us as much about the Other as 
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they do about the fears and anxieties of those who made and saw the movies” (Schaeffer 13). In 
the case of abortion exploitation films, the Other in question would be women with reproductive 
agency, while the fears and anxieties referenced include women making their own reproductive 
choices, particularly when those choices are pre-marital sex and illegal abortion.   
In addition to the exploitation film’s sensational anxiety-induced agenda, Schaefer also 
importantly points out that, “The lessons and information imparted by exploitation films were 
often complex and contradictory,” although he does not specify what exactly this means for the 
abortion exploitation film (165). Working, then, from a concept explored by Jay McRoy and Guy 
Crucianelli in their essay “‘I Panic the World’: Benevolent Exploitation in Tod Browning’s 
Freaks and Harmony Korine’s Gummo,” I describe competing narratives in the abortion 
exploitation film as contradictory instead of counterfactual. Rather than proposing alternative 
histories or ex post facto historical revisions, as do counterfactual narratives,79 contradictory 
narratives present two simultaneously occurring narratives that conflict with and potentially 
undermine each other.  
In the abortion exploitation film, we notice at least two sets of contradictory narratives. 
The first addresses a rift between what purports to be elements of scientific and moral education 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 Groundwork on the counterfactual narrative has been laid by Catherine Gallagher in a literary 
context and Daniel Dorhn in an art historical one. See also the collection of work on 
counterfactual narratives compiled in the Spring 2007 issue of Representations on 
Counterfactual Realities, which features essays by Gallagher, Mark Maslan, and Paul K. Saint-
Amour, among others. In the introduction to this forum, Gallagher, Maslan, and Saint-Amour 
write, “The essays collected here bear witness to a widespread intellectual trend—the popularity 
of alternate history as both subject and method in cultural inquiry. Alternate or counterfactual 
narratives imagine a world whose history diverged at some point from the course of events as we 
know them” (51). While this brand of inquiry is no doubt salient for literary and historical 
studies, my inquiries build upon this while also diverging from it. Instead, I find it more practical 
for my work here to consider different narratives happening simultaneously than narratives of 
alternate or revisionist history, as the former more accurately describes the how the competing 
narratives in the abortion exploitation films function.  
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within the film. Furthermore, we observe a second rift in the historical reality of women’s 
reproductive rights and options. Another way to think of this is through the lens of popular 
versus prescribed morality as laid out by reproductive rights historian Leslie J. Reagan.  
The abortion exploitation films’ contradictory moral narratives are directly related to 
their moral ambiguity and the ambiguous nature of opinions regarding abortion in the 1930s. 
According to Reagan’s research into early twentieth century abortion practices, popular and 
prescribed moralities were often not identical (Reagan 6). In Reagan’s terms, popular morality 
would be the moral beliefs on a given topic or subject—such as abortion—in reality. It reflects 
the views actually held by those affected by this topic, whether directly or indirectly. Prescribed 
morality, by contrast, is the way that those in power want people to think or want to make others 
believe is actually a popularly moral view. With regard to abortion, “[t]he evidence of people’s 
behavior—the persistent use of abortion by women of all social groups, and the sympathy of 
many men and women for their doing so—suggests the existence of an alternative popular 
morality in conflict with the law” (Reagan 45). Reagan’s work is useful in the context of 
abortion exploitation films—and contraception/abortion social problem films generally—
because it identifies a discrepancy and clears room for considering other possible receptions and 
meanings of this topic relative to its representations.  
The Production Code also provides a key context for both this chapter and the next, as it 
only exacerbates the popular/prescribed divide through its mandates, strictures, and suggestions. 
Furthermore, the Code functions differently with relation to exploitation films than it does for 
mainstream film from the major studios. The abortion exploitation films in this chapter illustrate 
how abortion is treated outside of the Production Code’s strictures, while the mainstream films in 
Chapter 4 needed to meet the Code’s requirements before distribution approval would be granted 
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(a process illustrated by the back-and-forth exchanges between directors and censors in the PCA 
files I examine).   
Given that a.) one of the problems with film is that it signifies, b.) those images that 
signify negatively to conservative reformers—female erotic and reproductive agency— must be 
regulated, and c.) film is legally proscribed as narrative entertainment, we can see how a 
regulatory form such as the Production Code could arise as a means of protecting the industry 
and legally allowing for the production of narrative entertainment. The Production Code, which 
is first introduced in 1930 although not enforced until 1934, seeks to aid film censorship by 
articulating what can and cannot be depicted in American Hollywood cinema. And as Ruth 
Vasey argues, “far from being a radical imposition on Hollywood’s production practices, [the 
Code] operated within, and was consistent with, broader preexisting and contemporaneous 
regulatory procedures” (7). Through the limitation of what it considers to be displays of vice and 
immorality, the Production Code seeks to exert control from within the industry over audience 
response to film content and assuage anxieties over audience reception. While the Code 
addresses areas of vice that are not inherently tied to issues of sexuality or gender—crime, 
murder, and alcoholism, for example—there are two tenets of the Production Code that 
implicitly attempt to censor the female body: General Principle 1 and Section III.  
General Principle 1 states that “[n]o picture shall be produced which will lower the moral 
standards of those who see it. Hence the sympathy of the audience should never be thrown to the 
side of crime, wrongdoing, evil or sin” (Qtd. in Leff 284). Section III, entitled “Vulgarity,” puts 
forward that “[t]he treatment of low, disgusting, unpleasant, though not necessarily evil, subjects 
should be subject always to the dictates of good taste and a regard for the sensibilities of the 
audience” (Qtd. in Leff 285). Neither of these tenets explicitly mentions the pregnant body, 
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contraception, or abortion, and this is precisely my point of interest in the Code generally and 
these tenets in particular. One critical point of inquiry is precisely how the Code is interpreted in 
such a way with regard to contraception films that it comes to include contraception, abortion, 
and the pregnant body within the umbrella of “low, disgusting, unpleasant, though not 
necessarily evil, subjects” (Qtd. in Leff 285). These tenets are unsettling when considered 
alongside contraception films because, with the help of the implications of the Sims Act and 
Mutual v. Ohio, they simultaneously acknowledge that contraception-related topics are not 
inherently bad while attempting, through limiting scientific or objective didacticism (which the 
exploitation film certainly does), to make them seem as though they are, and have always been, 
bad. With consideration of the previously stated givens, it follows that images of contraception, 
abortion, and pregnancy must be understood to also signify negatively if they are to be censored 
out—which they are.  
While the Code does not necessarily apply to exploitation films, as they are outside of the 
bounds of mainstream Hollywood, exploitation films nonetheless vexed Jason Joy and others in 
the censorship office. The separation between exploitation film and mainstream film began 
around 1919, according to Eric Schaefer, when positive public attitudes surrounding early 
venereal disease pictures “turned into sour denunciations as health officials, critics, censors, and 
the leaders of the motion picture industry began to dissociate themselves from the sex hygiene 
feature” (37). This attitude shift was caused in part by the educational bent of exploitation films 
post-Mutual, and in part because exploitation films began branching out from wartime VD films 
into a wider range of topics (pregnancy, narcotics) that were deemed unsuitable. From this 
moment forward, mainstream Hollywood did all it could to differentiate itself from exploitation 
films. Part of this distinction was the based around the aim and quality of film. As Schaefer 
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explains, “[t]he films that the mainstream industry tried to create through self-regulation fall into 
the field bound by wholesomeness and entertainment, whereas the films made by exploiters fall 
into the opposing conjuncture of unwholesome education. Through suggesting that education did 
not have a place on the screen, Hollywood drove a major wedge between their films and those of 
the exploiters” (155). By 1930, when the Production Code is introduced with Jason Joy at the 
censorship helm, even the Code’s preamble, as Schaefer notes, means to set this distinction: 
“‘Through regarding motion pictures primarily as entertainment without any explicit purpose of 
teaching or propaganda, [the signatories of the Code] know that the motion picture within its 
own field of entertainment may be directly responsible for spiritual and moral progress, for 
higher types of social life, and for much correct thinking…’” (Qtd. in Schaefer 154). It is clear 
that mainstream Hollywood sees itself—or at least wants to be seen—as a bastion of morality 
and public good, and Hollywood believes that morality and goodness happen through 
entertainment. I would contend, though, that Code-era films of both stripes are morally, though 
not scientifically or objectively, educational.  
Another part of this distinction had to do with distribution. In order for a film to be shown 
at an MPPDA-affiliated theater, that film needed a seal of approval from the Hays office. 
Without such a seal, films were generally restricted to release in independent theaters, where 
they would be subject to state and municipal censors instead of the Hays office. Thus, if one 
wanted a wider distribution for an exploitation film, that film would have to adhere to the 
Production Code and pass. However, even “[o]n those occasions when exploitation producers 
sought an MPPDA seal for a movie to gain broad distribution and access to better theaters—
which were generally owned by members of the MPPDA or major chains that abided by the 
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Code—they found the deck stacked against them” (Schaefer 158). As a result, most exploitation 
films were not Code-approved, including those examined in this chapter. 
With the Hays Code in place by 1930 and its enforcement in action by 1934, it becomes 
increasingly difficult to represent or even include contraception and abortion in Hollywood 
films. By this time, the split between scientifically and morally educational content becomes 
pronounced, as I will demonstrate by contrasting the social problem and scientific 
contraception/abortion films of the 1910s and 1920s, respectively, with their exploitative 
counterparts in the 1930s. While those writing and producing early classical Hollywood films 
under the Code still address the topics of contraception and abortion, the Code’s strictures as 
they pertain to the female body are still in play. As a result, those in charge of Code-era female 
reproduction films must develop ways around inviting censorship, such as, in the case of the 
abortion exploitation film, the contradictory narrative. 
The abortion exploitation film is considered under the rubric of social problem films 
(which, as discussed earlier, are important to the contraception/abortion film as a genre). It is 
critical to note, however, that despite this association with the social problem film, the abortion 
exploitation film does not, in reality, accurately fit this description. The social problem film, an 
example of which is Where Are My Children?, actually seeks to offer some sort of solution to the 
problem it addresses. In Children, one of the issues at hand is the Comstock Law’s ban on the 
dissemination of birth control information. The possible solutions vary according to 
interpretation, but certainly one solution the film offers is its advocacy of an end to criminalizing 
those like Dr. Homer who wish to educate others about eugenics-based contraception methods. 
The abortion exploitation film, however, while addressing an issue of greater social concern, 
sensationalizes it and thusly offer no real solution. Guilty Parents takes on the issue of prudish 
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parents who deny science-based knowledge about reproduction and contraception to their 
children. While we could potentially read the solution as entreating parents to encourage their 
children’s sex education, the import of this message is negated by the hyperbolic nature of Helen 
Mason’s narrative.  
Some criticism has been leveled against the major production studios for limiting the 
number of social problem film made in the thirties in favor of “escapist fare” and for watering 
down the message and criticism of those films that were made (Balio 281). As Tino Balio notes, 
however, 
[d]efining itself as a purveyor of entertainment, Hollywood never considered it a 
duty to analyze society or the economy. Any attempt to do so would have opened 
the industry to the charge of producing propaganda. Moreover, any proposal to 
solve a social problem would carry political liability and fragment the audience. 
Hollywood steered clear of this minefield and continued to do what it did best—
provide ‘harmless entertainment’ for the masses…the goal was always profits, not 
social justice. (281) 
Of the major studios, Warner Bros. took the lead in social problem pictures; however, instead of 
actually delivering social criticism or prescribing an agenda for change, they “typically 
sidestepped issues by narrowing the focus of the exposé to a specific case or by resolving 
problems at the personal level of the protagonist rather than at the societal level”—a move that 
came to be known as “Burbanking” (Balio 281)80. While Warner Bros. did not produce the films 
under consideration in this chapter—in fact, they were not produced by any of the majors—this 
process is nonetheless an apt description of any sense of resolution offered by the films 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 Balio notes that the trade publication Variety coined this term in reference to the studio’s 
location in Burbank, CA (281).  
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examined in this chapter; and even still, those resolutions, as I will explore, are nonetheless 
rendered ambiguous through the use of contradictory narrative. The films that I treat here were 
produced by Jay Dee Kay Productions (Guilty Parents, Gambling With Souls), Willis Kent 
Productions (Race Suicide), and Del Frazier Productions (Unborn Souls). These production 
companies, while smaller, were still considered “established,” with Willis Kent being somewhat 
larger than Jay Dee Kay, and they constituted 2 of the 4 major exploitation film companies of the 
time (Schaefer 44). In terms of output, Eric Schaefer notes that, “[i]n the 1930s, Kent alternated 
between Poverty Row westerns…and exploitation before moving completely into exploitation in 
the 1940s” (44). From honest women falling into lives of crime, to women blackmailed into 
work as call girls, to the hyperbolic worst-case-scenario feel of these films, it is not hard to see 
how their attendant elements of sensationalism help to lend them to the exploitation film 
tradition.  
 Between the elements of exploitation in these films and their inaccurate associations with 
social problem films (despite the fact that these films did not actually aim to solve any 
problems), we notice an inherent sense of moral ambiguity. Related to yet distinct from the 
exploitation film is the gangster film, which I will address here briefly for the points of crossover 
I observe between it and the abortion exploitation film. The gangster film, while ultimately 
making sure that its criminal protagonists were punished according to the specifications of the 
Production Code, nonetheless caught flack from the Board of Censorship for glamorizing a 
criminal way of life. Gangster films in particular saw a brief but bright heyday in 1931, but they 
quickly oversaturated the market and drew too much negative attention from the Hays Office: 
“[u]sing the Code for leverage, the Hays Office helped convince producers to put an end to the 
classic gangster cycle” (Balio 285). The abortion films share something in common with the 
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gangster picture in so far as they feature protagonists who are not to be emulated and who must 
ultimately be punished as per the Production Code’s stipulations, and they depict illicit and 
illegal activities. Additionally, they are both pretending to be social problem films, but they do 
not actually suggest any ways to solve the particular social concerns that they highlight. The 
main difference, though, is that the abortion exploitation films feature empowered women who, 
while to some extent victimized by circumstance, are also transformed by those circumstances 
into reproductive femmes fatales: dangerous women who are not afraid to resort to violence in 
order to protect themselves or exact revenge for wrongs done to a loved one, particularly when 
the crimes against others are of a sexual nature.  
 The social and industry limitations placed upon the abortion exploitation film lend 
themselves not only to the exploitation genre and the use of contradictory narratives, but also to 
our understanding of how the contraception/abortion film works as its own unique film 
movement. The abortion film, generally speaking, is what we could consider a film genre of its 
own. According to Janey Place, genres “exist through time...Genres are more characterized by 
their subject matter and their iconography than their movements, and they can express a wide 
and changing range of ideologies” (Place 37, 39). James Naremore describes the “genre 
function” with regard to film noir, which he bases on Foucault’s author function. For Foucault, 
the author function examines how various institutional structures impact and shape discourse. 
According to Naremore’s reading of Foucault, “[a]t the bottom, these relations [between 
institution and discourse] are ‘projections’ governed by belief in ‘a point where contradictions 
are resolved, where incompatible elements are at last tied together or organized around a 
fundamental and originating contradiction’” (Qtd. in Naremore 11). Applying the “genre 
function” to contraception/abortion films is also useful in so far that there are indeed many 
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institutional factors shaping their filmic discourse, such as eugenics, the law, and prescribed 
morality, to name just a few. Also, as I discuss in these chapters, it is useful to note that while the 
presentation of the relations between institution and discourse may try to resolve the issues of 
contraception and abortion—and make it seem as though these films have done so 
successfully—this is not the case.  
 The different types of contraception/abortion films that I discuss in these chapters would 
constitute movements that are part of the larger contraception/abortion genre. Movements, which 
Place uses in the context of the essay to describe the film noir, “occur in specific historical 
periods…they express a consistency of both thematic and formal elements which makes them 
particularly expressive of those times, and are uniquely able to express the homogeneous 
hopes…and fears…brought to the fore by, for example, the upheaval of war” (Place 37). I bring 
this up at this point not to quibble over definitions, but to illustrate, as I move from the early 
abortion films of the late 1910s to the abortion exploitation films of the thirties, that issues of 
attempting to represent abortion are not confined to a particular historical period; rather, like the 
issue of abortion practice itself, these films span many decades, styles, and, mostly importantly, 
ideologies. Ranging from scientifically and morally educational to sensationalized and 
entertaining to spectacular and melodramatic, the abortion and contraception film does not have 
one central function. And yet, while mostly generic in nature, these films, which are demarcated 
by different historical moments, also share trappings of the movement in so far that within each 
historical moment, there is a different impetus affecting how the issue is represented. Given, 
though, that the films from the 1930s are not accurate barometers of popular feeling about 
abortion, it is difficult to call that particular group of films a movement in the same way that one 
could call the films of the 1910s a movement. What is useful here about considering the 
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contraception/abortion film as a movement, however, is that the 1930s abortion exploitation 
films’ historical moment is the climate of fear surrounding the woman with reproductive agency.  
 The reproductive femme fatale who populates the abortion exploitation film represents a 
castration threat, as does the erotic femme fatale of film noir. Even though I would not consider 
these films to be films noirs (although there is surely some overlap), consideration of the femme 
fatale type is useful here in so far as she becomes explicitly reproductive; this problematizes the 
sex/pregnancy divide present in the femme fatale type that I discussed in Chapter 1. Of the film 
noir, Place has the following to say:  
[f]ilm noir is a male fantasy, as is most of our art. Thus woman here as elsewhere 
is defined by her sexuality…women are defined in relation to men, and the 
centrality of sexuality in this definition is a key to understanding the position of 
women in our culture. The primary crime the ‘liberated’ woman is guilty of is 
refusing to be defined in such a way, and this refusal can be perversely seen (in 
art, or in life) as an attack on men’s very existence. Film noir is hardly 
‘progressive’ in these terms…but it does give us one of the few periods of film in 
which women are active…are intelligent and powerful, if destructively so, and 
derive power, not weakness from their sexuality.” (Place 35, emphasis original)  
This viewpoint is not necessarily radically different from views posited by Laura Mulvey, Mary 
Ann Doane, and other feminist psychoanalysts, but I appreciate the way that Place sets up the 
possibility of a somewhat liberated representation of erotic agency. By extending her 
identification of these possibilities in terms of the reproductive femme fatale, who possesses and 
engages both her erotic and reproductive agency, the terms of relationality shift. Women in 
contraception/abortion films are certainly active when it comes to both realms of their sexual 
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identities, such that these two sexual identities are not separated in the way that they commonly 
are otherwise. In the abortion exploitation films of the 1930s, women occupy the principal 
position; the men in the film are defined in relation to her. Even if, in her erotic capacity, her 
agency could be seen as defined in relation to men, I argue here that the combination of erotic 
and reproductive sexualities changes the direction of the relational position. In this way, as I 
outlined in Chapter 1 with regard to Young and Kristeva, the now-pregnant woman occupies a 
subject position that is inaccessible and they therefore must be defined subjectively by that 
woman. In this way, the reproductive femme fatale poses twice the threat as the classical femme 
fatale; however, within a masculinist status quo, she also, as we see in the abortion exploitation 
films, “deserves” twice the punishment in order to maintain that status quo.  
    As Reagan demonstrates, the idea of punishing a woman for exercising her reproductive 
agency is a common action that can take place in different ways: “[p]unishment for violation of 
the law and sexual norms has been gendered. In abortion cases, the investigative procedures 
themselves constituted a form of punishment and control for women. Publicity and public 
exposure of women’s transgressions further served as punishment” (5). I also appreciate the 
emphasis that Reagan places upon the (female) gendered nature of punishment for sexual 
transgressions, particularly reproductive ones. Although abortion may have been a prevalent 
practice while illegal, it was also a secretive one, and the idea of being publicly outed, even for a 
decision that a woman confidently makes herself, is certainly part of the punishment; we can see 
this first phase of the punishment in the form of the trials that the female protagonists in these 
films must endure. The second phase of punishment is death or a prison sentence, as the case 
may be. In any event, punishment for reproductive agency cannot be avoided, and as we shall see 
in Guilty Parents and Gambling with Souls, the representation of reproductive crime and 
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punishment is rife with the moral ambiguity brought about by these films’ uses of contradictory 
narratives.  
 
Guilty Parents and Gambling With Souls: The Case of the Reproductive Woman 
I would now like to turn to Guilty Parents and Gambling With Souls as case studies for 
the problems of punishment that I have discussed for the reproductive femme fatale, as they fall 
into the first category of abortion exploitation film wherein a woman stands trial for crimes that 
are not explicitly abortion, but are nonetheless related to abortion. At issue in these films is not 
just their content, but how this content is relayed to the audience in terms of narrative structure. 
Both films rely heavily upon the use of flashback, which, as I will examine, is at once objective 
insofar as it supposedly reconstructs the story of the crime(s) as it/they actually happened. And 
yet, there is still information that is not made explicit or scenes that are not shown—like the fact 
that the protagonists had abortions, not to mention the abortions themselves. With each film, I 
want to trace how guilt—and what kind, and for what “crime”—gets constructed through the 
shifts between subjectivity and objectivity in the flashbacks. Additionally, I also want to draw 
attention to the contrasting endings of the films. Guilty Parents concludes with the protagonist, 
Helen, about to be found innocent, but she jumps out of the window nearby to her assumed death 
below because she cannot stand the suspense; the ending is riddled with female violence and 
ambiguity through closure. In Gambling with Souls, however, Mae receives no verdict, and the 
outcome is left deliberately ambiguous. These endings in turn connect back to my argument 
about the ambiguity of the practice of abortion as well as the avoidance of censorship while 
dealing with what the Code considers clearly problematic topics. 
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Elmer Clifton’s Gambling with Souls (1936) tells us the cautionary tale of Mae Miller 
through the trope of the courtroom frame, and it relies heavily upon analepsis to reveal the 
detailed circumstances regarding how Mae landed herself on trial. As the film unfolds through 
analepsis, however, the viewer learns that the angry and unrepentant woman on trial not only has 
every reason to be unrepentant and angry, but that she was not always this way (which, 
interestingly, solidifies her status as protagonist—a key point that I will address further.)  The 
film begins with the scene of mob boss Lucky Wilder’s death—a scene that we will see again 
later in flashback—and then cuts to the courtroom where Mae stands trial for his murder. The 
district attorney booms, “And it’s women of your kind who must be brought to justice. You, who 
thrive in the slime of life, who keep clubs like the one we raided open, to lure your victims out of 
their doom. And then you climaxed your vile life with the violent crime of murder, didn’t 
you??”; unwilling to confess at first, Mae responds simply with a standoffish, “I was there” 
(emphasis mine). What exactly does the district attorney mean by “women of your kind”? 
Context suggests that he is referring to gambling and murder as that which qualifies Mae as 
“vile,” but I would like to add that abortion is deliberately implied here. “Climax[ing]” one’s 
“vile life” is rich both for its narrative context as well as its suggested connection of sexual 
pleasure with reproductive choice. Abortion is deliberately implied here because, under the 
Code, it cannot be outright stated. The ambiguity of Mae’s response—“I was there”—temporally 
opens up multiple possibilities: she was there at the club gambling, she was there in the club’s 
bedroom to shoot Wilder, she was there at the hospital with her dying sister, but was she also 
there in an abortion clinic? Again, the prosecutor’s use of “climax” imbues the entire accusation 
with a sense of sexual agency and activity that insinuates that Mae enjoyed her crimes—and is 
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even worse off for doing so. Thus, from the film’s outset, we are given a fallen woman who 
stands accused of sexual and reproductive agency to a criminal degree. 
Of the two abortions in Gambling with Souls, Carolyn’s, while still never technically 
referred to as an abortion, is understandable as such, while Mae’s is problematically implicit; I 
will look first at Carolyn’s fatal abortion. Near the conclusion of Gambling with Souls, Mae 
beseeches the courtroom to take pity on her by describing how she did all she could to save her 
sister from descending into the underworld of crime, but her efficacy was seriously limited by 
Wilder, who had assigned a gunman to trail Mae. Eventually, Mae gets a lead on locating her 
sister when she “learn[s] from one of the girls a terrible thing had happened to Carolyn” and that 
Carolyn had been hospitalized. With a cut to a hospital room, we see little sister Carolyn lying 
listlessly on the bed. Out in the hallway, a nurse hands Dr. John Miller, Carolyn’s brother-in-law 
and Mae’s husband, Carolyn’s chart. At this point, Carolyn is only identified as “Mary Smith,” 
and John does not yet realize that it is Carolyn of whom he speaks. Upon consulting the patient’s 
chart, John remarks, “That’s pretty bad. Any doctor who would stoop to a thing like this is a 
disgrace to his profession.” This is the first inclination the audience is given that Carolyn’s 
hospitalization is due to a botched abortion. The central blame is initially placed upon the 
abortionist (as is also the case in Where Are My Children?), not upon the woman herself—or in 
the case of Carolyn, upon the teenaged girl herself. On the one hand, we might read this as a case 
of shooting the messenger, so to speak: of blaming the person or entity who provides the means 
to another’s desired ends, even though those ends are illegal in 1936. And yet, it remains unclear 
what exactly is so disgraceful to John: a doctor performing an abortion at all, or a doctor 
performing an abortion so unsanitarily and carelessly that he ends up jeopardizing the life of his 
patient. Even when faced with a young woman who is dying from a botched abortion, it is 
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unclear exactly what the film’s stance on abortion is. One might expect to hear John malign the 
practice entirely, but instead, all we meet with is a vague indictment that leaves reasonable room 
for trained and ethical abortionists to remain in the profession without disgrace.  
Upon the nurse’s insistence that John check in on “Mary,” John enters the room and leans 
over the bed to grasp the girl’s hand and check her pulse, does a double-take when he realizes the 
real identity of “Mary.” When asked why she didn’t tell John about her situation, Carolyn replies 
that she “couldn’t,” as she was “so ashamed.” Just as John leans into a medium close up with 
Carolyn and entreats her to share what has happened, we cut to a simultaneous shot of Mae 
arriving outside the hospital room door, inquiring about her sister’s whereabouts.  
 There is no abortion spectacle in this scene, but it is precisely the absence of spectacle 
that gives this scene its significance. Unlike the melodramatic abortion spectacles in Leave Her 
to Heaven and Christopher Strong that I will examine in Chapter 4, which are not only visually 
present but also extremely violent, Gambling with Souls erases all but the end result of death by 
botched abortion. We see Carolyn cavorting with Lucky Wilder at a seedy club two scenes 
before, and in the same scene Mae tries unsuccessfully to rescue Carolyn; we next see Carolyn 
on her hospital deathbed. What this leaves for the audience is a great deal of room wherein each 
viewer is forced to make the logical connections and fill in the gaps in the plot herself. We are 
left to assume that in the interim between the two scenes, Carolyn engaged in sexual intercourse 
with Wilder, became pregnant, realized she was pregnant, underwent an abortion, fell ill as a 
result, and was deposited at the hospital by an unidentified group of persons. (The nurse notes 
that “they” dropped Carolyn off the previous evening, yet the film never specifies who who 
“they” are.) There is much, however, that we either do not know, or at least do not know for sure, 
and there could be even more steps to that equation. For example, John assumes that the abortion 
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was performed by a derelict doctor, but the film never confirms nor denies his assumption. It is 
equally plausible, given the criminal crowd into which Carolyn has fallen, that her abortion could 
have been self-induced. We have seen this sex and gambling ring portrayed in detail throughout 
the film by Mae’s association with it; from this portrayal, we know that Wilder and his crew do 
not care for the mental or physical well-being of the women they blackmail into sexual servitude. 
Given that Carolyn is lured into the crime ring like many girls and women before here, and given 
that they were allowed no preferential treatment, it stands to reason that Carolyn would not 
receive special treatment, either, and would have to take her abortion into her own hands. While 
John might have jumped to the conclusion that a derelict doctor was responsible for Carolyn’s 
fatal abortion because he did not know that “Mary Smith” was really Carolyn when he made the 
comment and, thusly, did not know of her involvement with the crime syndicate, John’s 
assumption absolves “Mary,” at least unofficially, from responsibility for the abortion. It is worth 
wondering, however, if he would have had the same reaction to a girl who had an abortion but 
did not fall fatally ill because of it—but I will address Mae in a moment. 
 The details of Carolyn’s mysterious abortion could have been cleared up by Carolyn 
herself; we witness both John and Mae separately asking the dying girl for the back story. Just as 
John asks Carolyn, however, we cut to the shot of Mae in the hallway looking for her sister. 
Whether Carolyn gave John any details and what those details were, the viewer never learns. 
What this suggests is that the film rides the contradictory line between education and 
sensationalism in this move to include abortion implicitly without really talking about it, without 
giving any explicit account of it, and certainly without showing it. In terms of censorship, this 
deliberate absence is crucial; it allows the film to get away with including a salacious topic 
without running the risk of state or municipal censorship, since the references are all implied and 
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most of the causal steps building to the result are omitted. One of the problems that this move 
raises, though, is that of viewer reaction. If one of the biggest fears on the part of censors is 
giving viewers presumably immoral ideas and inciting the real-life repetition of what is depicted 
on screen, we could understand on the one hand how a particular act could not possibly be 
imitated if it is simply not shown in the first place. On the other hand, however, leaving these 
causal gaps open for interpretation gives the viewer carte blanche to fill them in with whatever 
she sees fit. If the viewer assumes that a film’s logical omissions were made because they were 
too salacious, inappropriate, immoral, and/or untoward to show or speak of in detail, then the 
film’s censors run the risk of having the audience fills these logical gaps with ideas and images 
that are potentially much worse than what would have been shown, which in turn defeats the 
point of censorship in this respect.  
 These logical omissions also obscure the potential moral of the story, so to speak. In 
order to examine the import of this, however, we must consider this film specifically as a social 
problem exploitation film. The way in which the prosecutor cuts directly at Mae’s sense of 
morality and categorizes her inherently with the criminals with whom she became associated, 
combined with Mae’s hardened and disdainful reply, makes it seem at the beginning like this will 
be a typical crime story: the fast and illegal lifestyle of Mae, an underworld queenpin, finally 
catches up with her. These generic expectations are undermined, however, as the film continues, 
and we learn that Mae was herself was a victim lured out to her doom, to paraphrase the 
prosecutor. In this way, Gambling with Souls does not merely use the main plotline of an 
investigation to reconstruct the sub-plotline of the crime, as in a typical crime movie. This film 
relies heavily upon Mae’s flashbacks in order to understand why she killed Wilder, not just that 
she killed Wilder, which ultimately makes this “fallen woman” the object of sympathy. If 
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anything, we notice a reversal of the more standard construction of the victim being revealed in 
the end as the criminal; here, Mae is presented as the criminal, and in the end is characterized 
predominantly as a victim, albeit a victim who reclaimed her agency and took revenge on the 
real criminal: Wilder.  
Eventually, Mae tearfully confesses to Wilder’s murder in the film’s final scene—while 
flanked by the righteous husband who forgave her transgressions and took her back—citing as 
her motive, “he killed my sister; he deserved to be killed.” Even John comes to her defense: 
“She’s accused of taking a human life when all she did was to exterminate a vile creature who 
was a menace to society. Surely she’s suffered enough.” To John’s entreaty, which cleverly turns 
the word “vile” from Mae and redirects it towards Lucky Wilder, the prosecutor remarks, 
“There’s nothing I can do. I’m sorry, but [your guilt or innocence] will have to be decided by a 
judge and jury.” 
What’s noteworthy about these pleas is that while they are acknowledgements of guilt on 
Mae’s part for Wilder’s murder, they are not apologies. In fact, Mae even tempers her confession 
with, “I wish I could have done it [killed Wilder] a hundred times.” While this case brings up 
issues of morality more generally and effectively strikes at the heart of the tussle between justice 
and the law, I am most impressed by the primary reason for Mae’s vengeful anger. Surprisingly, 
it’s not identified as what Wilder did to her: trapped her in a sex ring; threatened to tell her 
husband how much money she owed if she didn’t follow his orders; treated her with blatant 
disrespect and indecency. Rather, her justification for murder is “he killed my sister.” 
In light of this justification, the blame for Carolyn’s death does not lie with Carolyn nor 
even with the doctor who supposedly performed her abortion, but instead with the man who 
impregnated Carolyn. In this way, I read the true vileness of Wilder’s crimes more as an affront 
	   165 
on women’s reproductive agency than on women’s erotic agency. This is crucial because unlike 
the didactic Hollywood contraception films of the late teens and the spectacular abortion 
melodramas, the woman here is absolved from guilt surrounding the violation of her 
reproductive sexuality—yet also relieved of agency. She has the agency to make a choice—to 
abort her fetus, to commit murder—but once the choice is made, her agency disappears.  
Mae’s abortion, however, is quite a different story. After reaching the point where she 
has left her home and is living in squalor at a night club as one of Wilder’s call girls—for fear 
that her hardworking and morally upright husband would otherwise discover her secret—Mae 
has become haggard looking. Her hair, usually perfectly coiffed, is ratty and unkempt, and her 
lovely evening gowns and cocktail dresses have been cast aside for a simple black frock. Her gait 
appears lethargic, and she lists around uneasily. Mae stands in contrast with Wilder’s other white 
slaves at the club (who may or may not be there for reasons similar to Mae’s): at one point, a 
pert, vivacious blonde lures a country man into the back room area, where he is promptly pulled 
into a bedroom by three excited, energetic, and barely dressed women in lingerie and make-up. 
What accounts for Mae’s lethargy? At one point, we hear Mae chatting and laughing drunkenly 
with a man from behind closed doors. Does she try to remain drunk so as to disengage from her 
present situation of forced prostitution? We have seen her drunk before—when she was 
blackmailed into sleeping with Million Dollar Taylor in order to convince him to lend her some 
money for her gambling debts. Maybe, perhaps, the weight of her recent actions has caught up 
with her and Mae’s listlessness stems from shameful resignation to her present situation. Or 
maybe, perhaps, Mae acts in such a way because she is recovering from an abortion.  
There is solid evidence to support this theory, and as I have mentioned, there are other 
plausible ways of explaining Mae’s behavior. If Mae had an abortion, not only is it implied, but 
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it is implied even more vaguely that Carolyn’s. There are, however, some factors to consider in 
support of this reading, and the first is Mae’s behavior. A common trope of depicting women 
post-abortion is their carriage. When they leave the abortionist’s, as we saw with Lillian in 
Where Are My Children?, they typically stumble about and cannot seem to maintain balance, 
which I would attribute to having recently undergone a medical procedure; Mae’s stumbling 
lethargy could indicate that she recently had an abortion done. Furthermore, Mae receives 
information from another call girl about Carolyn’s abortion and is quick to understand and act 
upon this information. She recounts this in court as such: “From one of the girls I learned a 
terrible thing had happened to Carolyn. She was in the hospital.” Mae never tells us exactly what 
the other call girl said, and we don’t know if Mae interpreted the exact phrase “terrible thing” as 
botched abortion, but by the time she is with Carolyn at the hospital, she has deduced that Wilder 
impregnated Carolyn, Carolyn’s abortion went awry, and Carolyn’s death is Wilder’s fault. It is 
also not surprising that Mae gathers information about Carolyn from one of the girls in Wilder’s 
circle, since we know that women “talked about their abortions and relied upon friends, relatives, 
or partners to help them carry out their abortion plans” (Reagan 21). Maybe one of the other 
women overheard or was able to deduce that Wilder’s latest conquest was Mae’s sister and 
sought Mae out to deliver this information; more likely, however, Mae overheard this 
information. From this set of scenes we learn a few things. Firstly, even though the film does 
imply that women talk about abortion, the fact that we do not learn how this happens or what it 
looks like—or really anything specific about it at all—does not speak much to historical 
accuracy. Furthermore, whether Mae had an abortion or not, it is clear that she understands what 
happened to Carolyn, and this understanding motivates Mae’s murder of Wilder. 
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The trial-scene flashbacks function ostensibly to fill the audience in on the events that 
lead up to Wilder’s murder, and the courtroom frame lends an objective air to Mae’s story. We 
must remember, however, that this is still Mae’s story and not an objective retelling by any 
stretch. The idea that Mae’s testimony would provide some objective truth is also questionable 
given that as her narrative unfolds, we learn that she is a fallen woman—a character type that 
Lea Jacobs has examined at length: films focusing on female characters who, in short, make 
what society writ large would consider to be bad decisions (engage in premarital or extramarital 
sex, become too ambitious or greedy, fall prey to a life of crime or vice of some sort). As Lea 
Jacobs points out, fallen woman films (or “sex pictures”) drew quite a bit of negative attention 
from censors: “Like the gangster film with which it was sometimes compared, the fallen woman 
film served as a focal point for public criticism for the film industry. As a consequence of such 
criticism, it was targeted for regulation by the MPPDA” (x). Interestingly, though, the problems 
that censors had with the films were mostly framed in terms of narrative structure, and by 
embracing certain narrative forms and eschewing others, these problems could be avoided, for 
“[i]ndustry censors and producers treated proscribed ideas as problems of narrative and film 
form” (Jacobs x). They were “primarily concerned with the structures of narrative—the nature of 
endings, motivation of action, patterns of narration,” and this applies, to a certain extent, to the 
abortion exploitation films as well, as they could certainly be considered under the rubric of the 
fallen woman film (Jacobs 23, emphasis original). Even though exploitation films were not 
beholden to the Code in the ways that mainstream films were, and although exploitation films 
tried to hide beneath the mantle of education, they are, nonetheless, still largely narrative films. 
Speaking specifically about fallen woman films treating the female protagonist’s class rise—
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which, as we recall, is the reason Mae begins gambling in the first place—Jacobs notes the 
following:  
[a] number of narrative strategies could delay or redirect the trajectory of class rise. Often 
films stressed the heroine’s abasement or punishment rather than her acquisition of 
wealth. In some cases, the films used some form of narration such as voice-over, opening 
titles, or a character telling a story in flashback, all of which more or less ambiguously 
proposed criticisms of the fallen woman’s sexual transgressions and her aspirations to 
wealth.” (Jacobs 24) 
While Jacobs does not specifically address Gambling with Souls in her study, the same narrative 
observation applies; at least on one level, Mae’s flashbacks—even though they are hers and we 
are being told her version of the story—work to incriminate her, and she does, in her ex post 
facto narration, criticize her own actions and choices. As a part of the narrative as it is unfolding, 
she even warns Carolyn against privileging fine material possessions (clothes, jewelry, 
automobiles, nights out) over quality relationships (Mae’s marriage to John).  
 The flashbacks from Mae’s point of view do, however, also function as a means of 
demonstrating her thought process, rationale, and personal feelings about her ordeal. She is 
allowed, unchallenged by Wilder’s—or any—competing narrative account, to show repentance 
for those actions she regrets (desiring great wealth and gambling in order to acquire it) and 
explain those she does not (shooting Wilder). Even as she incriminates herself and identifies her 
choices to gamble and lie as wrong and undesirable, however, she also unapologetically asserts 
and rationalizes her own agency.  
 Nonetheless, the question of Mae’s fate remains—as does the real nature of her trial. For 
the sake of the plot’s cardinal functions and cohesion, as well as the sake of the film to comply 
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with the Production Code, Mae must be tried, as least superficially, for murder, which is 
certainly illegal. But what of her potential abortion? What of the fact that her chief motive for 
murder was to avenge her sister who died from an illegal abortion? Gambling With Souls ends 
with the Millers being informed that Mae’s fate “will have to be decided by a judge and jury.” 
We do not know whether Mae will be found innocent or guilty. On the one hand, the ambiguous 
ending emphasizes the fact that good intentions for illegal deeds such as murder—even when 
there is a public benefit—do not inherently absolve the killer from a guilty verdict or a 
punishment, as John believes they should. But what I wish to argue is that murder is neither the 
only nor the most important issue here. The real stakes of Mae’s trial and its unknown outcome 
have to do with reproductive agency—hers, Carolyn’s, any woman’s. Not only is abortion illegal 
in 1936, but the prescribed morality surrounding its representation dictates that more than being 
illegal, it is wrong, and those involved with its practice must be punished. Carolyn had an 
abortion, and her punishment, like Lillian’s, was death. If we believe that Mae had an abortion 
and lived, there must be some other kind of punishment meted out to her. Furthermore, the film 
suggests that abortion is a crime that is connected to other crimes; just as other vices and crimes 
become connected to one another (gambling, alcoholism, sex, adultery, theft, deception, murder), 
the same goes for abortion. If Mae can’t be tried directly for abortion, she can be tried for less 
taboo crimes that serve as a type of stand-in for that unspeakable crime; either way, Mae must 
meet with punishment for her agency. And yet, Gambling With Souls does not conclude with a 
guilty verdict. This move both places the responsibility for judgment upon the viewer (who has 
been put in a juror-like position throughout the film) and allows the possibility that perhaps Mae 
is not “guilty” in the sense that her reproductive “crime” is not a crime at all—a surprising 
contradictory option, given the film’s heavy verbal and visual rhetoric against abortion as a 
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reproductive choice. Through the film’s attempt to avoid censorship and thusly avoid any 
explicit mention of abortion, the possibility is created through the use of contradictory narratives 
for an audience member to come to her own moral conclusions.  
 Jack Townley’s Guilty Parents, produced two years in earlier in 1934, has the same 
courtroom frame narrative and a similar (although not identical) ending, but a decidedly more 
didactic beginning. At its outset, Guilty Parents presents its audience with this introductory 
intertitle:  
Foreword: sex ignorance, the black plague of adolescence, continues to augment 
the mass of innocent youth in the abyss of despair. Shouting from the mountain 
tops their battle cry of  ‘Save our boys and girls’ and deliberately concealing from 
them the understanding of the mysteries of sex life, the foolhardiness of these 
bigots remains today, as in other days, one of the pitiful inconsistencies of life. 
Teach them, if you will, to shrink from sex truth, but know that they then must 
pay the inevitable penalty for sex ignorance. Youth, caught in the current of 
flaunted worldly independence, demands not restriction, but instruction! Heed, 
therefore, the folly of false modesty. Grant them their birth right—to know the 
truth!  
 At face value, this entreaty does not seem altogether different in function than the 
opening intertitles of the contraception and abortion films from the late 1910s. We learn that this 
picture is trying to present itself as social problem film that promotes the importance of sex 
education. We know from precedent that the film will likely present its argument by way of 
cautionary tale. References to those who deny their children legitimate information about sex as 
“bigots” and to their actions as “one of the pitiful inconsistencies of life” seem to indicate that 
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Guilty Parents espouses a progressive outlook and promotes the view that sex education for 
teenagers is a moral imperative if we value their well-being (and we should value their well-
being). The way the mini-narrative is indicated, however, also suggests that this picture—and its 
cautionary, morally educational tale—will be somewhat sensational: “Teach them, if you will, to 
shrink from sex truth, but know that they then must pay the inevitable penalty for sex ignorance.” 
We are not told what the “inevitable penalty” is, but we also know that we will learn what is—
and it most certainly cannot be good. Thus, Guilty Parents draws the viewer in with the promise 
of a titillating moral tale—that will, incidentally, offer no scientifically educational information 
about birth control or abortion whatsoever. 
 Promotional materials for this film only confuse the matter more. A poster for Guilty 
Parents bearing the image of an embracing and nearly horizontal couple at once announces that 
the film is “A TRUE TO LIFE STORY” conveying “Cold Bare Facts for the Broadminded 
Fathers and Mothers Today!” These prominent phrases suggest that the film may actually convey 
scientifically educational material that is realistically relevant to young adults, but these slogans 
are undermined by the phrases that appear near the bottom of the poster: “WARNING! ADULTS 
ONLY,” “NO ONE UNDER HIGH SCHOOL AGE ADMITTED,” and, perhaps most tellingly, 
“A MOMENT OF DELIRIOUS FREEDOM.” Particularly when combined with the intimate 
image of the couple, these secondary phrases suggest a tale of sex and scandal unfit for the 
curious and impressionable teenagers who most need accurate information about sex and 
protection. From the outset, Guilty Parents is fraught with the ostensibly conflicted purpose of 
the exploitation that Schaeffer describes: it is to be (morally) educational and sensational.  
 The story proper deals with Helen Mason, a teenager whose conservative mother refuses 
to allow Helen access to sex education materials (even going so far as to throw a pamphlet that 
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Helen brought home from school into the fireplace). Young, inquisitive, and sexually ignorant, 
the underaged Helen attends a raucous college party where she gets drunk and proceeds to meet, 
have sex with, and become pregnant by a boy named Jimmy, with whom she later runs away 
from her home and unapproachable mother with the purpose of getting married. Shortly after 
they leave town, Jimmy is shot and killed at a gas station and Helen flees Ohio for an unnamed 
Big Apple-like city. If it intended to be a somewhat realistic cautionary tale, the film could have 
ended here. It’s enough that a young, naïve girl must face pregnancy out of wedlock, cope with 
single motherhood, and find a way to confront her conservative mother. But this is just the 
beginning.  
 As pages from a calendar fall from March to May, indicating the passage of time, we 
learn that Helen has been staying for at least some period of that time at a place resembling a 
hospital. As she is shown exiting, she leaves baby clothes behind, and a low height shot depicts 
her stumbling away. The fact that we knew Helen was pregnant by Jimmy—hence their decision 
to elope—combined with the hospital, the abandoned baby clothes, and the telltale stumble 
indicate, as I contend, that Helen had an abortion. But even here, the ambiguity of this 
combination of tropes is argumentatively useful in so far as it promotes the idea of the film’s 
contradictory narrative. The medical setting, while present in abortion films where abortion is 
unambiguous, could also signify miscarriage, as it does in other films from the 1930s and 1940s. 
Scarlett O’Hara (Vivien Leigh) in Gone With the Wind (1939) and Julie Adams (Irene Dunne) in 
Penny Serenade (1941) both experience unambiguous miscarriages in their respective films. 
Scarlett’s miscarriage is precipitated by her fall down a flight of stairs, while Julie’s results from 
the physical trauma she experiences when her house collapses on her during an earthquake. In 
both cases, however, the spectacles of miscarriage are immediately followed by shots of both 
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women in convalescing in bed—Scarlett at her home and Julie in a San Francisco hospital—with 
no shots of either woman in between. For Guilty Parents’ Helen, the medical setting is present, 
which could suggest miscarriage of her and Jimmy’s baby. The fact that Guilty Parents uses the 
medical setting trope, which has multiple signifiers, plays into the film’s ability to present 
plausible deniability in the face of potential objectors that Helen’s abortion occurred at all. 
However, since the trope of the stumbling gait is also present, I still contend that Helen did not 
miscarry but instead chose abortion. On this note, again, the film could have ended here and still 
effectively made its point about the importance of sex education. Alone and having just been 
through a trying personal and physical ordeal, a humbled and wizened Helen could have returned 
home and given her mother a fairly thorough guilt trip for her harmful opposition to sex 
education. Not only does the film continue, but at this point, it takes a dramatic turn from 
moderately tame cautionary tale to full-on exploitation picture. 
 After her abortion, the calendar temporally moves us forward again from June 11 to 
August 24. Helen is living with her new husband Billy, a hamburger cook, and has changed her 
name to Helen Wilson. Helen successfully auditions for a chorus girl job and, soon after, is 
running her own dancing school. In the meantime, Billy leaves Helen her temporarily to pursue a 
career of his own. Not everything is coming up roses for Helen, however, when she learns that 
she is wanted in Ohio for Jimmy’s murder. Al Brant, a man Helen thought was just a publicist, 
was inexplicably present at the time of the murder (which Helen did not commit) and blackmails 
Helen to send girls from her dancing school to Marie, a local madam who runs a brothel. As if 
this isn’t enough, Al has designs on Helen’s dancer friend Betty, who he rapes and impregnates 
one evening at a party after an inebriated Betty has passed out on the bed.  
	   174 
 Betty’s abortion, in contrast with Helen’s, is far more dramatic and ultimately fatal. After 
the implied rape scene, Betty disappears for a few days in order to undergo an abortion 
procedure. As Betty is given anesthesia, a complex flashback series begins that depicts the chain 
of events that led Betty to her present situation: we revisit Al picking Betty up for the party, 
Betty drinking with Al on the couch, and Betty passed out on the bed right before Al rapes her. It 
is unclear whether the flashbacks belong to Betty, to Al, or to both. On the one hand, it would 
make sense for Betty to be thinking about how she ended up needing an abortion in the first 
place as she is about to have one performed, and this could serve as a some didactic moment, as 
it succinctly reviews the chain of causality leading up to the need for an abortion. This flashback 
montage could be a shared consciousness or belong to Al, however, because after the montage 
finishes, we return to Al waiting outside the abortion clinic—supposedly after tailing her there, 
since she appeared to go there alone. Al sits in his car, lights a cigarette, and looks up in what we 
assume is the direction of the abortion clinic, suggesting that his glance toward the clinic 
motivates the flashbacks and what he imagines Betty is thinking about—which perhaps is what 
Betty is also thinking about at the moment. We can understand why Betty might be reflecting on 
these prior events, but when we consider the third event in the series—Betty lying passed out on 
the bed—it seems clear that these memories are from Al’s point of view, as Betty could not 
remember herself being asleep if was asleep. Of course, the rape that follows is omitted from the 
flashback—just as it was omitted from the presentation of this sequence the first time around, but 
knowing what happens next in this series of events, combined with the knowledge that this is 
Al’s flashback, lends a decidedly eerie feel to the scene, especially considering Betty’s status as 
rape victim and the central role that Al plays in this subplot. In a way, Al’s flashback montage 
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works to undermine the demonstration of the reproductive agency that Betty displays through her 
independent choice to have an abortion and terminate her pregnancy. 
 When Betty, fatally ill from her abortion, returns home to the apartment building where 
she lives with Helen, Betty’s mother is there and immediately tries to help her dying daughter. In 
a dramatic death scene that echoes both Where Are My Children? and Gambling With Souls, 
Mrs. Wagner grips Betty, shakes her, and entreats her not to die, but to no avail. After Betty 
passes, the doctor who Mrs. Wagner had called to the house remarks, “I’d like to get my hands 
on the man that butchered that girl.” Betty’s abortion subplot links back up with Helen’s travails 
when Helen returns to the building shortly after Betty has died. When Helen walks in, unaware 
of the events that just transpired, Mrs. Wagner accuses Helen of being responsible for Betty’s 
death, screaming “Get Out!” in concert with Helen’s screams of “Betty!” as she pushed Helen 
from the room.  
As in Gambling With Souls, the blame for Betty’s death is placed on anyone but Betty—
the abortionist, Al Brant, even Helen. There are some complicated abortion politics happening in 
both films in terms of culpability, and we see the popular and prescribed narratives playing out 
simultaneously and contradictorily. The impulse to absolve from guilt the woman who sought 
out the abortion might seem like a move against vilifying what women of the time perceived as a 
right to choice: choosing abortion isn’t morally wrong, but getting someone into a position where 
she has a reproductive choice is morally wrong, as is not giving that woman proper medical care. 
But as we saw in Gambling With Souls, this seemingly pro-choice move really works to strip 
agency from the woman in question. In Gambling With Souls, the abortionist and the lover were 
blamed for the woman’s death, although, interestingly, not for her abortion outright. The film 
seems to suggest that had Carolyn lived, no blame would have been necessary, as the abortion 
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itself would not have been worthy of blame. Here, though, Helen catches some of the blame for 
Betty’s death, which is a step further than Gambling With Souls dares to go. Perhaps this 
accusation comes from the somewhat benign fact that Betty only came into contact with Al 
through Helen. Or perhaps Mrs. Wagner’s accusation hints at something more. Perhaps the 
“blame” can be removed from Betty (and from Carolyn) post mortem because, through dying, 
she has sufficiently been punished for her illegal and immoral act. Once dead, she cannot be 
punished further. Helen has not yet faced real punishment for her abortion earlier in the film—
one which she lived through—and the result of her trial must provide that, one way or another.  
Incensed at Betty’s death, Helen immediately seeks out and fatally shoots Al, as Helen 
holds him responsible for Betty untimely demise. Incidentally, Helen’s absent husband, Billy, 
has left the hamburger business for journalism and reappears for the real murder, as he has been 
sent to cover Helen’s imminent arrest for Jimmy’s murder. Even though she didn’t kill Jimmy, 
Helen is going to be arrested and punished one way or another, and the presence of the additional 
crime of which she is innocent adds a level of absurdity to the witch-hunt for a woman with 
reproductive agency. Back in the courtroom, Helen’s attorney makes a final argument for her 
acquittal that sounds, unsurprisingly, very much like John Miller’s plea for Mae, but with a twist:  
This girl exterminated a vile creature who preyed upon the virtue of children. The 
case of this unfortunate girl is an indictment against guilty parents. Against every 
mother in every land.  Against you and you and you. There sits the real culprit. 
[Attorney indicates Helen’s mother in a MCU profile.] That mother, clutching to 
her breast the victim of her own neglect. That mother, who too late was awakened 
to the responsibilities of parenthood, and now sits, a broken pathetic figure, 
clutching frantically to the child she has made an outcast. Ladies and Gentlemen, 
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are you going to leave this courtroom with this girl’s blood upon your hands and 
consciences? Noooo. I thank you.  
We are given the courtroom commentaries of the defense attorney throughout, and never hear the 
point of view of the prosecution. Another key difference is that Helen does not actively tell her 
story in the courtroom as Mae Miller does; her attorney tells it instead. Thus, the flashbacks, 
while still functioning similarly in Guilty Parents—simultaneously incriminating and justifying 
Helen’s actions—have an added level of remove. It is not Helen’s account directly, although it is 
from her perspective. That her story is told in flashbacks narrated by her attorney somewhat 
lessens the level of incrimination and also of justification also lessens the level of agency—but 
that’s her attorney’s point. His efforts to get Helen acquitted rest upon making her seem as 
victimized and powerless as possible. While he does begin his closing statement with the 
argument that Helen did society a favor by eliminating a rapist, blackmailer, and white slave 
trader, he cannot stop there, for such an argument places too much agency in Helen’s hands.  
 Thus, he takes it one step further by placing the real blame for the murder of Al Brent—
and, relatedly, Betty and Betty’s fetus and Helen’s fetus and probably Jimmy, too—on Helen’s 
mother and her dangerous conviction that her daughter would be spoiled by knowing the facts 
about sex and reproduction. The medium close up profile shot of Mrs. Mason bears a strong 
resemblance to a mug shot, and the defense attorney’s rhetoric regarding Helen (“unfortunate 
girl,” “victim,” “outcast,” “this girl’s blood upon your hands and consciences”) and her mother 
(“culprit,” “neglect,” “too late was awakened to the responsibilities of parenthood,” “broken 
pathetic figure”) all but make parental guilt unquestionable. When we recall Helen’s earlier 
entreaty to her mother as she burned the sex education pamphlet, “But mother, all the other girls 
seem to know about getting married and that sort of thing,” the film seems always to have had a 
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vested interest in the saving power of education to help a naïve young woman from becoming a 
fallen woman—a fallen woman who murders and has abortions. And the closing statement seems 
to work with the jury, which we see momentarily stalled at an 11 to 1 vote in favor of innocence, 
with the straggling innocent vote looking likely.  
 Back in the courtroom, however, immediately before the delivery of the verdict, the 
suspense—or the guilt?—is too much for Helen, who screams, “Aaaaagh! I can’t take it!” before 
jumping out of a nearby window. Her jump is followed by a high angle shot of Helen’s lifeless 
corpse below as a crowd quickly gathers around the spectacle. Mostly likely, Helen would have 
been found innocent. The accusation of her mother was not a legal one, but a moral one, and had 
Helen but waited, mother and daughter could have left the courtroom together to rebuild a 
healthier relationship at home. Guilty Parents would have made its point that parents are 
responsible for acknowledging that their children need information about sex and reproduction 
and for providing that information. But that would not have been a fit punishment for Helen and 
her abortion crimes. If she wasn’t punished with death from her abortion, and she wasn’t 
punished by the law, then she must be punished in some other way: death by guilty conscience. 
If she’s guilty, she’s a villain because she has agency, and she must be punished. If she’s 
innocent, she’s a victim with no agency, which is in itself a type of punishment, although a less 
obvious one. Helen’s surprise suicide capitulates to both possibilities by rendering both 
impossible. 
There is something morally ambiguous in the choice to establish protagonists that are at 
once criminal, yet also with whom the audience can identify. The ambiguous endings of Guilty 
Parents and Gambling With Souls, in particular, demonstrate, as I argue, the necessity of meting 
out punishment for reproductive agency while simultaneously hiding the legal crime of abortion 
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behind other legal crimes in an effort to bolster the prescribed morality regarding abortion and 
downplaying the popular morality. However, the attempts of these films to have it all, so to 
speak—to make the women like Mae Miller and Helen Mason at once victims and villains—only 
muddle the import of their punishments. And this indicates that, just as there was a supportive 
culture surrounding abortion at the time of its illegality stronger in many ways than the culture of 
abortion’s detractors, perhaps there could be an actual social message beneath the ostensible 
need to punish reproductive women that is highlighted by this very ambiguity of crime and 
punishment. 
 
Race Suicide and Unborn Souls: Investigating Abortion’s Morality 
We have seen how, in Guilty Parents and Gambling With Souls, the young women who 
die from their abortions are absolved from culpability, and that that culpability is instead 
transferred to the doctor who performed the procedure and to the woman’s lover. We have also 
seen what happens to the lover: both Al Brant and Lucky Wilder are tracked down and 
murdered. What we have not seen is what happens to the abortionist, and this line of inquiry is of 
chief interest to these next two films. S. Roy Luby’s Race Suicide (1937) and Del Frazier’s 
Unborn Souls (1939)—both of which postdate Guilty Parents and Gambling With Souls, 
constitute the other type of abortion exploitation film that is less reconstructive and judicial and 
more investigative. Narratively speaking, both of these films move away from the use of 
flashback and unfold more like an active investigation or police procedural. Like the first group 
of films, they try to approximate objectivity, although through showing simultaneous actions on 
different locations and not through flashback; however, they fail to attain objectivity in the same 
way by eliding the central acts that prompt the malpractice investigations: the abortions 
	   180 
themselves. The emphasis that these films place upon the criminality of at least the “bad” 
abortionists—although this illegality is explored in different ways—in turn places clearer 
emphasis on the illegal status of abortion than did the previous films. It also equates the 
abortionist to the lover in terms of both culpability and need to punishment. Yet, they do so in a 
way that erases, or at least downplays, the importance of the pregnant woman to the equation of 
abortion practice. Given that abortionists would not have work—and therefore would not be 
criminals—without these women, the choice to temper their importance makes these films more 
sensational than informative, and it muddles the pregnant woman’s sense of agency when it 
comes to reproductive choices.  
The first film I’d like to consider, S. Roy Luby’s Race Suicide (1937), is, as the title 
suggests, eugenically tinged in a way that the other abortion films from the 1930s are not. This 
aspect, however, is downplayed, and the focus of the film that we infer from the intertitle 
foreword seems more along the lines of a crime exposé than a eugenic tirade: “The story of 
‘RACE SUICIDE’ as depicted in this Real Life Drama is based upon facts gleaned from 
newspaper reports of the smashing of a well organized gang of illegal medical practitioners in 
one of our great American cities. The names used, however, are fictitious and any resemblance to 
the names of actual participants is entirely coincidental.” From this intertitle, the film seems to 
aspire to be a dramatization of real events—even though we are not told what those events are. 
There was a popular exposé that ran in the Chicago Times in 1888 that perhaps could serve as 
fodder, but that report would be nearly fifty years old by the time Race Suicide is released, and 
from Reagan’s account of this exposé, the network of abortion practitioners and health 
professionals outed by the investigation could hardly be referred to as a “well organized gang” 
(Reagan 47, Suicide). Furthermore, the only real place where eugenic concerns become apparent 
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is in the subplot involving Ann Martin, and even then, she is presented more as someone who 
should be considering birth control or abortion than someone who should, by eugenic logic, be 
having children.  
Race Suicide begins by introducing a criminal abortion ring lead by Dr. Rudolph Von 
Hertsen. A dead girl’s body is found in Von Hertsen’s office, and despite the evidence 
suggesting Von Hertsen’s involvement in her death (gloves, ether mask, bloodstained sheets) and 
a discrepancy in how long the girl had been dead, the police make no arrest. Great suspicion 
exists amongst the investigators and coroner, whose report reads that the girl “came to her death 
by a criminal operation performed by a person or persons unknown,” indicating that the 
investigators have no solid evidence against Von Hertsen. The “criminal operation” to which the 
coroner refers, of course, is abortion, which, though never named as such, is again implied 
shortly thereafter when another doctor remarks, “they prey mostly on women who should have 
children. It is little short of race suicide…It’s still our responsibility to protect these women if 
possible form the results of their own folly.” The “they” referred to by the doctor are the “bad” 
abortionists (who are clearly set apart from doctors who perform safe abortions), and 
characterizing them as persons who “prey” upon women sets them up as the villains, while the 
women who need protection from “the results of their own folly” are clearly the victims. There is 
quite a bit that is yet ambiguous, even in these statements are merely exposition. Looking first at 
the victimized women who are clearly relieved of guilt (and therefore agency) for their abortion 
decisions, it is unclear what exactly is meant by their “folly” and its “results.” Is their folly their 
sexual dalliances (without the use of contraception), and the result their pregnancies? Or is their 
folly seeking abortion as the answer, and the result death? Given the attitude against so-called 
“race suicide,” I am inclined to think the latter; in either event, the film suggests that women are 
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not fit to be make reproductive decisions on their own and that women cannot effectively control 
their own desires, bodies, and reproductive capacities. This, in turn, could tell us something of 
the film’s attitude toward abortion: if a woman can’t control her reproductive sexuality and is 
prone to committing such “folly” as becoming pregnant or having an abortion, then perhaps 
abortion should be illegal and should be discouraged to prevent her from making further poor 
decisions. The implications of “folly” as a lighthearted act of foolishness downplays the 
seriousness of women’s reproductive decisions and places the burden of guilt with he who 
performs the serious offense against reproduction: the abortionist.  
Even when we know that the burden of reproductive responsibility lies with the abortion 
practitioner, it is unclear whether the film means to suggest that all abortionists are bad, or just 
those who provide abortions to women deemed by some authority as those who should be having 
children, or just those who perform abortions to profit off of vulnerable women (as opposed to 
those who, historically speaking, wished to help women terminate their pregnancies safely, if 
those women wished to do so). What we do know, however, is that Race Suicide emphasizes 
eugenic concerns, and that the doctor being investigated as a bad abortionist has a thick Slavic or 
otherwise Eastern European-sounding accent—a foreign accent. Thus, considering the 1924 
Johnson-Reed Act, which was aimed at restricting the number of Southern and Eastern 
Europeans allowed to immigrate to the United States, we have a character who himself reads as a 
dysgenic threat due to his ethnicity. Thus, we see a combination of problematic details that form 
a chicken-or-egg type of scenario that is certainly not positive either way: either abortion is bad, 
and therefore the abortionist needs to be represented as ethnic is order to “read” as bad and 
render largely secretive abortions visible; or, Eastern European immigrants are bad and already 
represent race suicide, so they may as well be associated with abortion to help make the race 
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suicide point more obvious. Eugenics only otherwise registers in this film in one character, Ann 
Martin, who has had three abortions that purportedly fall under the rubric of race suicide; Ann is 
a working-class woman who is married to a gas station owner who wishes to be a father. By the 
standards of the films from the late teens, Ann would qualify as someone who should be 
practicing birth control, and the only reason that her abortions might be considered race suicide 
is because her husband wants children (although she does not, as her mother died in childbirth 
and she is terrified of pregnancy)—a line of reasoning that hearkens back to Where Are My 
Children?. Beyond these cursory acknowledgements of eugenics and race suicide, the main 
focus of the film is vilifying bad abortion; rather than being a eugenic film, eugenics function 
primarily here to help characterize abortion as negative and harmful.  
The test cases for showing Von Hertsen and his cohort’s level of criminality involve 
Florence Davis, a working-class girl seeking an abortion after being impregnated by her 
boyfriend, who is also the son of her wealthy employer; and Lynn Morris, the daughter of 
Florence’s employer, who helps with the investigation into Von Hertsen. The film becomes even 
more clearly exploitative when Ann Martin is asked to testify against Von Hertsen, Von 
Hertsen’s gang goes to the gas station to kill Ann, but they accidentally kill Florence by mistake. 
Meanwhile, Lynn poses as a woman in need of an abortion in order to gather evidence on Von 
Hertsen (much like the real-life Chicago Times journalist), is discovered as a decoy, kidnapped, 
and threatened with death. The real investigators save her just in time, however, and Von Hertsen 
kills Dr. Randall (another bad abortionist who threatened Von Hertsen into working for him in 
exchange for his legal aid at the beginning of the film) instead and turns himself in.  
Assumedly, Von Hertsen will receive some sort of legal punishment for his criminal 
activity, although perhaps of a lessened nature due to his eventual cooperation in busting his own 
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abortion crime ring. However, for a film that purports to be about the criminal nature of the 
abortionist and efforts to stop and punish his activity, those who are really punished instead are 
the women who undergo abortions: Ann must cope with the fact that her husband, previously 
unaware of her activities, now knows the truth about their childlessness (much like Richard 
Walton), and Florence is dead. The real problem of the film, so it seems, is that women do have 
reproductive agency—contrary to what the opening intertitle would suggest—and do choose 
abortion, and this problem trumps that of malpracticioners and seedy crime rings. 
Malpractitioners like Von Hertsen are ultimately presented as problems with solutions, where as 
the problem of women wanting and having abortions does not seem to have an apparent solution. 
In this way, Race Suicide masquerades as a progressive film when, in fact, it has more to say 
about denying reproductive agency than it does about promoting abortion reform.  
Del Frazier’s Unborn Souls (1939), while not eugenically grounded, similarly treats the 
problem of the abortion crime ring.  Unlike Race Suicide, Unborn Souls makes no pretense about 
being educational to any degree, and from its opening intertitles, it claims to treat the real 
problem of bad abortionists without connecting its content to any specific real case. Additionally, 
it obscures any sense of female reproductive agency and choice even more so than does the 
intertitle foreword to Race Suicide: 
[…] Unfortunately, as in every walk of life, there are parasites in the profession 
who thrive upon the life blood of the unfortunate. Among these are the quacks 
who prey upon the frailties and fears of expectant mothers. These pseudo doctors 
under varying degrees of skill and cleanliness perform illegal operations and leave 
their victims with broken bodies and greater misery. 
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Holding no brief for or against the subject of dissimulation of information 
regarding birth control, this picture is dedicated to the men in and out of the 
profession who are doing their honest best to eradicate this evil.  
Immediately, we notice a distinction similar to that established in Race Suicide between doctors 
who aim to help their patients and those who aim to harm them—or who, at least, do not care if 
they end up harming their patients. It is clear from phrases such as “parasites…who thrive 
upon…life blood,” “prey upon…expectant mothers,” and of course, “pseudo doctors [who] 
perform illegal operations” that the “quacks” being referred to are abortionists whose shoddy 
operation skills destroy lives. Again, however, we are given no real motive for these doctors’ 
choices to “prey upon” pregnant women, and are left to assume that it is not purely out of malice 
but for monetary gain (combined with apathy) that they do so. Additionally, Unborn Souls fails 
to specify whether any of those doctors working to “eradicate this evil” are safe and ethical 
abortion providers. Given that the bad doctors are the ones harming pregnant women and the 
good doctors are fighting to stop the actions of the bad ones, the film leaves little room in this 
characterization for any sense of reproductive agency on the part of the pregnant woman in 
question—or any reproductive women—especially considering that abortion is the issue at hand. 
Whereas reproductive agency and the capacity for choice was downplayed for women in Race 
Suicide, this agency and capacity for choice does not even exist in Unborn Souls. Through 
describing women as “unfortunate” and “victims,” combined with the fact that they are dealing 
with “quacks who prey upon the frailties and fears of expectant mothers,” the film leads the 
viewer to believe that no woman would even think of choosing abortion; rather, it is something 
that dastardly medical practitioners force upon women or scare them into thinking that they 
want.  
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 The action in Unborn Souls begins with a conversation about birth control between 
District Attorney Thomas Maynard and one of the “good” doctors who helps save women who 
have undergone botched abortions. In this conversation, the doctor is trying to convince Maynard 
that something must be done about the unethical doctors described in the foreword, as well as 
that birth control information is not inherently harmful to young people. Maynard disagrees, 
arguing that giving birth control information to young people—young women in particular—
allows them to be “just as promiscuous as they please.” The doctor counters, however, by 
asserting that “[i]f parents instill into their children the proper respect for the moral and social 
order, then birth control information cannot be detrimental to their behavior,” and brings 
Maynard along to witness a surgical attempt to save a young girl after a botched abortion. 
Maynard cannot stomach the surgical spectacle, and the girl cannot be saved. This opening 
sequence previews one of the plot conflicts to come: Maynard’s own daughter, Helen, becomes 
pregnant as a result of her ignorance about birth control, seeks out an abortion, and becomes 
embroiled in the very abortion crime ring that those on the side of the law wish to break up.  
 When Helen learns that she is pregnant, she does not tell her parents, but rather her friend 
Peggy Blackburn, a nurse. When Peggy asks Helen, “Have you done anything to prevent having 
a baby?,” Helen responds by bursting into tears, indicating that Helen obviously had not taken 
any precautions; given the position of her father on birth control education, Helen likely did not 
know what precautions were available nor how to go about protecting herself. Not desiring to 
carry through with her pregnancy, Helen seeks out an abortion practitioner, which introduces the 
audiences to two very different abortion providers. Doctor Russell Kent, the doctor who Helen 
visits, is an ethical doctor who primarily spends his time operating on women who need medical 
help after other doctors “bungled” the initial abortion procedure—doctors like Dr. Martin Paris, 
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who specializes in “women’s disorders.” We know that Kent must be a primary abortion 
provider in addition to being a doctor willing to help women with post-abortion health issues 
because he is the first doctor Helen approaches, and he is willing to help her. And yet, when 
another women comes into Kent’s office asking for birth control, his nurse informs her that “Dr. 
Kent is not that kind of doctor.” These conflicting pieces of information are important in so far as 
they further illustrate the film’s confused and ambiguous stance on safe abortions. Dr. Kent is a 
well-respected member of his community who is presented as the hero of the film for his efforts 
to bust Dr. Paris’ abortion crime ring and see Paris tried and convicted. Although Paris dies in a 
spectacular car crash and never stands trial, he still receives punishment for his crimes through 
his death. Paris is clearly portrayed as a doctor fitting the opening description of a vile 
abortionist who preys upon women, and his death reads as fitting punishments for his crimes. 
The film’s stance on Paris is clear. For Kent, however, the film’s stance is unclear, as is, 
similarly, Kent’s sense of what is allowable and what is not when it comes to women’s 
reproductive options.  
It seems contradictory that Kent, for example, will perform abortions and lend medical 
aid to women post-abortion, yet is not “that kind of doctor” who will provides women with 
information on contraception when they seek it. As a medical professional who deals with the 
aftermath of botched abortions, one would think that Kent of all people would understand the 
importance of sharing his knowledge of contraception so as to theoretically prevent a woman’s 
need for abortion services. Furthermore, given that abortions are illegal and Kent nonetheless 
performs them, it does not make much sense for Kent to be leading the charge for Paris’ 
indictment, since he is assumedly performing the same illegal actions as Paris. And yet, placing 
someone like Kent—a good abortionist—in the position to lead the charge against someone like 
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Paris—a bad abortionist—is precisely what the film suggests in the opening intertitle. It would 
seem, then, as though the film promotes safe abortions performed by ethical health care 
providers in spite of their illegality. However, I would argue that the criminal subplot focuses the 
main attention of the film on thwarting the sensationalistically bad doctor’s criminal activities to 
the point that the positive and progressive moral message is lost along with any sense of 
women’s reproductive agency in the film. 
 Here is a brief synopsis of Dr. Paris’s additional criminal activities: when Paris is 
threatened by Mr. Givens, a patient’s husband, and informed that Givens will go to the 
authorities if anything happens to his wife, Paris has Givens murdered to keep him quiet. 
Eventually, Mrs. Mary Givens, who had previously been a supporter of Paris, finds out about her 
husband’s murder and learns that Paris is trying to frame Kent for malpractice. She ends up 
saving Kent’s reputation and sacrificing her own life to avenge her husband by getting Paris into 
her car and speeding off a cliff.  As in Guilty Parents and Gambling With Souls, abortion is 
characterized as a crime that begets other crimes; however, the emphasis placed on the criminal 
murder aspects of the plot obscures abortion as the real issue even as these crimes are directly 
related to abortion.  
Even the ending of the film, which recalls the conversation between Thomas Maynard 
and the doctor earlier on, obscures the issue of abortion. In the closing scene, Helen, who 
narrowly escaped being operated upon by Paris—and who may or may not have ultimately had 
an abortion—exclaims to Kent, “Oh doctor! Don’t forget that information about what every new 
bride should know!,” which suggests that promoting birth control education (amongst married 
women), along with foiling “bad” abortion providers, are the most important messages in the 
film. The birth control angle would at least be somewhat positive if any real information were 
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shared, but this is not the case. Furthermore, the birth control angle raises questions about the 
“goodness” of Kent, whose office refuses to provide such information, but this ambiguity is 
never addressed. Given the foci of the film, however, the discrepancies surrounding Kent are 
downplayed, and Unborn Souls not only ultimately confirms the morally ambiguous status of 
safe abortions, but indicates that this ambiguity is unimportant—or at least too complex and 
touchy a subject to address and investigate in any meaningful way. The film’s dedication to its 
contradictory narratives and their attendant ambiguity undercut the stated intent of the Unborn 
Souls—and, in a way, makes reproductive choice seem totally irrelevant.  
 
*** 
 
 From these two types of crime films, we can see that just because abortion is a delicate 
subject, it is still important enough to engage with in filmic narrative despite—or perhaps 
because of—its polarizing and political nature. On the other hand, we can see these filmmakers 
struggle with how to represent and discuss a subject that perceive will face severe scrutiny. We 
also see two options for how to deal with female characters who wield reproductive agency: strip 
them of it, as in Race Suicide and Unborn Souls; or punish them for it, as in Guilty Parents and 
Gambling With Souls. As we move into the mainstream films of the 1930s and 1940s, the issue 
of abortion remains, but as I will examine in Chapter 4, new ways of dealing with the topic of 
abortion while adhering to the strictures of the Production Code emerge. While maintaining the 
trope of vilifying the woman with reproductive agency, as was introduced in the films from the 
1910s and intensified in the abortion exploitation films of the 1930s, the classical melodramas of 
the 1940s achieve a new level of visually representing abortion that moves away from the 
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implicit signification of the deathbed representations we have seen thus far and helps abortion to 
read more readily as such without explicitly calling it by name. From the depiction of more 
easily representable crimes in the 1930s, we move toward attempts to represent the central crime 
of abortion itself through the abortion spectacle. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
The Visible and the Violent: Classical Hollywood Melodrama and the Abortion Spectacle 
 
In the abortion scene from John M. Stahl’s Leave Her to Heaven (1945), Ellen Berent 
(Gene Tierney), the anti-hero protagonist, stands poised at the top of a flight of stairs, 
contemplating the fall she is about to willingly take. Clad here in a floor-length light blue 
negligée and matching heeled slippers, no physical indication of her pregnancy is noticeable. At 
the top of the stairs, we see a close-up of Ellen’s determined stare followed by a reverse shot of 
the staircase. The camera then cuts to an extreme close-up of Ellen’s slip-on heels as she slides 
the toe of one shoe beneath a gap in the rug and gingerly removes her foot. This series of shot-
reverse-shots draws out the deliberate moment and heightens the air of suspense and anxiety—
especially for viewers who anticipate what is about to happen. The camera remains trained on the 
top of the stairs as Ellen disappears from view and falls, screaming, down the staircase, leaving 
the telltale slipper behind as evidence of the “accident.” We then cut to the foot of the stairs 
where Ellen’s body lies motionless as her family members rush to her aid; as we learn from the 
doctor shortly thereafter, Ellen will make a full recovery, but the baby couldn’t be saved.  
In this climactic scene from John M. Stahl’s domestic melodrama Leave Her to Heaven, 
Ellen decides to end her pregnancy and takes its termination into her hands. What is clearly an 
abortion—and what is recognized as such by censors81—is identified in the film as merely a 
miscarriage. Indeed, the implication or deliberate mislabeling of abortion is not new to the 
abortion melodrama of the 1930s and 1940s. One point of commonality amongst the abortion 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 See the letter from Joseph Breen to Col. Jason Joy, 12 December 1944.     
 
	   192 
melodrama, the reproductive social problem film, and the abortion exploitation film is that 
abortion is implied: explicit talk or depiction of abortion would cause these films to risk 
censorship under either the National Board of Censorship, state and municipal boards, or the 
Production Code, and thus, the use of implication is all that is left to filmmakers and production 
companies. The spectacular abortion domestic melodramas of the 1930s and 1940s that 
constitute a movement within the larger contraception/abortion genre are no exception to the rule 
of implication. As the output of major production studios MGM, RKO, and Twentieth Century-
Fox, these melodramas are held to the standards of the Production Code and must necessarily 
deal in implication and innuendo in order to address topics such as birth control and abortion.82 
One crucial difference between this movements and the others, however, is that the melodrama 
only implies abortion verbally while it obviously, visually, and viscerally depicts the abortion or 
abortion-related surgery itself. 
This chapter is built upon three fascinating and highly problematic films: Richard 
Boleslawski’s Men in White (1934), Dorothy Arzner’s Christopher Strong (1933), and John M. 
Stahl’s Leave Her to Heaven (1945). Richard Boleslawski’s Men in White (1934) stands as a 
transitional piece poised between the exploitation tradition and the spectacular melodrama. It 
features a different type of abortion spectacle than the other two films in this chapter. Clark 
Gable stars as Dr. George Ferguson, an idealistic young doctor who cheats on his fiancée (Myrna 
Loy) with Barbara (Elizabeth Allan), a nurse at his hospital. Barbara ends up pregnant as a result 
of the tryst, but instead of encountering the post-affair, post-abortion Barbara half-dead in a 
hospital bed (as we encounter Carolyn from Gambling With Souls, for example), we encounter 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 As mentioned earlier, those films produced in and after 1934 were held more strictly to the 
tenets of the Productions Code. Although the Code was introduced in 1930, its earnest 
enforcement did not begin until 1934. Additionally, these three films were all produced by major 
studios and were, therefore, subject to Production Code censorship.  
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her on the operating table as George is about attempt to save her after her botched abortion. 
While there is still quite a bit of causal narrative elision in this film, it does recover one of the 
crucial pieces of the sex/pregnancy divide by depicting, instead of merely alluding to, the post-
abortion operation. 
While Men in White presents the post-abortion reproductive female body as spectacle 
during Barbara’s surgery scene, Christopher Strong and Leave Her to Heaven make, for the first 
time, a spectacle of the act of abortion itself. Dorothy Arzner’s Christopher Strong (1933) and 
John M. Stahl’s Leave Her to Heaven (1945) up the ante in their successful attempts at depicting 
abortion by moving it out of the back alley and the hospital and making it violently spectacular 
and hidden in plain sight, as it were. In both films, we witness the female protagonists’ acts of 
abortion as they occur: Christopher Strong’s Lady Cynthia Darrington (Katharine Hepburn) 
deliberately crashes her plane, and Leave Her to Heaven’s Ellen Berent throws herself down a 
flight of stairs. Although no one in either film uses the term “abortion,” there is no doubt to 
Ellen, to Cynthia, nor to the viewer that abortions—albeit less conventional ones—are precisely 
what these women performed.  
In this chapter, I explore exactly how these three films were able to negotiate censors’ 
mandates in order to arrive at final versions that ultimately demonstrate that it is acceptable to 
talk about pregnancy but not to show it, and to show abortion but not to talk about it. The shift to 
the use of abortion spectacle, such as Ellen’s, that I examine in this chapter marks a very distinct 
departure from the premium placed upon the didactic in reproductive social problem films—and 
even from the mere trappings of the didactic in abortion exploitation films. As a result, the 
1930s-1940s abortion melodrama, with its dearth of educational content and its focus on female 
audiences and, uses abortion spectacle to forge a dialectical relationship between female 
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character psychology and choice as a social issue. In this way, Men in White, Christopher 
Strong, and Leave Her to Heaven stand as a set of abortion films that, through their spectacular 
displays of violence toward pregnant female bodies, move the contraception and abortion film 
away from even the pretense of scientific education and completely eschew any rhetoric of 
choice in favor of socially blind mainstream entertainment.   
 
From Exploitation to Mainstream: Surgical Spectacle in Men in White  
 Unlike contemporaneous abortion exploitation films, Richard Boleslawski’s Men in 
White (1934) harbors no pretentions at its outset toward being educational—scientifically, 
morally, or otherwise—nor is the plot initially set up to indicate that abortion will even be an 
issue. Generically, the film is a melodrama centered around its protagonist, Dr. George Ferguson 
(Clark Gable): George is a young, idealistic doctor who struggles to balance his time between his 
work at the hospital and his wealthy, vivacious socialite fiancée, Laura Hudson (Myrna Loy). 
With all of the sickness and despair surrounding him, the stalwart George would prefer to be at 
the hospital where he is needed than out with Laura. Although he privileges his work over his 
relationship, George is nonetheless presented as a character with a strong moral bearing through 
his commitment to his patients’ well-being. Laura, although she loves and tries to support 
George, grows frustrated with making solo social appearances and use guilt to persuade George 
to spend more time with her, which only seems to push George further away.  
 Enter Nurse Barbara Denham (Elizabeth Allan): the female version of George. Similarly 
idealistic and committed to her patients, Barbara quickly falls for George; after a particularly 
hard day at work for George and a social brush-off from Laura for the evening, George and 
Barbara find themselves alone in George’s office under the pretext of George loaning Barbara 
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some medical notes for one of her upcoming exams. Notes are exchanged, but Barbara must 
linger a few minutes, lest she get discovered in the doctor’s office by her head nurse who 
happens to be right outside George’s office door. Bonding instantly over their concern for 
humanity and their loneliness, the two share a kiss. George immediately apologizes, tells Barbara 
that it’s safe to leave the office and encourages her to do so, and heads off to check on his 
patients. Barbara does not immediately leave, however—instead, she walks over to the office 
window where George stood minutes earlier, and we are given a medium shot of Barbara, bathed 
in the stripes of moonlight filtered through the window blinds, as she contemplates whether to 
stay or to exit. She leaves the window and heads for the door, but stops before exiting, sits down 
on the office bed, and takes off her nurse’s hat as George’s still-burning cigarette emits a trail of 
smoke from the ashtray near the bed. The next we see of Barbara, she is severely ill after a 
botched abortion attempt. George takes it upon himself to treat her, and the spectacle of 
Barbara’s surgery follows. Despite George’s best efforts, Barbara dies in a hospital bed shortly 
after her surgery.  
 But how do we get from one kiss to an abortion gone wrong? As is typical of the 
contraception and abortion film, Men in White elides many causal steps between George and 
Barbara’s kiss and Barbara’s post-abortion hospitalization. Barbara’s decision to stay in 
George’s office implies that she desires more than just a kiss, as the film suggests with Barbara’s 
removal of her hat and with the smoking cigarette that stands in for the smoldering desire 
between George and Barbara (and which also perhaps foreshadows a post-coital cigarette to 
come). When Barbara turns up at the hospital later, the audience learns retroactively that she and 
George must have engaged in intercourse and that he is responsible for her pregnancy. This type 
of causal narrative compression certainly recalls the problems attendant in educational narrative 
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contraception and abortion films of the 1910s, their scientific counterparts from the 1920s, and 
their exploitation counterparts from the 1930s: how could women possibly learn anything 
accurate about sex and its potential consequences when filmic narratives jump from ostensibly 
benign acts such as kissing, taking a promenade in a garden, or going out to a party, straight to 
severe consequences such as pregnancy or death from abortion?  
 I contend that audience members couldn’t learn anything useful or factual from these 
gross causal elisions. But unlike the other films in this study, which made more or less of a claim 
to actually be educational, Men in White is not attempting to educate women about 
contraception, safe sex, or safe abortions. Although causal elisions have plagued the 
contraception/abortion film since the transitional era and the beginnings of the classical 
Hollywood narrative, the melodramas of the 1930s and 1940s mark a serious decline in the 
presentation of choice as contrasted with the social problem films—and even the exploitation 
films—discussed earlier.   
 In Men in White, George’s affair with Barbara and her eventual abortion function to fuel 
the flames of melodrama: what will happen when a caring doctor cheats on his fiancée, 
impregnates another woman, and then is faced with the task of saving her life? Will he take 
responsibility for his actions? Will his fiancée take him back? Will he uphold his Hippocratic 
oath and do all he can—or more—for his mistress, even if it means losing his fiancée? As I will 
elaborate, these questions actually draw abortion out from behind the shadows in a way that does 
not involve accusations, murders, or courtrooms, and that can, in some ways, be seen as a 
positive in the representation of reproductive agency. Overall, however, this small gain is 
overshadowed by the punishment of women who choose abortion. As Stanley Cavell observes in 
Contesting Tears, the melodramas of the unknown woman—and, I would add, abortion 
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melodramas—“are among those films known to our culture, from the time of their making until 
the present, as ‘women’s films’ or ‘tearjerkers’” that are “treated as works to be somewhat 
condescended to” (“Contesting” 7). I wish to play for a moment on Cavell’s phrase, 
“condescended to.” Cavell identifies condescension as felt by scholars toward these films; he 
takes issue with this scholarly stance, as he valorizes the melodramas in his study as worthwhile. 
I would like to use the idea of condescension a little differently, in so far that I argue the abortion 
melodrama condescends to its female audience—the very audience, as Cavell reminds us, to 
whom these films are targeted. In this way, condescension aids the films in this chapter in their 
erasure of education and choice by depicting reproductively liberated women and then violently 
punishing them. These questions take precedence over questions about the nature of Barbara’s 
abortion and emphasize the film’s melodramatic nature over any educational message or aim. In 
this way, these abortion melodramas void the films of any progressive political message or 
message of choice. 
 Furthermore, even though causal elisions have been made in the case of Barbara, there 
are nonetheless more pieces of the puzzle filled in here than typically have been supplied in any 
of the previous contraception/abortion films, with the exception of the circumstances of Betty’s 
pregnancy in Guilty Parents. In Guilty Parents, we are very clearly shown Al bringing a drunken 
and unconscious Betty into the bedroom; the next we know of Betty, she is missing and 
eventually shows up at the abortionist’s office, which we know because Al has tailed her there. 
We are never explicitly told that Al raped Betty, but we are given more innuendo in their 
situation than would otherwise exist from simply showing the two flirting, followed by Betty 
turning up pregnant (as we see with Lillian from Where Are My Children? and Carolyn from 
Gambling With Souls, amongst others).  
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 With Barabra and George, too, we are given an extra link in the causal chain beyond the 
wide-eyed admiration Barbara shows for George when treating a young diabetic patient together 
or the kiss shared in George’s office. Men in White clearly depicts Barbara’s struggle between 
squashing any potential for a sexual liaison by leaving George’s office and making it clear that 
she desires a sexual liaison by staying; it also clearly presents Barbara’s ultimate choice to 
remain and begin undressing (as indicated tacitly by the removal of her nurse’s hat). Through 
these representations of struggle and choice, Men in White simplifies the guessing game that 
viewers must play as they try to deduce whether, in the near future, Barbara and George will 
sleep together or, retrospectively, whether or not they have slept together—an affirmation of 
which would potentially link that sexual act with Barbara’s pregnancy.  Even though the causal 
link between kissing and pregnancy/abortion is made comparatively clearer in Men in White, it 
still remains enough of an implication so as to avoid transgressing the Code’s stance on adultery, 
found in Section II—Sex: “Adultery, sometimes necessary plot material, must not be explicitly 
treated, or justified, or presented attractively” (Qtd. in Leff and Simmons 287). I am making a 
loose reading of “adultery” here, for while George is not technically married, he is engaged to be 
married and is publicly known to be in a serious and monogamous relationship with Laura 
Hudson. But even as the rules for depicting seduction more generally go, the scene still passes: 
“[seduction] should never be more than suggested, and only when essential for the plot, and even 
then never shown by explicit method” (Qtd. in Leff and Simmons 288). Whether Barbara and 
George’s tryst qualifies as adultery or seduction, it is not explicitly shown, and, as we see later in 
the film, not justified (Barbara and George both apologize to Laura) or made to seem attractive 
(Barbara dies). 
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 As I mentioned, the next time we see Barbara after she has sex with George, she is at the 
hospital as a patient suffering from a medical procedure gone wrong. At this point, the viewer 
must work backwards to deduce not only that George and Barbara indeed had sex in the a 
previous scene, but also that Barbara become pregnant as a result and that the illness she 
currently suffers is from a botched abortion attempt. None of these plot points are outright 
stated—a move that further codes abortion through implication and places the onus on the 
audience to read abortion into the film. The audience is given a set of clues as the film progresses 
that help in the process of decoding the film’s earlier events. One such clue is the first 
conversation about Barbara’s condition, which is exchanged between George and one of 
Barbara’s fellow nurses. The nurse tells George that even though Barbara has been asking for 
him, he cannot go in to see her because, “[s]he’s quiet now. If you go in there she might start 
talking. You wouldn’t want that, would you?” Here, the nurse implies that the affair has been 
kept a secret and its result—Barbara’s pregnancy and abortion—have been kept a secret even 
from George, who we have cause to believe to be the other responsible party, as he is the only 
man with whom Barbara has even implicitly had intercourse. Furthermore, the nurse’s 
threatening tone suggests that George may want to keep the truth behind Barbara’s condition a 
secret or risk losing Laura and perhaps damage his reputation. The string of questions that 
comprise George’s response betrays a gamut of emotions ranging from shock and confusion to 
support, concern, and responsibility: “Why didn’t she come to me? Why didn’t she tell me? Why 
did she keep away?” The nurse takes responsibility for Barbara’s decision to leave George out of 
the situation by explaining, “It’s my fault. I told her that you were in love with someone else and 
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engaged to be married, to keep away from you,” and keep away Barbara did—until, that is, 
medical attention became necessary.83  
The nurse upholds her dedication to protecting Barbara’s and George’s secret, at least 
immediately thereafter when discussing Barbara’s case with George’s superior and mentor, Dr. 
Hochberg. After explaining to Dr. Hochberg that Barbara has no relatives to notify, he asks, 
“And a man who…does she realize what’s happened?,” to which the nurse replies, “I suppose 
so.” When Hochberg inquires as to the identity of the man involved, the nurse maintains, “I don’t 
know.” Even when discussing what has become obvious for the audience—Barbara had sex, 
became pregnant, and had an abortion—implication remains the rule of the day. There is a 
certain level of condescension in Hochberg’s query of “does she realize what’s happened?,” 
suggesting that Barbara, a nursing student and member of the medical profession, does not 
understand that sex may lead to pregnancy and that an improperly performed abortion may lead 
to infection, illness and even death. Yet, his question also serves as a key meta-question for the 
audience: does the viewer realize what’s happened? Has the viewer been able to follow the chain 
of implicit events and deduce that Barbara and George slept together, that George impregnated 
her, and that a secret botched abortion has landed the now fever-ridden and delirious Barbara in 
the hospital? Hochberg’s question provides a moment of reflection for the viewer to process 
recently acquired information and fill in any gaps in the causal chain before the plot moves 
forward and we encounter the film’s surgical spectacle.  
It is also crucial to note from these conversations that no blame for Barbara’s abortion-
related condition is placed on any one individual: not Barbara, not George, not the unnamed 
doctor who performed her abortion—a move that differs significantly from both the films that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 Barbara’s initial ignorance about George’s relationship also functions to clear her of any 
adultery accusations. 
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precede it in this study as well as from those others that I examine in this chapter. If any blame is 
assigned for Barbara’s illness and eventual, unavoidable death, it is assigned to the limitations of 
current medical science. At various points in the film, Both George and Dr. Hochberg bemoan 
the fact that even with obvious and marked improvements in medical diagnosis and treatment, 
there is still so much left unknown and so many patients that they are incapable of saving. 
Barbara falls into this category of casualties that result from medicine’s current limitations; if 
only medical science could provide them with more treatment options, then Barbara—and 
women like her who need post-abortion care—could have been saved.  
This particular instance in the film is progressive. I contend that through the film’s 
removal of the possibility of blame from any human agent, this new perspective places emphasis 
upon the importance of what should be medicine’s ability to save more women from 
complications, such as infection, that often result from unhygienic and poorly performed 
abortions. Additionally, this perspective also seems to refrain from judgment regarding Barbara’s 
decision to keep her pregnancy from George and to carry through with an abortion. In this way, 
at least, Men in White seems to limit the ambiguity surrounding its stance on abortion in a way 
that most other contraception and abortion films within the parameters of this study do not: Men 
in White blames neither the woman, nor the man who impregnated her, nor the abortionist. In 
this way, the film suggests that the taboo nature of abortion and instances of its shoddy 
administration are the problem—not abortion itself as a choice.  
Such an anomalously progressive view in mainstream entertainment cinema is undercut, 
or at least mitigated, however, by the facts that Barbara is ultimately still punished with death 
and that her post-abortion surgery—and her reproductive body—become the fodder for violent 
bodily spectacle in Men in White’s surgical scene. Thus, in spite of this progressive aspect, Men 
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in White as a whole does not live up to its potential to differentiate itself as a film that could 
advance choice. The operating scene that follows the nurse’s exchanges with George and Dr. 
Hochberg provides more context with which the audience can reconstruct that which happened 
earlier. This scene begins with a close up of nurses’ hands pulling sterilized gowns out of a steam 
chamber and lowering the operating table, which is followed by procedural shots of various 
characters preparing for surgery: doctors scrubbing their hands and arms and rinsing them in 
basins, nurses clothing the doctors and each other in sterilized gloves and gowns before placing 
sterilized equipment on trays. For all of the time that the film spends lamenting the limitations of 
modern medical science (and it does this quite frequently), it also makes good on opportunities 
such as this to display improvements and advancements in medical facilities and procedures. 
Although never stated, the surgical preparatory procedural shots, at least on one level, convey to 
the viewer how much safer an abortion would be at a clean, modern hospital, as opposed to in a 
clinic of the type depicted in the educational and exploitation contraception/abortion films or in 
one’s home. Even though George—who, with Dr. Hochberg, performs Barbara’s operation—
cannot guarantee a positive outcome for Barbara, he nonetheless feel confidence in his skill as a 
surgeon (even if not in medical technology) when he responds to Barbara’s pre-operation query 
of “What are they going to do to me?” by assuring her that “[t]here’s nothing to be afraid of” as 
he promises to remain by her side throughout the surgical procedure.  
 After this exchange—filled with close ups and medium close ups that increase the 
dramatic effect of pre-operation preparations—the camera height, angle, and placement changes 
dramatically. Instead of the close shots and cinematographic continuity that the film has 
maintained up until this point, the operation scene cuts to an aerial shot looking straight 
downward from what appears to be a large round ceiling window. Soon, the film reveals that this 
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window only forms the ceiling of the operating room and not the hospital itself: it is a viewing 
window, and around it are 14 chairs where spectators, likely other doctors, are seated. Below in 
the operating room, we can see through this large viewing area an empty surgical bed meant for 
Barbara, as well as several medical professionals milling about.  
As Barbara is wheeled into view, the shot cuts back to the operating room and Barbara is 
moved from her bed to the operating table. Nurses then begin to prepare her for surgery. At first, 
they are staged in a way that blocks her abdomen—the surgical site—but when they step away, 
Barbara’s mid-section is revealed for a few seconds; just as a nurse begins to apply ointment to 
Barbara’s abdomen, another nurse conveniently wheels a large lamp into the shot that effectively 
blots out the surgical site. Immediately after, however, the scene cuts to the same aerial shot as 
was used moments before, only this time we can see (although not in great detail) Barbara and 
her uncovered midriff on the operating table below. A cut back to the operating room returns us 
to Barbara and the lamp obstruction, but the following shot from the operating room floor 
upward reveals over one dozen spectators above who are primed to observe the surgery. The 
visual analogy that this shot creates between the intra-filmic and extra-filmic viewer functions to 
both connect and disconnect the two in a way that heightens the effect of Barbara’s reproductive 
bodily spectacle.  
Right before Barbara is given anesthesia, she says to George in a close-up that begins 
with just Barbara in the shot but ends with the couple together, “George, darling. I loved you. I 
don’t care.” Laura, who, at Hochberg’s suggestion, waits in the operating room to observe the 
surgery (he wants her to have a better idea of what George does so that she will stop hounding 
George about spending too much time at the hospital), overhears Barbara’s confession of love, 
and judging from the tears that well up in her eyes, realizes George and Barbara’s affair. The 
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surgical spectacle continues with a shot/reverse shot sequence between a close up of Barbara and 
and close up of the machine that regulates her anesthesia. This is followed by another shot from 
the operating room floor upward, again from Barbara’s point of view; we can tell even more 
clearly now that we are seeing the spectators from Barbara’s perspective because the image 
begins to blur as Barbara loses consciousness from the anesthesia. The faces above stare down at 
her through the viewing window. Once the anesthesia has taken effect, the surgery begins: Dr. 
Hochberg asks for a scalpel and begins the incision. Although we are not shown the actual 
incision site once the operation is in progress, we can clearly see intimidating surgical tools. The 
operation scene continues in this manner for over a minute, during which Laura, weak from 
some combination of the news she just received and the sight of the surgery, faints.  
The film never clarifies why the crowd has gathered to observe Barbara’s surgical 
procedure, and this is thus left open to audience interpretation. It is possible that, with such a 
high-tech and elaborate-looking viewing set-up, that it is common practice for other doctors, 
nurses, and students in the hospital to view surgeries as their schedules allow. It is also possible 
that, given George’s good reputation as a humanitarian and up-and-coming medical scholar and 
practitioner, we are witnessing a version of the star system in practice84: just as fans of Clark 
Gable in 1934 will see a film that features him, so too will fans of Dr. George Ferguson flock to 
witness him perform a surgical procedure.85  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 For differing takes on the emergence and prominence of the star system in Hollywood, see 
Richard Dyer’s foundational Stars (1979) and Paul McDonald’s The Star System: Hollywood’s 
Production of Popular Identities (2000). While Dyer focuses more on the production and 
circulation of actors’ images, McDonald instead “combine[s] an understanding of industry and 
image” (2). 	  85	  Gable had gained popularity as an actor well before his award-winning role as Rhett Butler in 
Victor Fleming’s 1939 classic Gone with the Wind. He was signed by MGM in 1930, and with 
the help of starring opposite leading ladies like Norma Shearer, Carole Lombard, and Joan 
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There could, however, be other explanations for the crowd that have less to do with 
George’s medical prowess and more to do with Barbara. Firstly, even though the nurse I 
discussed earlier claims to have kept Barbara and George’s affair a secret, perhaps she—or 
someone else who knew the truth, such as Barbara, George, Dr. Hochberg, or another staff 
member who overheard the news—could have spread the rumor that George is operating on his 
mistress who, because of him, became pregnant and had a botched abortion. In this case, the 
crowd, interested in the scandal surrounding the ingénue nursing student and the morally upright 
and engaged doctor, may have flocked to the surgery for the sake of gossip. Alternatively, 
though, given how difficult the doctors anticipate saving Barbara will be and given the 
technological limitations on their abilities, it seems plausible that other medical professionals 
would want to witness what they hope will be a successful, life-saving post-abortion operation. 
Whatever the reason (or reasons) might be, this much is sure: the display of Barbara’s partially 
exposed reproductive body makes her both an erotic and a reproductive female bodily spectacle. 
The men and women gathered around to watch the surgical show—some clearly identifiable as 
doctors and nurses, some dressed in formal non-medical garb—are there to witness a bloody 
bodily female spectacle as the surgeons cut open Barbara’s abdomen.  
The one progressive aspect of Boleslawski’s use of spectacle here that does not happen in 
Christopher Strong or Leave Her to Heaven is that Barbara, while the objectified focus of the 
gaze of viewers both inside and outside of Men in White, can, at least until the anesthesia takes 
effect, look back at her viewers within the film. Even while lying supine on the operating table, 
Barbara is able to look up at the crowd gathered for her surgery and remind them, even if 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Crawford, he was already quite popular by the time he starred in Men in White. According to 
biographer Chrystopher J. Spicer, “By the end of 1931 Clark Gable was a star…In one year he 
laid the foundation for the next thirty years of his career” (68).  	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momentarily, that she is a person with agency and not just a medical subject or a statistic. Given 
the nature of her surgery, this act of looking back takes on even greater significance: it asserts 
that Barbara is also a person and not just a statistic in terms of women who choose abortion—
and that women do choose abortion, as Reagan’s research has shown. Furthermore, it reminds 
the various audiences that Barbara is a woman with both erotic and reproductive agency, as 
opposed to just being a passive object for others to look at and project their desires onto. 
Representing Barbara during the surgical scene as a woman with both reproductive and erotic 
agency recalls her earlier sex scene that lead to her pregnancy which helped to link desire, sex, 
and pregnancy. It also provides an example of a woman who, despite complications, is 
comfortable with this holistic identity, as evidenced by her public confession of love to George: 
“I loved you. I don’t care.” With this confession, Barbara suggests that she does not currently 
need to love or be in love with George in order to be accept her own sexualities; her assertion of 
“I don’t care” informs us that she does not regret her erotic or reproductive choices. It also shows 
how, despite Hollywood’s and the film’s attempts to divorce the erotic and the reproductive, 
Barbara does not see her erotic and reproductive sexualities as separate entities. 
However, even as the surgery scene uses a double-audience construct to allow Barbara to 
gaze back, her agency is undercut by the presentation of her reproductive body as spectacle. This 
scene also makes Men in White a noteworthy film to consider in terms of censorship, as the 
Production Code explicitly prohibits “[s]urgical operations,” as specified in Section XII—
Repellent Subjects (Leff and Simmons 289-290). However, the Code gives no further detail 
regarding type of surgery, circumstances of surgery, or precisely how much or what details of the 
surgery may be shown. I would argue that this surgical scene is passable under the Code because 
we the viewers do not see any of the gory details: incisions, blood, organs, etc. We still, 
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however, see more than we do in most other abortion and contraception films: the operating 
room, surgical instruments, exposed flesh, the preparatory procedures.86 Furthermore, although 
our viewing of the operation is restricted by creative mise-en-scene, the audience within the 
film’s vision is not restricted at all. Those gathered to view Barbara’s operation can see what we 
don’t, and they assumedly go on watching the surgery long after the scene has ended for the 
extra-filmic viewer. The surgical scene works to simultaneously conflate and distinguish the 
perspective of the intra-filmic and the extra-filmic audiences, relying upon an imaginative 
connection between the two to supplement what is obscured for the extra-filmic audience. In this 
way, Boleslawski is able to include the details of surgery and display female bodily spectacle 
without attracting criticism from censors.  
 Ultimately, there is no happy ending for even the woman who accepts both aspects of 
her sexuality—even when the film deliberately toys with the possibility of a classical Hollywood 
ending for Barbara. The day after Barbara’s surgery, George and Dr. Hochberg are out to dinner 
when a very somber but determined George announces,“[w]hen [Barbara] gets out [of the 
hospital], I’m going to marry her if she’ll have me.” Hochberg, as usual, tries to promote more 
work as the answer to George’s dilemma, but George persists: “Dr. Hochberg, you don’t know 
what this Denham girl’s up against. It isn’t as though she’s just a…[pause]…she’s a fine, 
sensitive girl. She’ll have nowhere to go and no one to turn to unless...[pause]…well, I’m going 
to marry her.” Dr. Hochberg seems amenable to this idea until George announces that he’s 
“going into practice” and leaving the research hospital. A few scenes later, George makes it clear 
that he doesn’t intend to marry Barbara because he loves her, but because it is the right and 
decent thing to do—even if he does have to sacrifice the woman he loves (who he ultimately 	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  Crane Wilbur’s 1934 Tomorrow’s Children caught a good deal of criticism, however, for its 
surgical scene. 	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sacrifices for his career anyway) and his medical career. What follows is the heated exchange 
George has with Laura about his decision to marry Barbara: 
Laura: And now you say you’re going to marry a girl you don’t care about? 
You’re going to let a casual incident rob you of all the things you think are 
important? 
George: It’s not a casual incident anymore, Laura.  
Laura: All right. Go ahead. Make your beautiful gesture. Marry her.  
George: I’m going to. 
Laura: Just because it’s the easiest way out. Because you’re afraid of what people 
will say about you. You’re a coward! You haven’t any backbone! 
George: I had no backbone when I let myself be talked out of a chance to work 
with Hochberg! I’m not doing this because I care what anybody says or thinks. 
I’m doing it because this girl’s life is smashed! And I’m going to help her to try 
and pick up the pieces and put them together again! 
 These conversations carry at least the possibility for a somewhat progressive ending 
wherein Barbara is saved from vilification and punishment. George’s determination to stick with 
Barbara—even though there is no longer the promise of a baby—certainly marks a departure 
from earlier contraception and abortion films where the man responsible for the woman’s 
pregnancy wants nothing to do with the woman once he realizes that she is pregnant and/or has 
had an abortion. George acts in a seemingly selfless way by deciding to leave the hospital—and 
even medicine, if need be—in order to provide for his wife. He is extremely respectful toward 
and complimentary of Barbara, and he clearly has a high opinion of her as an individual. Beneath 
all of this, however, lies a different masculinist agenda from those we have previously seen.  
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 While the men responsible for pregnancies in earlier contraception and abortion films 
abandon their lovers because they can, because it seems like the easy way out, and because they 
believe that women can simply be used for sex and then discarded, George’s masculinist 
assumptions work along different lines. George does not love Barbara, but he is willing to marry 
her for a few problematic reasons. Firstly, seeks marriage because Barbara is “a fine, sensitive 
girl,” and because of what she isn’t. George doesn’t finish the sentence detailing what Barbara is 
not: “It isn’t as though she’s just a…[pause]”. “Just a” what? Fling? Slut? Tramp? What George 
doesn’t call Barbara is the norm; Barbara, he believes, is the exception to that norm because she 
is “fine” and “sensitive.” Secondly, even though Barbara worked at the hospital in the first place 
because she was a nursing student, George wants to be with her because he believes that she is 
incapable of coming back from her ordeal and making a life for herself—more pertinently, she is 
incapable of doing so without a man’s help. He believes that she will need financial and social 
assistance that she cannot procure on her own. Lastly, Laura is right when she angrily informs 
George that he’s marrying Barbara because “…it’s the easiest way out. Because you’re afraid of 
what people will say about you. You’re a coward! You haven’t any backbone!” George’s 
reputation as a humanitarian doctor would certainly take a beating if people who formerly 
admired him were to discover that he cheated on his fiancée, impregnated his mistress who 
nearly died from a botched abortion, and then refused to marry the girl whose life he ruined. 
George, Dr. Hochberg, and the hospital rely upon George’s good reputation, and he would 
become a disappointment and embarrassment if he were to shun Barbara after all she had been 
through. Given all of George’s intermittent doubts throughout the film about the worth of 
practicing medicine if he can’t save everyone—“What good is it all? Why go on? We don’t 
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know anything—we’re only groping!”—, it would prove his doubts right if he couldn’t “save” 
Barbara by rescuing her reputation and providing her with a good life.  
 Here I would like to bring a key element of Ben Singer’s understanding of melodrama. 
As Singer explores in Melodrama and Modernity, melodrama is a reflection of the anxieties 
produced by modernity and modernization. Of classical melodrama, he argues that “[b]y 
maintaining the protagonist’s dramatic powerlessness, melodrama was able to function as a 
parable of modern anxiety” (Singer 137). Specifically, Singer examines the modern(ist) anxieties 
of technology and capitalism, but here I wish to extend the list of anxieties to maintaining 
reproductive control of women. Ostensibly, George is upset because he could not save Barbara, 
his patient. But more so, I read George’s melodramatic anxiety that stems from powerlessness as 
the result of his inability to control Barbara’s sense of reproductive agency. 	  
 Ultimately, Barbara is stripped of agency—but not in the manner common to other 
abortion/birth control films, and not in an obvious manner, either. Despite George’s fine 
intentions to save Barbara—both physically and socially—these intentions need not ever be 
realized, for Barbara dies with George at her side in a deathbed scene much like we have seen in 
several earlier contraception and abortion films. One could argue that her agency remains intact, 
as Barbara never apologizes for her actions—not to George in the operating room and not to 
Laura on her deathbed—which asserts over and again her own sense of choice. Even despite the 
absolution of Barbara’s guilt that the film purports—absolution which typically harms a 
woman’s sense of agency—Barbara’s agency is not lost because the blame is not shifted to 
another person, but rather to the failings of medical science; in this sense, I would argue that she 
maintains agency in this transferral because Barbara is a nurse at a research hospital and 
therefore indirectly helps to advance medical science. Instead, Barbara is stripped of her agency 
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through the assumption—George’s assumption, society’s assumption—that no woman who 
unapologetically makes the erotic and reproductive choices that she has made could possibly 
have a successful, independent life in the wake of such decisions. While Barbara is not explicitly 
vilified for her actions, she is vilified for not regretting her actions. She is vilified for thinking 
actions that should be understood as mistakes might instead be understood as choices.  
After Barbara breathes her last, George, affectionately poised by her side, closes her eyes 
for her. He tenderly lays his head on her hand, and he then stands up to lower her bed. Barbara’s 
last screen moments consist of a close up of her face—of her unseeing eyes—as it sinks into the 
lower left corner of the frame and out of sight. Light from an unseen window shines onto the 
opposite stark white wall of Barbara’s hospital room. The Barbara who once defiantly and 
unabashedly looked back at those who looked at her—at those who judged her—can look back 
no longer. Despite Men in White’s attempts at breaking out of the contraception/abortion film 
mold of its contemporaries through its depiction of the unapologetic Barbara, such as abortion 
exploitation films Guilty Parents and Gambling with Souls, it nonetheless ultimately uses 
spectacle to take a step further from presenting abortion as a valid choice—and even from 
presenting choice as valid at all.  
 
Reproductive Agency Up in Flames: Christopher Strong’s Spectacular Abortion 
While Men in White at least acknowledges the possibility of a woman feeling confident in 
her non-traditional erotic and reproductive sexual choices, Dorothy Arzner’s Christopher Strong 
(1933), based upon the Gilbert Frankau novel of the same name, opens by establishing a stark 
dichotomy between behavior to be imitated and behavior to be avoided in an erotic sexual 
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context.87 As the film commences, a group of revelers sets out upon a late night “treasure hunt” 
to find two people who would not otherwise fit in their company: “an attractive man who can 
swear he’s been married for over five years, has always been faithful to his wife, and is not 
ashamed to admit it,” and “an attractive girl of over twenty who would swear she’s never had a 
love affair.” These requirements imply, of course, that the present group is comprised of 
adulterous men and sexually active unmarried women. This group includes, among others, the 
title character’s twenty-year-old daughter, Monica Strong (Helen Chandler), and Harry 
Rawlinson (Ralph Forbes), her married beau (whose wife we never see). Monica and Harry best 
the efforts of the other partygoers by succeeding in finding the “treasure”: Monica heads straight 
home and summons her father, Sir Christopher Strong (Colin Clive), a British statesman and 
model husband, while Harry luckily happens across Lady Cynthia Darrington (Katharine 
Hepburn), an independent and accomplished young aviatrix known for her risky flight ventures 
and unflappable courage. Ironically, it is the very “treasure” set apart at first for fine moral 
bearings and sterling characters who ultimately become enmeshed in an affair that results in 
Cynthia’s pregnancy and suicide-abortion.  
It is worth pointing out that while the stakes of the scavenger hunt make it seem as 
though (sexually) morally upright members of both sexes are difficult to come by, the criteria for 
the women are based upon far more problematic gender assumptions than those for the men. 
Faithfulness is the primary concern for the married man—a criterion that implies his freedom to 
engage in whatever sexual activity he pleases with his wife and within the confines of his 
marriage. This criterion also suggests that faithful men are rare and that cheating is the accepted 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 The film version changes Lady Felicity Darrington’s name to Lady Cynthia Darrington. When 
referencing the novel, I will refer to Cynthia as Felicity for accuracy, even though they are the 
same character.  
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norm amongst the group. And yet for the men, both the options of fidelity and infidelity seem 
passable; for the women, however, it’s the opposite. For the “attractive girl of over twenty who 
would swear she’s never had a love affair,” virginity—abstinence from any sexual action and its 
implied subsequent lack of any sexual agency whatsoever—tops the treasure hunt requirement 
list.88 As early as the plot’s exposition, the film foregrounds unequal assumptions regarding sex 
and gender behavioral norms. More specifically, though, this early scene establishes the double 
standard of women’s sexuality that continues throughout the film. On the one hand, the 
scavenger hunt implies something abnormal about being a non-sexually-active woman, yet also 
that the only socially and morally sanctioned sexual activity would be within the bond of 
marriage. And yet, at the same time, the male portion of the treasure hunt suggests that, in 
theory, the men to whom these acceptable sexually active women are married are unfaithful and 
thus not sexually limited by their marriage bonds. This indicates (in a way that bears upon 
women’s reproductive sexual agency as well) that female erotic agency must be confined, lest it 
become destructive—or, reproductive. As we shall see, this unchecked reproductive destruction 
is precisely what causes problems for Christopher, his family, and especially Cynthia. 
Censorship correspondence records indicate that while the initial version of the 
Christopher Strong script (which was first billed as the more scandalous-sounding Great Desire) 
contained a reference to abortion, this reference was subsequently removed. As censor James 
Wingate writes to producer David O. Selznick on 18 November 1932, “the reference to 
abortion…is, of course, inadmissible under the Code” (Wingate). On 23 November 1932, less 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 According to definition 2a in the Oxford English Dictionary, a love affair is “A romantic or 
sexual relationship between two people in love” (OED). This definition identifies the usage of 
the term that matches temporally with Christopher Strong. While sex is not required, it—or at 
least some kind of physical contact—is most certainly implied. It is also important that this 
definition does not specify that one or both parties involved must be married. 
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than a week later, Wingate contacts Pandro Berman at RKO to express his pleasure that it was 
“definitely decided to remove the element of abortion from the script of ‘Great Desire,’” for with 
this, he has “removed a universally dangerous element, which it seems to us the screen should 
never attempt to handle” (Wingate).89 Soon afterward, on 8 December 1932, Wingate lauds 
Selznick for the script’s “changes and improvements” (Wingate). One observation from the 8 
December letter from Wingate to Selznick, however, is of particular importance. Wingate writes 
that, “we note a reference to Monica’s trip to Berlin. This refers to her abortion, which is out of 
this final script, and we assume was left in here by error” (Wingate). Notably, the novel’s source 
material did contain Cynthia accompanying Monica to Berlin with Christopher’s blessing in 
order for Monica to have an abortion, although all traces of Monica’s abortion were indeed 
erased from the film version. It is also worth noting that while the novel ends with Felicity 
attempting to break the altitude record, she does not do so in order to commit abortion-suicide. In 
this way, Christopher Strong the film erases Monica’s abortion, which was problematic to the 
censors, and transfers it onto Cynthia in a way that adheres to the Code.90  
While Monica’s abortion of what we can safely assume is Harry’s illegitimate child was, 
in fact, removed in its entirety—allusions, implications, and all—from the final version of the 
script, another abortion remained. Cynthia’s abortion goes completely unmentioned in the 
censorship reports. Perhaps it simply didn’t read as an abortion. Perhaps it was implicit enough 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 It is not specified who exactly made the decision to remove the flagged abortion elements, 
although Selznick, and not director Dorothy Arzner, is implied as the decision-maker.  
 
90 The word abortion is never used in the novel, either. Felicity and Christopher’s conversation 
takes place in a completely coded manner. Felicity refers to the Berlin trip as “a bleak sort of 
job…[b]ut I don’t see who else is going to do it” (Frankau 172). Also, while Monica marries 
Harry Rawlinson in both versions, the film erases the character of Ruth, Monica’s responsible 
older sister, and it presents Monica as happily pregnant near the end. In the novel, Monica does 
not become pregnant again after her abortion.    
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to pass as Cynthia’s suicide alone: the caption on a promotional poster advertisement entitled 
“Heavenly Love” declares in its description of Cynthia that, “[s]he [Cynthia Darrington] is an 
aviatrix whose love for a married man causes her to sacrifice her life in a flight to the clouds” 
(“Heavenly Love”). Here, Cynthia’s death barely registers as suicide, let alone suicide/abortion. 
Or, perhaps the overt nature of Monica’s abortion in the original script so overshadowed the 
implied of abortion with regard to Cynthia that censors simply did not pursue it. Whatever the 
potential reason, the fact remains that not only is Cynthia’s abortion left in the film, but it is one 
of spectacular violence packaged as noble, self-imposed punishment. Yet how exactly does the 
traditional need to punish female characters in the cinema for erotic sexual agency translate into 
and necessitate punishment for reproductive sexual agency (which, here, could be seen as the sex 
act that leads to pregnancy and/or to the choice to abort said pregnancy)?  
Cynthia’s pregnancy enters the plot late in the film; while it is surely the most significant 
complication to arise from her love affair with Christopher, it is not the most immediate.91 
Additionally, while it is revealed to the audience, she never apprises anyone in the storyworld of 
her secret. When Cynthia first hints at her pregnancy, it is while speaking excitedly to 
Christopher in public: “I’ve been to the doctor’s first. He told me not to fly, darling, but not 
because of my heart.” To Cynthia’s disappointment, Christopher does not catch on to the 
practically palpable subtext, and as a result, the two make dinner plans for the same evening. 
However, when Christopher cancels to attend dinner in honor of his recently wed and now-
expecting daughter—or, in order to honor a legitimate pregnancy that creates instead of destroys 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 Before Cynthia becomes pregnant, she must also cope with the guilt associated with Lady 
Strong’s trust in her; hypocritically advise Monica Strong against her affair with Harry (while 
she engages in her own affair with Monica’s married father); negotiate certain flight attempts 
with Christopher, who does not wish for her to continue such a dangerous career as aviation; and 
keep her affair hidden from her and Christopher’s family and friends, as well as from the public.  
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a family—Cynthia pens her confessional response to Christopher’s cancellation letter. She 
writes, “I did so want to tell you my news tonight. Since you are going to have a son—or 
daughter—I’d hoped you’d drink to his future with his mother. That’s why I shall take no more 
risks. Of course this letter will never be sent, for I shall see you tomorrow night, surely.” Even in 
Cynthia’s letter, she avoids the word “pregnancy,” and her condition remains only implied 
(although still fairly obvious). The following evening, Cynthia has another chance to tell 
Christopher her news, but reconsiders her decision when, while speaking hypothetically about 
her pregnancy, Christopher reveals his hypothetical response: he would break up his current 
marriage to be with Cynthia and their child out of a sense of duty. The guilt Cynthia feels at that 
prospect compels her to keep her pregnancy a secret and, ultimately, to sacrifice herself in order 
to keep it hidden and protect Christopher’s family. In Christopher’s reaction, we notice an echo 
of Men in White’s George, but with the exception that Christopher admittedly loves Cynthia. 
Nonetheless, Christopher presents marrying Cynthia as a duty, and he makes it clear that he 
would not marry her under any other condition besides her pregnancy.  
While hiding Cynthia’s pregnancy is certainly crucial to the plot, it is also crucial for 
adherence to the Code. Only one tenet makes any specific restrictions on representations of 
reproductive sexuality: as Section II.7 states, “Scenes of actual child birth, in fact or in 
silhouette, are never to be presented,” which, in a way, falls in line with the prohibition of 
surgical procedures as outlined in Section XII in so far as they could both be considered under 
the rubric of potentially graphic medical bodily concerns (Leff and Simmons 288). Both of these 
films—as well as many more Hollywood pregnancy or abortion films of the Code era92—avoid 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 The following are examples of films explicitly treating the subject of pregnancy that do not 
show scenes of childbirth: Bad Girl, directed by Frank Borzage (1931); Bondage, directed by 
Alfred Santell (1933); Little Nellie Kelly, directed by Norman Taurog (1940); The Miracle of 
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said representation without problem. Beyond that explicit restriction, however, much grey area 
exists for other reproduction-related topics. While other tenets of the Production Code place 
limitations upon representations of adultery, sex hygiene, and cruelty to children—all Code-
related topics that surface in one or more of the films I am considering in this chapter, not to 
mention in the other films addressed in this project—there are two Production Code tenets in 
particular that work to limit the possibilities of representations of reproductive sexuality.93 Along 
with Section 1.1, these tenets go even further to restrict visual representations of abortion—or, as 
is the case in Christopher Strong and Leave Her to Heaven, these tenets restrict the 
representations of acts that the viewer could visually identify as abortions without them ever 
being thusly named.  
As mentioned earlier, General Principle 1 and Section III stand out as the aspects of the 
Code from which attitudes and interpretations against the display of pregnancy most likely stem. 
The former dictates that “[n]o picture shall be produced which will lower the moral standards of 
those who see it. Hence the sympathy of the audience should never be thrown to the side of 
crime, wrongdoing, evil or sin” (Qtd. in Leff and Simmons 286); the latter stipulates that “[t]he 
treatment of low, disgusting, unpleasant, though not necessarily evil, subjects should be subject 
always to the dictates of good taste and a regard for the sensibilities of the audience” (Leff and 
Simmons 288). The topic of pregnancy—let alone the topics of birth control and abortion—is not 
mentioned specifically in the Code, and this omission on the part of the Code’s authors, I argue, 
is significant.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Morgan’s Creek, directed by Preston Sturges (1944); Good Sam, directed by Leo McCarey 
(1948).  
 
93 These restrictions are outlined in Sections II.1, II.7, and XII.5, respectively (Leff and Simmons 
287-288, 230).  
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The fact that even the Code itself cannot seem to articulate that which it wishes to keep 
either implicit or absent reemphasizes the taboo nature of these subjects. Additionally, it 
simultaneously necessitates that abortion and birth control generally be understood as so “low, 
disgusting, unpleasant, though not necessarily evil” that they can only be suggested as falling 
under the rubric of the “low, disgusting, unpleasant, though not necessarily evil” (Leff 288). A 
topic need not be mentioned specifically as forbidden or taboo or immoral in order to be 
understood as such; thus we see how the Code comes to exist as a sort of catch-all for any topic 
that may garner negative attention from the Catholic Church or other religious or morally 
conservative groups, and in turn, we see how the Code is not only a censorship document that 
issues dictates of taste and decency, but one that can respond to and absorb dictates of taste and 
decency from other sources as well. Furthermore, the nebulous nature of what—with specific 
regard to pregnancy, contraception, and abortion—is actually forbidden and what is not may be 
creatively negotiated to, as I will demonstrate, surprising and problematic ends.  
Let us take Cynthia’s pregnancy, for example. Despite the audience’s awareness of 
Cynthia’s pregnancy, Cynthia never physically reads as pregnant on-screen. Before conceiving, 
Cynthia most frequently appears dressed in masculine but form-fitting aviation garb, with the 
outrageous exception of the scene wherein she sports an elaborate, elegant gold lamé moth 
costume for a themed party. Yet even this costume, while certainly out of the ordinary, shows off 
her slim and undeniably feminine figure. E. Ann Kaplan rationalizes the extreme nature of the 
moth costume by observing that “Cynthia has to be outrageous in order to permit the transition 
from masculinzed female, in plain leather and jodphurs, to the patriarchal feminine,” or, in other 
words, in order to demonstrate that she is even capable of feeling and exciting erotic desire at all 
(Kaplan 152). The audience learns of Cynthia’s pregnancy almost immediately after Cynthia 
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learns of it herself, which suggests that she is not yet far enough along to show. It then comes as 
no surprise when, after the pregnancy is revealed, she wears the same masculine but form-fitting 
clothing and looks no different than she did before. To extend Kaplan’s logic about Cynthia’s 
more feminine costuming, the choice to dress Cynthia in her masculine garb while pregnant de-
eroticizes her and thus makes pregnancy seem a practically impossible state for her to attain. 
These facts are key to the censorship logic at play in the film’s penultimate spectacular abortion 
scene. 
Having decided that death is the only noble solution to her predicament, Cynthia arranges 
for a dangerous air stunt that she had previously promised Christopher she would not 
undertake.94 The violent nature of her death turns abortion into another kind of female cinematic 
spectacle akin to the flaunting of the eroticized body, and yet, by Wingate’s censorship logic, it 
does not read as an abortion; in fact, scholars such as Kaplan do not read it as an abortion, either. 
In her reading of the film’s penultimate altitude flight scene, Kaplan posits that Cynthia’s choice 
to undertake the flight reasserts her agency and transgressive femininity. After Christopher and 
Cynthia consummate their relationship, he forbids her from taking any risks; Kaplan argues that 
the loss of Cynthia’s career combined with her pregnancy render her silent and weak: 
“[Cynthia’s] sudden loss of power now suggests that, far from being woman’s most creative 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 While in the novel version, Felicity does promise Christopher that she will take no more risks, 
there is no indication that Felicity attempts to break the altitude record in order to kill herself and 
her fetus, and at no point does Felicity remove the oxygen mask from her face. In fact, while she 
feels ambivalent about carrying Christopher’s child at the beginning of the flight, her 
ambivalence changes as the flight progresses: “‘You’ve been scared of bearing this child. But 
you must bear this child. And not in shame but in pride. Because this is your real pride—your 
real laurel crown,’” Felicity tells herself (Frankau 339). Here, Felicity decides that her real 
contribution to England is not her altitude record, but her yet-unborn child. And yet even when 
Felicity was less confident in her pregnancy, she still denounced abortion: “For long ago, when 
terror was at its height, she had thought to take the easy way—Monica’s way—with the child. 
But by this light…that way seemed all the coward’s; and a degradation to this flesh of hers, 
which had done no shame” (339).  
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activity, motherhood deprives, contracts, and reduces woman” (Kaplan, Motherhood 154). 
Through reclaiming her career, even with the intention of suicide, Cynthia rejects the silence and 
marginalization that have been forced upon her through her nontraditional sex and gender 
choices. While I agree with this reading in so far that Cynthia’s altitude flight is an assertion of 
agency, I cannot help but argue that what Cynthia intends as a suicide mission is really a 
suicide/abortion and, thusly, is more an assertion of reproductive agency than anything else.  
Not only do I wish to challenge Kaplan’s omission of the abortion angle, but I think that 
there are some serious implications in Cynthia’s suicide/abortion for the Code’s impact upon 
representing reproductive options and their potential consequences. The pretense for Cynthia’s 
suicide is a flight attempt at breaking the altitude record—which she accomplishes, but not 
without tragic results. Due to the increased altitude, oxygen is needed once the plane clears 
15,000 feet, and Cynthia dutifully dons her oxygen mask at that point. Once Cynthia’s plane 
nears the record altitude, director Dorothy Arzner’s use of a series of flashbacks interrupted by 
close-ups of Cynthia’s masked, bug-like face remind the viewer what has led Cynthia to this 
point and work to validate her decision; these serve to prioritize Cynthia’s perspective, which 
does not often happen in either the film or the novel. At the same time, though, these close-up 
shots and juxtaposed memories are crucial in so far as they foreshadow Cynthia’s 
reconsideration of her choice. Yet even this interpretation goes against Arzner’s own 
understanding of the scene; in Gerald Peary’s and Karyn Kay’s interview with the director, 
Arzner denies that Cynthia reconsiders her suicide decision. The interviewers ask, “Wasn’t there 
a moment when Cynthia tried to save her own life by putting the oxygen mask back on her face 
after she had ripped it off?,” and Arzner replies: “No, Cynthia did not try to save her life. If you 
remember, she looked back over the whole affair seen through superimpositions as she flew to 
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break the altitude record. Suicide was a definite decision” (Peary and Kay 26). While Arzner is 
certainly entitled to her directorial intention, said intention doesn’t change the fact that Cynthia 
does fumble with the oxygen mask after her hallucinations in a manner that suggests that she is 
trying to replace it.  The close-up shot cuts out Cynthia’s environment, making her face—and her 
thoughts—the focus of the scene, such that the viewer identifies with Cynthia while momentarily 
forgetting about her pregnant body and the choice that she has made to abort her fetus and take 
her own life. And yet, while Cynthia’s body is excluded, her flashbacks and perspective 
creatively remind us of her pregnancy and abortion.  
When Cynthia finally removes her oxygen mask, she fumbles for a moment trying to 
replace it, but to no avail. A medium shot of the unconscious Cynthia follows, and the camera 
moves to a full exterior shot of the plane as it begins its rapid descent. The pattern of successive 
shots alternates twice more between the medium shot of Cynthia and the full shot of the plane 
plummeting. We are then given a view of the quickly approaching ground from inside her plane 
(as though we must fill in for Cynthia in her absence), and finally the plane crashes in a fiery 
explosion. Cynthia’s pregnant body is part of the spectacle, but according to Wingate, this is not 
an abortion. I contend that this is possible in the mind of the censor for the following reasons. 
First, if Cynthia didn’t tell anyone she was pregnant, and if Cynthia never looked pregnant, then 
for all intents and purposes, she is not pregnant. If no one knew about the pregnancy while 
Cynthia was living, no one could possibly know about it nor perpetuate knowledge of it once she 
is dead, especially since, given the nature of her death, there would be no corpse to autopsy. 
Secondly, if Cynthia is not pregnant, then she cannot enact an abortion: something that was not 
there in the first place cannot be done away with. Thirdly, only three characters—Christopher, 
Monica, and Harry—know about her affair, and they’re not sharing that information so as to 
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protect themselves as a family.95 Thus, for all anyone knows, Cynthia’s sole intention for the 
flight was to break the altitude record. Lastly, no one—except the audience, of course—knows 
what took place inside the plane. The only surviving information from the crash is that of the 
record-breaking altitude achievement. Only Cynthia knows that she decided at the last moment 
to live; other characters’ lack of knowledge regarding Cynthia’s original and reconsidered 
intentions makes the crash seem purely accidental and woefully tragic. However, none of this 
changes the fact that the viewer is aware of Cynthia’s pregnancy as well as her intention, which 
thus makes her crash read as a suicide/abortion, albeit perhaps ultimately accidental. In 
Christopher Strong, abortion is avoided through neglecting to acknowledge pregnancy within the 
storyworld, which thus allows the crash to read as dramatic entertainment and not as a 
“universally dangerous element” (Wingate).96 
It is useful here to recall how Laura Mulvey uses the phallocentric system stand as an 
example of what’s happening sociohistorically in America and in Hollywood in the 1930s and 
1940s. The trajectory of how woman in presented in film via psychoanalysis—woman as erotic 
object  woman as potential castrator  need to subordinate/punish woman—demonstrates 
how the reproductively sexual does not really fit in. This underscores the need to present 
reproductive sexuality as erotic sexuality. In this way, the abortion spectacle does not read as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 While Lady Elaine Strong (Billie Burke) witnessed Christopher and Cynthia share an embrace 
late one evening and thus has cause for suspicion of an affair, her suspicions are never 
confirmed. In fact, despite these suspicions, Elaine actively speaks in favor of Cynthia when 
Monica, with confirmed knowledge of the affair, maligns Cynthia near the film’s end. Elaine 
reminds Monica of Cynthia’s good reputation and of the help Cynthia gave her with Harry when 
Elaine did not view their courtship favorably. Elaine even goes so far as to later thank Cynthia 
for her help in person, not knowing, of course, that Cynthia is currently carrying Christopher’s 
illegitimate child.  
 
96 James Wingate to Pandro Berman. 23 November 1932. 
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abortion; it reads as erotic spectacle, as female spectacle, and can thereby get by the Code. 
Ultimately, Cynthia is punished for adultery, her suicide reads as self-sacrifice, and the abortion 
doesn’t read as an abortion but as female spectacle. And yet I think most would agree that there 
is something profoundly disturbing in this alchemy. In Cynthia’s case, the masculinist constraints 
of the storyworld (and of the historical context in which it was produced) demand that she 
sacrifice herself and her fetus in order to save her reputation and appease mainstream bourgeois 
expectations. In the case of Leave Her to Heaven’s Ellen Berent, however, the abortion spectacle 
in much less easily mistaken for something else (i.e. suicide or accidental death) and therefore 
requires a different manipulation of censorship logic. The logistic gymnastics necessary to make 
Ellen’s pregnancy invisible and her abortion allowable under the Code are more complex and 
raise a fresh set of concerns about the cinematic display of the reproductive female body since 
Ellen’s pregnancy (unlike Cynthia’s) is not kept secret. Christopher Strong uses the audience’s 
identification with Cynthia not to make her sympathetic, but to make her death even more 
spectacular and reinforce judgment upon her perceived transgressions.  
 
“Yes, she was that kind of monster”: Leave Her to Heaven and the Domestic Abortion  
 Spectacle 
As with Cynthia Darrington, Ellen Berent’s pregnancy does not occur until later in the 
film. And like Cynthia, Ellen’s costuming, while feminine at times, also highlights the ways in 
which she diverges from gender norms and presents her as a different type of woman: one who is 
strong-willed, athletic, and in charge of her own decisions. Earlier in Leave Her to Heaven, Ellen 
appears clad in both a horseback riding outfit as well as in bathing suits (for swimming, not 
sunning) on several occasions. While these costume choices do establish what are considered 
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Ellen’s more masculine, athletic tastes, they also function to remind the audience that, like 
Cynthia, Ellen is still a woman with a figure.  
When Ellen decides to become pregnant by her husband, Richard Harland (Cornel 
Wilde), her costuming changes dramatically. Instead of her shoulder-length soft curls and 
tasteful yet form-fitting dresses, blouses, and slacks (which initially drew some negative 
attention from Joseph Breen)97, the expecting Ellen sports a matronly up-do with loose-fitting 
dresses and billowing tops. As Kelly Oliver notes of the film’s costuming, “[t]hroughout the 
film…[Ellen] never looks the least bit pregnant” (28). This costuming is critical, for it signifies 
pregnancy without allowing the viewer to actually see Ellen’s pregnant body. We, like the 
characters in the storyworld, are aware of Ellen’s pregnancy. And yet, as Breen suggests, the 
script, which is based upon the 1944 novel of the same name by Ben Ames Williams, must walk 
a fine line between verbally indicating the state of pregnancy without drawing much (if any) 
attention to its attendant physicality. In an official censorship correspondence from Breen to 
twentieth Century Fox’s Colonel Jason Joy on 2 March 1945, which concerns the revised first 
draft of the Leave Her to Heaven screenplay, Breen comments that, “Ellen’s reference to her 
physical condition will very likely be deleted by censorship boards, and we suggest that it be 
changed” (Breen). Additionally, he notes in the same correspondence that, “we ask that Ellen’s 
line ‘Look at me! Heavy and misshapen…’ down to the end of the page ‘…having the little brat 
under foot’ be rewritten” (Breen).98 The problems that arise in these revision suggestions do not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97 In a letter from 12 December 1944, Breen instructs Joy to “watch the costuming of Ellen…in 
order to avoid any objectionable exposure” and again to “watch the costuming of Ellen 
carefully” (Breen). Later, in a letter dated 2 March 1945 letter, Breen’s tone towards Joy 
becomes almost passive-aggressive: “We presume the costuming of Ellen will be quite proper” 
(Breen). While Breen does refer to page numbers from the script when referencing various of 
Ellen’s outfits, he never does specifically state (or restate) the problem. 
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even yet concern abortion (which is yet to come in the censorship reports), but something even 
more fundamental: a visibly pregnant body, which is something that none of the other 
contraception/abortion films have yet approached.  
Ellen’s pregnancy is not a plot point that the film attempts to hide: Ellen discusses the 
possibility of pregnancy with her cousin, Ruth; Ellen’s family is shown transforming her late 
father’s old laboratory into a playroom; Ellen’s physician, Dr. Saunders, pays her a visit and 
gives orders regarding how she should best care for herself while pregnant. The problem is not 
simply discourse about pregnancy. Instead, it is the depiction of the pregnant body and, relatedly, 
verbal descriptions thereof that would call attention to it in a negative way. Any time that Ellen 
appears on screen while pregnant, her garments are loose-fitting (to an almost comically 
exaggerated extent) so as not to betray the definite shape of her pregnant body—even though, as 
we learn from Dr. Saunders, she is so far along in her pregnancy that he orders her to bed rest for 
the duration of her term. The importance of Ellen’s costuming is not to make her look as though 
she isn’t pregnant, but rather, costuming works to hide the physical details of her pregnancy. 
Ellen’s descriptive verbal references to her pregnancy, then, cannot be allowed, for self-
identifying as “heavy and misshapen” would undermine all costuming efforts to present her as 
just simply pregnant. In the final version of the script, however, the “heavy and misshapen” 
reference has been removed, such that Ellen no longer calls attention to the physical condition 
that we know is there, but that is (now) otherwise invisible. This edit belies the importance of the 
rhetorical negotiation necessary to the inclusion of pregnancy as a plot point along with the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 Ellen’s hatred of her pregnant body in the film is consistent with the novel, where, for 
example, the narrator notes of Ellen, “As the shape of [Ellen’s] body began to change, she sought 
to avoid [Richard]” and “Nameless terrors haunted her, and the child growing in her body came 
to personify them all” (B. Williams 184). At another point, a frustrated Ellen beats on her 
stomach and yells to her fetus, “‘Oh, I hate you, too, you little beast! I hate you, hate you! Oh, I 
wish you’d die!’”—dialogue that is pulled nearly verbatim into the movie (191).	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inclusion of the censorable pregnant body. The physically invisible pregnancy is also necessary 
for the alchemical transformation of abortion into murder. 
Unlike Cynthia’s plane crash abortion in Christopher Strong, which does not register 
with the censors, the implications of Ellen’s trip down a flight of stairs do not go undetected or 
unaddressed by Joseph Breen and the MPPA. On 12 December 1944, Breen informs Joy of the 
following: 
It will be absolutely essential to remove any flavor from these pages that Ellen 
plans to murder the unborn child merely because she is misshapen. It should be 
definitely established that her reasons [sic] for murdering the child is that she 
thinks that the newborn will replace her in her husband’s affections. This is 
important in order to avoid any of the flavor that is normally connected with what 
could be termed “abortion.” (Breen) 
With Breen’s comment, we again note the importance of the censor’s understanding of perceived 
audience reception. It is not so much that Breen attempts to make what seems like an act of 
abortion within the film look like something that it’s not—in the context of the film, an 
accidental trip down a flight of stairs. Instead, Breen is trying to make what looks like an 
abortion seem like something else. It is worth noting here that in the novel, Ellen’s abortion is 
not depicted this graphically—in fact, it’s not really described at all. The only reference to it is 
what the narrator tells secondhand through Richard: “Ellen, he said, had walked in her sleep 
during the night, had fallen downstairs. Her cry awoke him, and he was quickly at her side. She 
insisted she was unhurt, but almost at once they knew harm had been done, and Harland 
summoned Doctor Patron, who took her to the hospital. The baby—a lusty boy—was dead” 
(Williams 197). In the novel, we don’t even “see” Ellen’s abortion; we’re only informed of it ex 
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post facto. Like the film, however, the word “abortion” is never used in the novel, which also 
deals in implications and innuendos.  
 According to Breen’s logic, if the audience believes that Ellen’s intention in ridding 
herself of her fetus is to regain her slim figure—if she’s terminating her pregnancy for 
superficial, cosmetic reasons—then the act would read as an abortion. If, however, the audience 
believes that Ellen’s intention is to remain sole possessor of her husband’s affections, then the 
act reads as murder, and somehow, murder does not carry connotations as bad—or as 
censorable—as does abortion (although murder, to an extent, is still fair game for the chopping 
block and does have Code-related guidelines to follow). While Ellen does admit to an 
unsympathetic Dr. Saunders that “[t]his baby’s making a prisoner out of me,” she also laments, 
“I don’t even see my husband.” When Dr. Saunders queries, “Why don’t you have him come in 
here?,” Ellen retorts, “Because I don’t want him to see me this way.” Ellen’s objections could be 
read as superficial and cosmetic or as coming from a place of embarrassment and shame—
especially given the emphasis put upon her attractive physique earlier in the film—but the 
audience could also interpret them as legitimate concern over the increasing lack of basic 
physical closeness in Richard’s and her marriage as a result of her pregnancy. In the event of the 
latter, Ellen’s act is a murder for the sake of saving her marriage, not an abortion. As a story 
summary report from nearly ten months after Breen’s objections claims, “Ellen is a very 
possessive type of girl who wants her husband all to herself,” and later, it describes the abortion 
scene as such: “Ellen imagines that her child, even unborn, is taking her place in her husband’s 
affections. In hatred she deliberately falls downstairs, hoping to kill the child, and she is 
successful in this” (Heaven story summary). Here, we can see that the official follow-up material 
(which was filed about three months before the film’s release) honors Breen’s recommendations.  
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Even so, one of the most striking parts of the preceding passages from Breen’s letter and 
the story summary report is the distinction between an act looking like an abortion and an act 
being identified, even implicitly, as an abortion; Breen suggests this distinction, and the film’s 
official file documents later mimic it. By Breen’s logic, the act may look like an abortion, but as 
long as it’s not called one, it does not read as one. We observe this type of censorship logic in 
both Christopher Strong and Leave Her to Heaven, which, unlike the early 
contraception/abortion films and abortion exploitation films explored in Chapters 2 and 3, are 
abortion films that are never explicitly about abortion. Part of this distinction is also that these 
films center around an understanding of projected viewer reception that is further complicated by 
the fact that, due to censorship, these films take pains to ignore the very abortions that are so 
central to their plots. Part of the social fear driving censorship is that if the cinematic material 
presented contains ideas of images that are deemed somehow “immoral,” then the 
impressionable imagined viewer will absorb and emulate these ideas or actions. If these films 
were to show abortions and actually identify them as such, they would then run the risk of 
potentially advocating abortion at most, and at least presenting it as an option. Heaven, however, 
does no such thing, and Ellen Berent’s “choice” is presented as the wrong one, regardless of 
whether it was done out of possessiveness or vanity. In this way, director John M. Stahl shows an 
abortion, but according to Breen, as long as it is contextualized as something other than an 
abortion, then it reads as something other: namely, in Ellen’s case, miscarriage. Furthermore, the 
way in which the “miscarriage” occurred (falling down a full flight of stairs), combined with the 
fact that Ellen did sustain some bodily harm, does not make “having a miscarriage” look like 
something a woman would want to imitate. While some female viewers doubtless could relate to 
Ellen’s frustration with her pregnancy, Ellen is in no way presented ambiguously. As suggested 
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by Breen’s written exchanges, the consequences Ellen faces for her abortion, as well as her 
characterization earlier in the film as someone devoid of maternal instincts,99 her choice is wrong 
and is not to be emulated. Indeed, in the context of the film, the only real or correct choice for a 
pregnant woman is to carry her pregnancy to term and to want to do so. 
According to Breen and the Code, then, murder and the representation thereof ranks as 
less egregious and more tolerable a crime than abortion. This, however, does not mean that the 
Code takes a progressive or liberal stance on abortion. It’s not that abortion isn’t “murder”—
quite the opposite is true, in fact—it’s just that abortion can’t exist in the Hollywood narrative. 
Thus, as in the abortion exploitation films, abortion must be criminally coded as something else. 
The abortion melodramas take a sharply conservative view of abortion that excludes it as an 
acceptable option for women. Additionally, the alchemical transformation of abortion into 
murder doesn’t mean that murder may be presented without consequence, and for Ellen Berent, 
there are certainly consequences. Whether abortion or murder, Ellen is nonetheless subjected to 
punishment for her crimes within the storyworld.  
I contend that the punishment of suicide is made more acceptable within the film, as 
Ellen is vilified throughout for her agency. Even before the film’s release, MPPA discourse 
about Gene Tierney’s character betrays a decidedly negative bent. An analysis chart for Leave 
Her to Heaven lists Ellen Berent as a “prominent” and “unsympathetic” character who commits 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99 Earlier in the film, Ellen convinces Richard’s disabled younger brother, Danny, to go for a 
swim. When the boy finds himself physically in trouble, Ellen pretends not to hear his cries for 
help and allows the adolescent to drown so that he will no longer occupy Richard’s time and 
attentions. Danny brings a certain eugenic element to the Leave Her to Heaven, as his physical 
disabilities act as a foil for Ellen’s physical prowess, namely her swimming and horseback-riding 
athleticism. Ellen’s physical prowess, combined with her wealth and good looks, masks what the 
film presents as her Ellen’s own dysgenic shortcoming: her tendency to, as her mother puts it, 
“love[] too much.” In this way, Ellen is presented as the real dysgenic threat who, arguably, 
really shouldn’t be having children anyway.  
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“murder of unborn child by deliberately falling downstairs [sic]” (Heaven analysis chart). In the 
film itself, Ellen is immediately characterized as possessive and obsessive through her 
relationship with her deceased father (the intensity of which strained her parents’ marriage), and 
warning bells ring early for the viewer when Ellen makes much ado about the uncanny 
resemblance between her father and Richard. Even Ellen’s own mother claims that Ellen “loves 
too much,” meaning that she does not love in a proper familial, wifely, or motherly manner, but 
with a selective fervor that borders upon the deranged. Of course, Ellen is also independent, 
strong-willed, and clever; Ellen has agency, but those positive qualities that enable her agency 
become problematized along with her “negative” traits. With this in mind, we recall the 
Production Code’s General Principle 1: “[n]o picture shall be produced which will lower the 
moral standards of those who see it. Hence the sympathy of the audience should never be thrown 
to the side of crime, wrongdoing, evil or sin” (Qtd. in Leff and Simmons 286). If Ellen is to be 
vilified for her erotic and reproductive agency, then her crimes—the “murders” of both her 
adolescent brother-in-law, Danny, and of her fetus—are passable in so far as they both now read 
as cautionary tales.  
To return, however, to Ellen’s staircase scene, the composition, editing, and pacing of the 
scene make it difficult to miss (or to unsee, or to resee) the abortion aspect. The actual scene of 
Ellen’s abortion functions in way that is very much like Cynthia’s in its spectacular nature, but 
with one key difference: Ellen does not reconsider her decision.100 As Ellen stands at the top of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 This scene also functions in a totally different way in the film than it does in the novel. In the 
source text, nothing happens in real time, and the only ex post facto description of Ellen’s fall is 
this: “Ellen, [Richard] said, had walked in her sleep during the night, had fallen downstairs. Her 
cry woke him, and he was quickly at her side. She insisted she was unhurt, but almost at once 
they knew harm had been done, and [Richard] summoned Doctor Patron, who took her to the 
hospital. The baby—a lusty boy—was dead” (B. Williams 197). There is not, at any point at all 
in the novel, a detailed description of Ellen falling down the flight of stairs. 
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the staircase, we notice Stahl’s employment of a shot/reverse shot pattern that is strikingly 
similar to the one Arzner uses in Christopher Strong. The pattern begins with a motivated close-
up of Ellen’s face as she gazes beyond the frame, and then cuts to a pan of the staircase at which 
she is looking. The shot/reverse shot repeats again, this time with Ellen looking at her shoes at 
the top of the staircase, and then wedging the toe of one shoe beneath a gap in the carpeting. The 
first pattern repeats again, and the camera remains at the top of the stairs while Ellen unsteadies 
herself and falls. We do not see her fall, but we do hear her scream as she jumps; we also hear 
the sound of her body thudding down the stairs and landing, immobile, at the bottom. The pre-
jump close-ups with motivated reverse shots foreground Ellen’s thought process and unwavering 
determination such that, like Cynthia, it is Ellen’s facial expressions, not her body, upon which 
the film focuses here. While the shot/reverse shot patterns might make it seem as though Ellen is 
rethinking her decision to carry through with the abortion, they actually reaffirm her decision; 
she is not reconsidering so much as she is sizing up her fall and making sure that one shoe 
remains at the top of the stairs to prove that she “tripped.”  
The ellipsis of the falling body and synecdochical substitution of the scream and thuds 
confirms that it is not the body that is of interest here, but the transgression. And yet, the absence 
of the body at the scene’s most crucial moment does not diminish the bodily spectacle but rather 
enhances it—all while simultaneously helping the film to remain in line with Code requirements. 
By not showing the body at the moment of physical harm, the audience can imagine whatever its 
likes—it can imagine the most horrible version of the violence, which makes it all the more 
effective as a caution against any inspired imitation. Additionally, Code adherence is in check, 
for no detailed actual violence is being displayed. This, too, could help transform this scene from 
reading as Ellen’s abortion to reading merely as a miscarriage. 
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I am intrigued, however, by a comment that Ellen’s mother makes to Dr. Saunders and 
Ruth at the hospital in the following scene, as it distinctly suggests, of all things, abortion: “First 
his brother, and now his son.” Mrs. Berent suspects foul play on Ellen’s part in both Danny’s and 
the fetus’ deaths. However, an act cannot seem like an abortion if an abortion isn’t possible. In 
this case, Mrs. Berent’s comment helps to keep the idea of abortion at bay while simultaneously 
reinforcing the idea of murder and casting Ellen’s reproductive agency as exclusively 
destructive: an accusation that follows Ellen even after her death. 
Whereas the focus in Christopher Strong is more on Cynthia’s nobility, her partly 
purposeful, partly accidental death emphasizes her sense of responsibility and self-sacrifice and 
helps mitigate her transgression. Of course, this angle on the film’s part is helped along by 
Cynthia’s eventual remorse over the affair, its outcome, and the threat it posed to marriage as an 
institution. Ellen Berent, on the other hand, shows no remorse for orchestrating the drowning of 
her young, disabled brother-in-law; her own “accidental” trip down a staircase and consequent 
abortion; and her own suicide, for which she attempts scapegoating her cousin, Ruth. After the 
plane crash death, Cynthia is remembered posthumously with a large stone monument extolling 
her courage. After poisoning herself, Ellen is slandered at her own posthumous trial by her own 
husband: “Yes, she was that kind of monster.”101  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101 Ostensibly, Ruth is on trial for Ellen’s murder. However, Richard, compelled by his love for 
the humble and sweet Ruth, clears her name by confessing that Ellen killed Danny and her fetus, 
therefore making her capable of killing herself and trying to ruin his and Ruth’s lives. With this 
admission, Ruth’s name is cleared, but Richard is convicted as an accessory to the crime and an 
obstructer of justice. During the confrontation that precipitated Ellen’s suicide, Richard accused 
her of allowing Danny to drown, and Ellen confessed to Danny’s murder and the abortion. 
Richard, however, did not take this information to the authorities. Although Richard is found 
guilty, imprisoned, and released two years later, Ellen is more the focus of the trial than is 
Richard; if anything, Richard is “being tried” for having fallen out of love with Ellen and in love 
with her cousin, Ruth, while Ellen is, as Richard puts it, a “monster.”  
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*** 
 
Erika L. Doss notes the vilification of the successful, independent, strong-willed female 
character in Great Depression-era films, and mentions Christopher Strong in particular. As an 
attempt to understand this phenomenon, she posits that, “[i]n all likelihood, accomplished, 
powerful women were treated this way in Depression films because in real life their existence 
was regarded as both a slap in the face and a threat: movie studio heads presumed that 
unemployed American men would not appreciate viewing successful women, on screen or off” 
(3).  Along these lines, it would make sense for Men in White’s Barbara Denham—a nursing 
student at a prestigious research hospital with a promising career amongst leading doctors and 
surgeons—to be treated similarly. We notice the same kind of threat in Christopher Strong’s 
Lady Cynthia Darrington: before her pregnancy, she is an adventurous and prominent aviatrix. 
And although Leave Her to Heaven’s privileged Ellen Berent does not need to work—and while 
the film does not acknowledge its postwar context—it was nonetheless released in December 
1945—mere months after the United States ended World War II. Women were no longer needed 
as a substitute work force and as heads-of-household; as men returned from the war, women who 
had recently enjoyed independence needed to step back into the kitchen.  
The larger historical context, as Doss suggests, points to male viewers regarding women 
with agency in the movies as threatening because they have agency, and they are using it. But 
when we consider the female viewership of melodramas like these, the erasure of the 
educational, the vilification of agency, and the related valorization of the domestic status quo 
becomes directly tied to reproductive rights and agency—and to the message that women don’t 
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need it, shouldn’t want it, and must not have it. Abortion becomes the vehicle for vilification 
employed in Men in White, Christopher Strong and Leave Her to Heaven—and this also explains 
the peculiarly disturbing nature of the on-screen Production Code abortion spectacle. 
Considering also the progress made since the late 1910s regarding Margaret Sanger’s public 
crusade for sex education and family planning, women’s agency concerning their own 
reproductive capabilities had increased. Despite this positive change—and despite the fact that, 
in 1945, the birth control pill and the legalization of abortion are still 15 years and 28 years 
away, respectively—prescribed morality still insists upon the unpopularity and immorality of 
abortion practices.  
Through condoning a version of the display of abortion that enables sanctioned violence 
against the vilified woman, the Production Code attempts to reinscribe old conceptions 
prescribed morality onto the popular morality of modern woman’s reproductive agency. What’s 
more, though, is that these Code-era melodramas from major studios make abortion visible and 
violent in ways that recall previous contraception/abortion films while differing tremendously in 
their presentation and exclusion of choice. However, these extreme and daring displays of 
spectacular abortion simultaneously serve another more subversive political agenda that is only 
enabled through these violent abortion displays. By showing women characters who would 
unapologetically accept death as a punishment for reproductive agency and knowingly push their 
own bodies to the extremes of personal injury or death in order to reclaim control over that 
agency, Men in White, Christopher Strong and Leave Her to Heaven deliver a scathing 
Hollywood commentary: through linking erotic and reproductive agency, these films also 
criticize the strictures unduly placed upon women who choose to employ both their erotic and 
reproductive agency in the ways that they see fit. 
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CODA 
 
 In my dissertation, I have examined the effects of the Supreme Court’s 1915 Mutual v. 
Ohio decision—a decision that removed film from First Amendment protections and deemed it 
entertainment—upon representations of reproductive women in film. Eventually, however, 
Mutual is reversed in the 1952 Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson decision, which is commonly 
referred to as the Miracle case after the film that precipitated it. The Miracle case centers around 
Italian New Wave director Roberto Rossellini’s 1948 short film, Il Miracolo, or The Miracle, 
one portion of the longer anthology film, L’Amore. Joseph Burstyn, “a highly respected but 
small-time film importer,” first viewed Il Miracolo at the Venice Film Festival, where he “fell in 
love with it” and purchased U.S. distribution rights (Wittern-Keller and Haberski, Jr. 4, 3). The 
film tells the story of an Italian peasant woman who, after a bit too much wine, sleeps with a 
stranger she thinks to be St. Joseph. She becomes pregnant, believes herself to be carrying a holy 
child, and is ostracized by the nearby villagers for her behavior. Yet, despite the unkind 
treatment she faces from others for her pregnancy, she cherishes her newborn son.    
 While Burstyn thought that the film would be received as “the story of man’s inhumanity 
to man, as Burstyn had seen it and Rossellini said he had made it,” the Catholic Church felt 
differently, railing against the film as “a mockery of the Virgin birth,” and therefore as 
sacrilegious (Wittern-Keller and Haberski, Jr. 5). Il Miracolo swiftly triggered a years-long battle 
over the nature and application of free speech that ultimately lead to the reinstatement of film’s 
protection under First Amendment rights in 1952. As Laura Wittern-Keller and Raymond J. 
Haberski, Jr. observe of the decision’s effects, “when [the Miracle case] raised substantial 
questions about the amount of control the state could exercise over movies, it also created a new 
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threshold for cultural tolerance. The case encouraged movie critics to challenge censorship, 
champion pluralism, and argue that there was worth in many different and even offensive 
cultural expressions” (8).  
 As mentioned, most explicitly, the Catholic Church’s objections to the film were based 
upon accusations of sacrilege that, for them, stemmed from its problems with the film’s 
treatment of the main pregnancy plotline and its too-close resemblance to the narrative of 
Christ’s birth; the Church interpreted the pregnancy plotline as an “offensive cultural 
expression,” to borrow Wittern-Keller and Haberski, Jr.’s phrase. According to the Christian 
biblical account, Mary, a virgin teenager engaged to a man named Joseph, immaculately 
conceives of and gives birth to Jesus, the Son of God. Apparently, in Il Miracolo, the peasant 
woman’s misunderstanding of the non-divine nature of her conception came across to the Church 
more as parody that homage. But what strikes me most about this landmark case is not the 
Church’s concern with parody so much as its concern with premarital sex and pregnancy. Given 
Hollywood’s trend from the transitional era to the end of the Production Code era to implicitly, 
increasingly control and censor representations of female reproductive agency, it seems ironic 
yet fitting that the decision to return free speech protection to film—and thereby also return the 
potential for freer artistic and political expression—be centered around a particular type of film 
that had been so fiercely monitored for so long. Hollywood film’s tendency toward moral 
didacticism—and the Church’s influence thereupon—is, at least in this moment, struck down. 
What the Catholic Church meant as an act of censorship resulted in perhaps one of the most 
remarkable and groundbreaking acts of regulation. While Il Miracolo does not deal specifically 
with contraception or abortion, it does bring the topic of female reproductive agency and choice 
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to national attention in a way that retroactively functions, I would argue, as a critique of decades-
long attempts to hide and control these very issues.  
 
*** 
 
 Throughout my project, I have examined several different approaches to acknowledging 
birth control and representing abortion in American film from the 1910s to the 1940s. We have 
seen the scientifically and morally didactic narratives of the 1910s, with their strongly eugenic 
frames and agendas, which originate the trope of the melodramatic post-abortion deathbed scene 
as well as the need to punish those women who have undergone abortions. And yet, in spite of 
the extra-legal punishment faced by those women who choose abortion, films like Where Are My 
Children? remain ambiguous about whether or not these women should be punished. The 
ambiguities attendant in the social problem contraception/abortion films from the 1910s 
demonstrate how these films ultimately privilege choice through their use of objective 
didacticism.  
 In the abortion exploitation films of the 1930s, we observe how these films only pretend 
their concern with scientific didacticism while promoting a more extreme and hyperbolic moral 
didacticism through the presentation of worst-case scenarios. Here, the post-abortion deathbed 
scene is reserved for secondary female characters and while the female protagonists (who have 
also undergone abortions and survived) instead murder the men who are sexually responsible for 
their deceased loved ones. These women stand trial ostensibly for the less taboo crime of murder, 
although, as I argue, they are really on trial for abortion. However, under the strictures of the 
Production Code—which exists as of 1930, but which is not enforced consistently until 1934—
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abortion can only be implied, and these acts of substitution are in place to prevent the 
intervention of censors. In the abortion films that focus more upon the doctors performing the 
acts, the women who seek abortions in the first place are victimized to the point that the abortion, 
which should be understood as a personal reproductive choice, becomes a sick act perpetrated by 
depraved rogue members of the medical profession upon unsuspecting women in compromising 
positions. Both types of abortion exploitation film feature contradictory narratives; they use the 
trappings of the scientifically didactic to gloss over a film’s seediness with the veneer of 
respectability, all the while promoting a highly moralized anti-choice ideology. These films 
pretend to promote choice, but instead punish women who display reproductive agency.  
 The classical abortion melodramas of the 1930s and 1940s completely do away with even 
the vaguest semblance of the scientifically didactic in favor of intensely promoting what they 
consider to be the only moral, normative erotic and reproductive choices: women should abstain 
from sex until marriage; a pregnant woman should choose to carry her fetus to term. While the 
women in classical abortion melodramas are punished with death for their abortions, their deaths 
are presented as violent spectacle. And yet, these spectacles are carefully coded so as to remain 
within the strictures of the Production Code. This new turn in the representation of abortion 
demonstrates these films’ departure from any desire to educate women about choice—as well as 
from any real engagement with contraception and abortion as complicated and critical social 
issues.   
 Thus, over the span of three decades, we notice two significant trajectories. The first is a 
shift from a focus on contraception and abortion education to a focus on moralizing. While both 
the scientifically and morally didactic are present in the social problem films of the 1910s (and 
even in the science films of the 1920s), that is precisely the point: both dialectical elements are 
	   239 
present. By the 1930s—at least 15 years removed from Mutual v. Ohio and at the beginning of 
the institution of the Production Code—abortion exploitation films depart from any meaningful 
engagement with the scientifically didactic, although they do ostensibly claim such engagement. 
By the time we reach the abortion melodrama, both time and genre have completely removed the 
last vestiges of the scientifically didactic, and, thereby, the last vestiges of both the verbal and 
visual rhetorics of choice.  
 The second trajectory I posit is an increasing disconnect between pro-choice popular 
morality and anti-choice prescribed morality as seen in the visual and verbal rhetorics of choice. 
This disconnect is evidenced by an eventual collapse of the distinction between prescribed and 
popular morality as it is represented in contraception/abortion films. While social problem 
contraception/abortion films use ambiguity to indicate a distinction between popular and 
prescribed morality, abortion exploitation films contend to maintain this separation even as they 
weaken it through their contradictory narratives. Abortion melodramas fold the popular into the 
prescribed: while they represent women who choose abortion, they also make these women seem 
like the exception to the moral norm. Ultimately, American contraception and abortion films in 
the interwar period illustrate a consistently decreasing engagement with choice both topically 
and visually as the Production Code attempts to reinscribe old conceptions of gender hierarchy 
onto the reproductively liberated modern woman. 
 Despite the Code’s influence during the mid-twentieth century, Hollywood abandons the 
Production Code within 16 years of Burstyn v. Wilson and replaces it in 1968 with a ratings 
system very similar to the one still in use today. With the strictures of the Code lifted, one might 
theorize that there would be a significant change for the progressive in terms of the treatment of 
subjects like contraception and abortion. While a comprehensive analysis of the continued verbal 
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and visual rhetoric of the contraception/abortion film would be vast enough to warrant a separate 
study, Kelly Oliver’s recent work on representations of pregnancy in contemporary Hollywood 
film indicates that post-Code films do not offer quite the picture of progressiveness that we 
might anticipate. She argues that “pregnancy and pregnant bodies have gone from shameful and 
hidden to sexy and spectacular,” and bringing pregnancy out of the shadows in Hollywood film 
can be seen as a positive development since the Code era (although, as Oliver notes, there are 
still many attendant problems with “sexy and spectacular”) (Oliver 2). However, she complicates 
these assertions by suggesting that “if we look closer, we can also see how these seemingly new 
stories repeat traditional ideas about abject maternal bodies, conventional notions of family 
values, familiar anxieties over women’s reproduction, and fears of miscegenation” (Oliver 2). 
Oliver’s argument would suggest that, from the wide array of films in her study, although 
pregnancy has become more visible, it does not inherently follow that representations thereof 
have become more progressive.  
 The recent boom in Hollywood movies explicitly treating the experience of pregnancy—
particularly unplanned, unwanted pregnancy—is undeniable: for example, consider films like 
Juno (2007), Knocked Up (2007), Waitress (2007), Quinceañera (2006), Saved! (2004), Kill Bill: 
Volumes 1 and 2 (2003, 2004), to name just a few. Despite the fact that the female protagonists 
neither plan nor are particularly excited about the prospect of pregnancy and motherhood, 
abortion does not arise as a serious option. With specific regard to abortion in contemporary 
Hollywood film, Oliver criticizes the disturbing pattern of films co-opting pro-choice rhetoric in 
order to make continuing with one’s pregnancy—and not aborting it—the “choice” that female 
characters make: “Even while these films embrace a woman’s right to choose, they still expect 
women to choose babies and not abortions” because “they are expected to make the right choice, 
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which is always to have their baby” (Oliver 11, emphasis original). Furthermore, despite the fact 
that political arguments over women’s reproductive rights occur frequently and openly, these 
arguments seldom make it into Hollywood films. Even Alexander Payne’s Citizen Ruth (1996), 
which refreshingly pokes fun at both the pro-life and pro-choice camps, slyly weasels its way out 
of any actual political statement. Firstly, the film’s antihero is a pregnant-yet-emaciated-looking 
woman (Laura Dern) who demonstrates, as Oliver notes, a “strict, if unspoken, code that 
abortions and fetuses cannot be shown in conjunction with the visibly pregnant bodies that they 
may inhabit” (90).  Secondly, the film ends with pro-life and pro-choice activists fighting to win 
the pregnant Ruth—an economically disadvantaged, spray paint-huffing, self-interested 
delinquent—as the poster woman for their respective causes. However, unbeknownst to any of 
them, Ruth already chose no side but her own: she secretly miscarried and skips town with a 
duffel bag full of cash—maybe to begin a new, reformed life, but maybe to continue her familiar, 
destructive one. Either way, Citizen Ruth uses miscarriage as a means for both Ruth and the film 
itself to conveniently avoid having to make a choice at all.  
 One of the few films in recent—very recent—years to meaningfully engage with the 
subject of abortion is Gillian Robespierre’s Obvious Child (2009, 2014). Obvious Child began in 
2009 as a short film in which its protagonist, twenty-something Brooklyn everywoman Donna 
Stern (Jenny Slate),102 has casual sex and becomes pregnant. Instead of following a standard plot 
option that would avoid and/or vilify abortion, Robespierre took an entirely new tack: her 
protagonist chooses abortion, and after the man from her fling accompanies her to the procedure, 
they go out on a date. Here, Robespierre describes the impetus behind Obvious Child in 
Filmmaker Magazine in 2011: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102 Slate plays the character of Donna in both the short and feature versions.  
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 After years of watching films that featured unplanned pregnancies ending in childbirth 
 (Juno, Knocked Up, Waitress, etc.), we became disenchanted with the way young 
 women’s experiences with pregnancy were being represented in the media. With Obvious 
 Child we wanted to tell a story of a strong, funny woman who easily makes the decision  
            to have an abortion without feeling guilty or traumatized. (Robespierre) 
She also describes the film as a “romantic comedy”: hardly the description one would give to any 
of the transitional and Code era abortion films that I have examined (Robespierre).103 Based 
upon the success of the film short, the IFP granted Robespierre funding to turn Obvious Child 
into a feature-length film; the feature of the same name premiered at the 2014 Sundance Festival. 
Robespierre’s film—and its title, especially—perhaps hint at a more contemporary version of the 
kind of representation of choice we have not seen since Lois Weber’s Where Are My Children?: 
for Donna, the choice to carry through with her pregnancy and have a child is not obvious at all. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103 Oliver does, however, devote her second chapter to the momcom: romantic comedies about 
pregnancy.  
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